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Objective of the study 
This thesis examines how private equity investors employ management control systems in strategy 
implementation during their ownership of buyout targets. Private equity investments differ from 
industrial acquisitions in that they have a predefined lifespan, an intention and even a schedule to 
be sold further. Private equity funds also tend to have more complex governance structures. 
However, management control systems in private equity investing have gained scarce attention 
among academic research. Notably, there is a lack of longitudinal single case studies sensitive to 
actual context of private equity and its contingent factors. The research illustrates the lifespan of a 
cleantech fund and uses Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control framework to analyze, how private equity 
investor implemented strategy into the target companies by using management control systems. 
Distinctive motivation behind this research is the expansion of scope from governance of a single 
buyout company to a wider private equity context. This scope is sensitive to factors that potentially 
influenced management control systems beyond the boundaries of a single target company. 
Method and framework 
The research adopts a longitudinal, retrospective single case approach together with an exceptional 
method of systematic combining. Systematic combining differs from traditional linear approach by 
its non-linear, continuous back and forth integration of theory and empirical observations in order 
to match theory and reality. It is appropriate for research on subjects that have slight body of existing 
research. Expansion of research scope in aforementioned way raised the need to integrate additional 
and relevant theoretical insights into the framework. Consequently, literature reviews on private 
equity and management control systems were complemented with theoretical concepts that shed 
light on entrepreneurship, ownership and capabilities. 
Findings 
This research generated multiple findings and insights. Generally, management control systems 
supported alignment of the whole fund with the perceptions and wishes of the original investors. 
The examined fund management implemented management control systems and especially 
interactive controls in remarkably various ways for a growth business. The case demonstrates how 
management control systems were not designed and used in isolation from factors such as 
ownership, parent organization and capabilities. Parent company and its customers as potential 
investors were taken into account in early formulation of beliefs and boundary systems. 
Furthermore, the fund had a distinct investment “philosophy” with indirect implications for 
diagnostic and interactive control systems. Private equity buyout research also has a tendency of 
limiting scope to single organizations. Such scope limits realization of investor’s potential. Notably, 
this exceptional case illustrates how private equity investor had a comprehensive entrepreneurial 
plan that defined exploration and orchestration of resources acquired through buyouts. 
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1 Introduction 
Management control systems (MCS) in Private Equity (PE) investments have gained relatively 
scarce attention. Conventional MCS frameworks (e.g. Simons 1995) focus on strategy 
implementation and internal strategic renewal of rather mature industrial organizations. The 
term “private” in PE stands for the opposite of being listed in public stock exchange. PE 
investing implies active ownership and is often related and even mixed with the term Venture 
Capital (VC). Certain characteristics deviate typical PE investments apart from operational and 
even strategic investment projects of industrial organizations that fit into aforementioned MCS 
literature. Whereas industrial organizations typically invest without a predefined intention to 
sell assets further (Barber & Goold 2007), buyouts under PE ownership have a predefined 
lifespan (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). Thus, PE investments cannot be related to all acquisitions 
by default. Another difference is the degree or even nature of influence. It is suggested that PE 
ownership without intention to hold would not be suitable to integrate and build synergies 
between investment targets (Barberg & Goold 2007). 
Implementation of strategy and maintaining its renewal in PE setting differs from conventional 
MCS literature that focuses on single organizations and takes their senior managers as the 
highest authority of control. Typically, PE investments are organized by a PE fund that governs 
its portfolio companies (Gilligan & Wright 2008, 18). In such case, implementation of MCS 
needs to flow across formal organizational boundaries. Furthermore, factors beyond the 
boundaries of the target companies may potentially influence MCS practices of strategy 
implementation. However, only few papers explicitly integrate comprehensive MCS 
frameworks such as Levers of Control (LOC) of Simons (1995) into buyout research or even 
issues of ownership in the first place. Due to slight body of research, there are various aspects 
related to the use of MCS in PE investing that define a fruitful research space. 
The rest of the introduction part will be structured as follows. First, existing literature, its 
limitations and potential research space will be discussed more specifically. Second, objectives 
of this research will be defined. Third, exceptional method of systematic combining that was 
used in this single case research will be introduced. Fourth, the structure of this thesis will be 
presented. 
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1.1 Background and research space 
As mentioned above, few studies on MCS and PE do exist. Bruining et al. (2004) examine 
strategy change in four buyout cases by using LOC. The use of more than one case enables 
comparisons and ground for diverse findings. Aforementioned authors find evidence that 
buyout managers undertake efforts to balance “traditional” control systems with “newer” 
systems that stimulate opportunity-seeking and learning. Equivalent levers are also present in 
research of Nisar (2009) that examines the evolution of MCS in leveraged buyouts. The author 
applied both qualitative and quantitative methods with a larger number of buyout samples. 
Findings demonstrate variety of specific outcomes which can be tied to contingent factors such 
as cost leadership and differentiation strategies. Worth noting is that quantitative samples 
describe attributes of MCS in a certain point of time. Despite having qualitative depth, 
aforementioned cases are not constructing a longitudinal path of strategy implementation with 
MCS. Furthermore, common for these studies is their limited focus on MCS attributes of the 
target company. Precisely said, scope has typically been limited to regard separate target 
company as a unit of analysis. 
Consequently, numerous aspects of MCS in buyout context have not yet been researched. 
Changes and even retention of MCS practices are results of managerial activities. Based on 
above mentioned papers we do know tentative links between certain contingent factors and 
MCS attributes in buyout context. However, these factors are closely related to buyout 
companies under examination. The role of PE setting involving potential general and limited 
partner investors remain little studied. Despite the topic of the paper by Nisar (2009), 
"Evolution of Management Control Systems in Leveraged Buyouts", there remains lack of in-
depth longitudinal research on the development of MCS in PE buyout context. 
Bruining et al. (2004) recalls more longitudinal studies on the subject. Even the common 
practice of having separate single companies as units of analysis may hinder aspects of MCS 
and their role for investment directors governing target companies. In a recent quantitative 
analysis on management practices of PE owned firms, Bloom et al. (2015) have a similar 
caution. They recall that identified superior management of PE owned firms could come 
entirely from purchasing well-managed firms, rather than improving their management over 
time. Arguably, this also implies the need for longitudinal and case-specific studies. 
Quantitative studies have helped to form a general picture of PE practices, but the actual active 
ownership and influence in target companies still remains to a great extent a black box. 
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1.2 Objectives 
The research question of this thesis has been summarized briefly in the following sentence:  
How do PE investors employ MCS in strategy implementation  
during their ownership of buyout targets? 
More comprehensively, the purpose of this research is to examine MCS in PE context in a way 
that contributes to the research space identified above. The empirical setting will involve a 
single case of a PE fund that is a branch of a larger asset management group. As defined, the 
focus will be laid on strategy implementation by the PE investors during their ownership period 
of the buyout targets. Deviating from existing research on the subject, single case research 
enables in-depth and longitudinal approach to MCS in PE buyouts. Thus, one objective is that 
of constructing a robust description of the path behind examined PE fund, its investments and 
strategy implementation. Distinctive for this research is the expansion of scope from 
governance of a single buyout company to a wider PE setting. Single case examination is 
sensitive to factors of the PE setting that potentially influence MCS beyond the boundaries of 
the target companies. In addition to analyzing interrelations between the PE fund management 
and the target companies, parent company of the PE investors and its customers as investors 
are closely linked to the setting. Furthermore, PE fund management may have particular 
capabilities and approaches to investing that can be seen from MCS practices. At this point, 
worth noting as a clarification is that this research still emphasizes the MCS within the PE fund 
and not the MCS of the department of PE investors within the asset management company. 
Despite the few existing studies on MCS in PE buyouts, preliminary literature does not provide 
sufficient examples of in-depth research with similar scope. Thus, this gap also imposes the 
need to construct theoretical framework beyond existing PE and MCS literature to match with 
the empirical case. 
Research space can be motivated by analyzing interrelations of existing theories and 
contemporary development. As mentioned already, literature linking MCS to PE or even 
ownership is notably scarce. As a result of applied research method of systematic combining, 
this research builds theoretical framework further in order to describe empirical case more 
accurately. Consequently, contemporary theoretical concepts related to ownership and resource 
orchestration will be introduced. To some extent, their theoretical roots have been introduced 
as well. Essentially the approaches of entrepreneurial judgment (Foss & Klein 2012) and 
dynamic capabilities (Teece 1997; 2007; 2012) will be utilized. 
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1.3 Method 
To examine the use of MCS in PE buyouts, and more specifically, to expand scope from single 
organization to a wider setting of PE investing, the research will be conducted as a longitudinal, 
retrospective single case study applying systematic combining. As implied in the objective of 
this research, lack of existing studies with similar scope imposes a need to develop framework 
to match empirical case. The method of systematic combining has been chosen primarily for 
the reason that it enables incremental development of framework that is sensitive to the 
particular empirical case. Systematic combining differs from traditional linear approach by its 
non-linear, continuous back and forth integration of theory and empirical observations in order 
to match theory and reality (Dubois & Gadde 2002). As described by the authors, constant 
matching of framework will occur during research, when new insights arise from empirical 
world. Again, framework directs the search for empirical data. Furthermore, observations may 
lead to unanticipated discoveries with further implications. Case studies provide unique 
opportunities to develop theory and utilize in-depth insights of empirical phenomena and their 
contexts. (Ibid.)  Furthermore, single case research and systematic combining enable extensive 
attention to longitudinal and context-specific issues implied in the research question. 
The unit of research is a single PE fund managed by an asset management company. Typically, 
PE funds consist of numerous idiosyncratic targets, which should provide multiple units of 
research. In this case, however, level of analysis will be the whole fund of interrelated units. 
Justification for this fund-level examination will be discussed further in the method chapter. 
Furthermore, single case method and systematic combining can be supported by various 
notions emerging from case-specific issues, theoretical framework and preliminary 
methodological literature as well. These underlying notions will be introduced in the method 
part as well. 
This research employs different sources of data. Interviews are the primary sources that enable 
to shed light on interrelations, perceptions and experiences on aspects found from other data 
sources. Altogether, four persons were interviewed. These persons were selected by their 
relevance to strategy implementation in the examined case fund. Other data sources include 
informant documentations about organization policies and accountabilities, Power Point 
presentations on investor materials and strategic plans, spreadsheet valuations and financial 
new, to name few. Diverse data sources support triangulation. In systematic combining, it not 
only supports checking results, but contributes to discovery (Dubois & Gadde 2002). 
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1.4 Structure 
This thesis will be structured as follows. The framework part will be introduced next. It defines 
relevant literature and concepts for PE and MCS. Furthermore, as a result of the systematic 
combining method applied in the research, additional theoretical concepts will be integrated 
into the framework. Based on PE and MCS literature together with new concepts, a synthesis 
part will be constructed. Interrelations and potential applications of these elements will be 
discussed in it.  
Framework will be followed by the method part. Research will be positioned, and details of 
the setting and the research space will be specified. Essentially, research design and 
longitudinal research process by using the exceptional method of systematic combining will be 
introduced comprehensively. Additionally, justification for method will be enhanced by 
introducing views from the relevant framework literature that recall more case studies on 
subjects in question. Reliability and validity issues of the research will be taken into account 
in an own topic as well. 
Case will be introduced together with an integrated analysis. First, the case company and the 
PE setting will be described. Second, historical path of the fund strategy implementation 
originating from the imagined business opportunity and exploration of suitable target 
companies will be introduced and analyzed. Third, MCS of higher order will be examined by 
using LOC and revised framework. Fourth, activities that were stated in strategic planning 
materials of the fund are being examined. These activities that were used in strategy 
implementation with more operational relevance will be analyzed in light of MCS. 
Additionally, other elements of the framework will be applied in the analysis as well. 
Essential findings of the case and analysis part will be discussed in the actual discussion part. 
First, MCS will be discussed in the particular PE context. Second, general tendencies of the 
use of MCS by the examined PE fund will be identified and positioned against the literature. 
Third, activities that implement intended strategic plan will be discussed in light of MCS. 
Furthermore, identified processes of dynamic capabilities will be linked to MCS research as 
well. Finally, there is a part for conclusions and implications that approaches the research 
findings from even more abstract level. This part includes theoretical and managerial 
implications, limits of the research and ideas for further research. 
 Framework 
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2 Framework 
The framework of this thesis consists of three literature review sections and a synthesis part. 
The first section introduces private equity (PE) literature and helps to understand the industry 
under case examination. The second section covers management control systems (MCS) as the 
major theoretical frame to be used in empirical analysis. The third section is formed by a 
diverse selection of relevant theoretical concepts from fundamental and contemporary 
organization science. These insights support matching empirical reality of PE investments 
further with theoretical understanding of MCS. Additionally, the fourth part aims to reflect 
aforementioned theoretical sections and serve as a guide for conducting research further. 
Construction process and relevance of the framework will be discussed more extensively later 
in the method part. 
 
   
 Framework 
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2.1 Private Equity 
"Only by demystifying the PE phenomenon can we make the detailed case-by-case 
analyses needed to judge its strengths and weaknesses." 
Peter G. Klein, John L. Chapman, Mario P. Mondelli (Klein et al. 2013) 
2.1.1 Definition and characteristics 
As terms, Private Equity (PE) and Venture Capital (VC) have slightly varying purposes that 
require special attention. In very general level they both can be seen as umbrella terms 
describing transactions of private capital (not listed in public stock exchange). In such cases 
there is no distinction between PE and VC. In professional contexts, however, PE and VC are 
used to describe particular industries, mostly by the stages of target companies. For example, 
many general associations such as The European Private Equity and Venture Capital (EVCA), 
The British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and The Finnish Venture 
Capital Association (FVCA) relate to both categories, but emphasize only one in their letter 
abbreviations. In their PE handbook Gilligan & Wright (2008, 10) note that PE has no 
consistent definition. The authors mentioned that PE often covers VC investments in relatively 
early stage companies. The authors chose a definition that excluded VC and focused on more 
mature buyouts. Additionally, Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) notice that VC firms typically do 
not obtain majority control, whereas PE firms typically buy majority control of existing or 
mature firms. 
Wright et al. (2001a) has created a classification for different buyout types, implying different 
roles for VC and PE. This distinction can be supported empirically. Kelly (2012) examined 
drivers behind investment activities and the question, if PE and VC investors are really so 
different. The paper started from the idea that PE cannot be treated as a whole, but rather as a 
heterogeneous asset class. As a result, early stage VC and later stage buyout capital (PE) were 
examined separately. Findings conclude that clear differences do exist. Especially VC investors 
have been identified to invest in high-growth companies, whereas drivers of PE investors relate 
more to financial engineering. Apparently, aforementioned classifications resemble each other. 
Furthermore, Knigge, et al. (2006) have also found differences between the drivers of PE and 
VC performance. The former has found to be driven more by managerial experience, whereas 
sensitivity to market timing defines the latter. 
 Framework 
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Another empirical difference between PE and VC is active ownership. VC investors appear to 
be more heterogeneous according to their role in corporate governance. Elango et al. (1995) 
distinguish three types: "inactive", "active advice giving" and "hands-on" venture capitalists. 
Although, more recent research suggest that the variety of VC may vary depending on country-
specific institutional settings (Bruton et al., 2009). However, whereas VC investors may easily 
have limited involvement in early stage investments, PE investors that usually perform LBOs 
tend to strive for majority control (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). 
This thesis will apply the definition of PE favored by recent academic literature. Unless 
specified, PE will be used to describe non-quoted capital transactions of relatively later stage 
buyouts. Consequently, early stage VC will be ruled out from the definition. 
2.1.2 Transaction types 
In addition to differences between PE and VC, formal types of PE takeovers are often classified 
in academic literature. Major types are insider-driven and outside-driven buyouts. Their sub-
categories deserve short review, since the role of incumbent management has implications for 
the research. All types of buyouts imply ownership change, but not all imply changes in 
operating management. 
Figure 1. Summary of PE transaction types 
In insider-driven buyouts existing management takes control of the organization, sometimes 
together with a PE firm. Management buyouts (MBOs) and Management-led employee 
buyouts (MEBOs) represent this type. (Wood & Wright 2009) On the contrary, an outside-
driven buyout type called Management buy-in (MBI) implies management change (Robbie & 
Wright 1995). In such case management team will consists of outsiders. There is yet a 
possibility that a transaction will include elements of both insider- and outside-driven buyouts. 
This combination of MBI and MBO (BIMBO) will employ mix of expertise to overcome 
information asymmetry problems of MBI (Wood & Wright 2009). Other forms of outside-
Inside Outside 
MBO 
Management 
buyout 
MEBO 
Management-led 
employee buyout 
LBO 
Leveraged 
buyout 
IBO 
Institutional 
buyout 
BIMBO 
Hybrid 
MBI + MBO 
MBI 
Management 
Buy-in 
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driven buyouts are not defined by the role of incumbent management. Kaplan & Strömberg 
(2009) use Leveraged Buyouts (LBO) as a synonym for typical PE transactions. The name 
comes from the substantial amount of debt usually utilized in the transactions by PE firms. 
Institutional Buyouts (IBOs) mean buyouts conducted by an institutional investor such as a PE 
firm (Gilligan & Wright 2008, 97). Notably, LBOs and IBOs can often be related. Although 
there is no theoretical necessity for IBOs to require substantial leverage. 
This research focuses on outside-driven buyout category and emphasizes mainly IBOs/LBOs 
due to the substantial use of leverage. The role of incumbent management as owners has 
implications for governance and MCS. Instead of managers buying themselves independent, it 
is the outside-driven buyout, where new owner(s) constitute(s) an additional governance layer. 
Thus, the balance between empowerment and control becomes more important. 
2.1.3 PE as active ownership 
Private Equity is best understood as a form of active ownership. Jensen (1989) distinguished 
active and passive types of ownership, going so far as predicting the decline of traditional 
public firms and replacement by LBO associations representing the PE industry. To be more 
precise, by the term "active" I refer to those actions of shareholder that strive to influence 
corporate management and boards. Gillan & Starks (1998) define shareholder activism as a 
continuum of responses to corporate performance, emphasis being laid on the use of voice. The 
logic applies for both publicly listed and private companies. The definition implies that bare 
trade of shares, even being a frequent activity related to ownership change is not enough to 
make ownership "active" in the quoted sense. Review of the opposite "non-active" or passive 
ownership as a counterpart of active ownership will provide a useful contrast. Furthermore, 
discussion about Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and its critics help to realize the position 
and logic of active ownership typical for PE industry.  
2.1.3.1 Passive ownership 
Common portfolio investing is a typical form of passive ownership. Returns are result of 
buying, holding and selling stocks. Portfolio investors utilize general knowledge when trading 
publicly listed companies. According to the EMH (Fama 1970), efficiently functioning markets 
would immediately incorporate general information into stock prices. Thus, there should be no 
opportunities left for investors to gain extraordinary returns. This portfolio theory implies that 
rational investor should become a passive owner, invest in a diversified portfolio of stocks and 
merely hold them to gain risk-adjusted market returns. 
 Framework 
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EMH, its assumptions and their empirical validity have been thoroughly researched and 
discussed critically without clear conclusions. Certain points from the whole variety of 
literature are worth additional focus. Pasour (1989) suggests that EMH is an example of yet 
another static economic theory that neglects the role of entrepreneur and discovery process of 
market opportunities. EMH implies that general information should necessarily lead to 
homogeneous implications, thus equating access to information to profit. Shostak (1997) 
suggests that the major problem of EMH is its expectation of rational expectations forecast, 
which implies existence of a true intrinsic value. Thus, focusing on the market participants 
utilizing general information shifts attention from specific information and subjective 
opportunity discovery. Israel Kirzner (1973) defines entrepreneurship as individual alertness 
to profit opportunities not seen by others. Vital knowledge affecting the individual decision-
maker is not explicit (Pasour 1989). As Hayek (1945) noted, "there is a body of very important 
but unorganized knowledge" that of "the particular circumstances of time and place." 
EMH describes efficient asset valuation, the core performance driver of passive ownership. It 
implies that there would be no systematic opportunities to beat the markets by buying 
undervalued stocks and selling them further. Thus, EMH does not cover active ownership, 
which by definition involves owner's labor to leverage returns for committed capital. Owner's 
activity to participate in governance implies existence of a profit opportunity available for a 
combination of capital, labor and subjective judgment. It must be noted that EMH neglects the 
role on entrepreneur described above. Certain critics of EMH emphasize that financial markets 
cannot be distinguished from other markets, since all economic activities involve 
entrepreneurial opportunity discovery (Pasour 1989, Shostak 1997). 
2.1.3.2 Active ownership 
Active and "non-active" (passive) ownership should not be treated literally as complete 
counterparts. Rather, active ownership brings additional elements and complexity into 
consideration. Income of an active owner has two sources. First, equal to passive owners, active 
owners can benefit from identifying and buying potential undervalued companies. Second, 
unique to active owner is the chance to increase value through influential governance. Whereas 
passive owners seek to employ superior knowledge in their transactions, active owners in a 
sense aim to create that valuable information themselves. Studies (e.g. Becht et al. 2009) 
indicate that influential shareholder activism, rather than picking right companies, can 
outperform passive peers. 
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There is an opportunity cost of labor for an investor if one chooses to become an active owner. 
This costly effort must have a potential to lever return to committed equity enough to break 
even with direct labor and the expected returns of passive ownership. Mere superior return rate 
is not sufficient to bring advantages. It is the absolute return, which depends on the volume of 
capital invested by an active owner. Furthermore, there is yet another reason for ownership 
stake to be relatively significant. Larger ownership stake ensures power to influence and 
implement own ideas. Thus, efforts are more easily realized in outcomes and ready to be 
capitalized. PE investors as typical active owners usually have majority ownership in their 
target companies (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
Figure 2. Cost and benefit analysis of ownership types 
Figure 2 above demonstrates conditions and payoff of active ownership through a 
simplification of two scenarios. First, it is assumed in the example above that the investment 
generates returns with a positive rate. Shareholder activism will be equivalent to a fixed amount 
of labor and thus a fixed opportunity cost. In turn, there are no comparable costs involved in 
the case of passive ownership. Furthermore, shareholder activism is assumed to have a positive 
impact, an ability to lever up return rate for committed equity capital. With these assumptions, 
there will be a break-even point where returns for active ownership exceed returns for passive 
ownership. Thus, the more there will be committed capital, the more profitable will active 
ownership become compared to passive ownership. Worth noting is the limited ability of the 
Invested capital 
Absolute returns 
Cost of owner’s activity 
Passive owner 
Active owner 
0 
Break-even  
point 
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model to capture dynamic reality. Potential and easiness to have impact on the target company 
depends on the governance power based on equity stake. 
Both sources of income, returns for holding assets (passive ownership) and levering returns for 
additional value-increasing activities (active ownership) are entrepreneurial in a sense that they 
include profit opportunities to discover. First, potentially undervalued target companies must 
be identified. Since the future is uncertain, opportunities will be assumed to exist. Existence is 
not equal to recognition, since opportunity discovery may depend on specific knowledge not 
available to everyone. Second, potential target companies do not need to be undervalued, if 
only the bidder has enough potential to create value. These opportunities are present in firm-
specific attributes, which require governance and managerial decisions to be seized. Again, 
opportunity discovery can depend on specific knowledge. In this sense public financial markets 
are no different than other markets, such as market for corporate control. 
2.1.3.3 Comparison 
Differences between active ownership and more common forms of ownership, such as portfolio 
investing, have been recognized. The nature of PE, where potential buyout targets need to be 
searched outside the exchange of quoted companies decreases the explanatory power of EMH 
and traditional portfolio theory in this context. Such cases involve specific information, which 
is costly to acquire. Gilligan & Wright (2008, 22) concludes that before transaction decisions 
PE funds can access to private information. On the contrary, public transactions involve only 
public information equally available for all. The same applies after the deal has been made. PE 
managers receive frequently sensitive information, while quoted equity investors only receive 
public information. 
Adopting the view that the future is uncertain (Knight 1921), returns and costs of acquiring 
information cannot be foreseen and defined ex ante. Therefore an idea of an objective state of 
equilibrium is merely a misleading thinking tool. Uncertainty implies that expectations and 
perceptions of opportunities depend on individuals using judgment on resource allocation. 
Describing such a way of thinking or acting Foss & Klein (2012) use a term "entrepreneurial 
judgment", with a distinction to mere opportunity discovery mentioned above. Notions of EMH 
neglecting the role of entrepreneurial judgment apply in case of public stock exchange. More 
explicitly, the importance of entrepreneurial judgment gains strength in PE industry relying 
more on unique perceptions made of private, specific information. 
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2.1.3.4 Relevance of MCS 
Arguably, variety of MCS will be more relevant in PE than in VC investing. As discussed 
earlier, VC investors may have more passive and advice-giving roles when compared to 
generally active PE owners. Especially in cases of LBOs, funding arrangements are inflexible. 
Furthermore, when startups grow, more emphasis will be laid on control systems (Simons 
1995, 128). These distinctions imply that PE investors would be generally more responsible 
for balancing both empowerment and control. Thus, compared to VC or the abstract definition 
of PE, there is yet more relevance for the use of MCS in PE investments, when the term has 
been understood as a definition of later stage buyouts. 
Active owners can be expected to use MCS in various purposes. The possibility that PE 
investors understand aspects of MCS and consider them already in target evaluation phase and 
due diligence cannot be neglected from straight hand. Practices involved in governance and 
MCS become central tools for active owners to influence firm-specific attributes as discussed. 
Rather than realizing ownership and governance as a unidirectional top-down flow, a circular 
model of Connelly et al. (2010) will be adopted. Thus, ownership is not just exogenous, but 
firm-specific attributes affect different investors' willingness to take stakes. 
2.1.4 Ownership flexibility and influence 
Barber & Goold (2007) use a matrix for classifying ownership of business units by the degrees 
to hold and influence. Traditional idea of a business is a specialized industry focusing on the 
core production. Such companies "buy to keep". Either they identify long-term prospects or 
valuable resources to utilize, integrate and build synergies between existing operations. The 
opposite logic of intentional holding is "buying to sell". PE funds are demonstrated as a typical 
form of such category. Such investors influence, but do not try to integrate businesses into any 
greater whole. The businesses need to remain stand-alone in order to become sold in the future. 
PE funds usually have a pre-determined life cycle, which restricts the most flexible use of 
assets. 
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Table 1. Ownership types (Barber & Goold 2007) 
There is an intermediate form between "buying to sell" and "buying to keep" owners. This 
"flexible" owner type is not literally intermediate, but rather a rich combination of both two 
aforementioned types. Unlike investors that buy to sell, flexible ownership has no exit plan. It 
can be integrated or combined into another whole as well as remained independent like the 
targets of PE funds. Not all sectors of the matrix will be covered, since benefits come from 
complementary attributes. For example temporary ownership and long term integration would 
be an obvious mismatch. 
Arguably, PE as a form of active ownership can be found from two sectors in the matrix. By 
definition, active ownership includes influence. Thus, bare "invest" column in the matrix will 
not meet the conditions. PE can be found from the matrix as a combination of "buy to sell" and 
"invest and influence" intentions. In addition to the original position set by the authors, similar 
buyouts can be conducted by conglomerates too. This requires that such diversified firms have 
a flexible ownership mentality instead of permanent one. 
Despite the usefulness of the matrix to demonstrate and classify differences between owners, 
it simplifies buyouts. One should be cautious when ruling out the possibility to build synergies 
and integrate businesses in PE industry. Asset stripping has often been perceived as a typical 
activity of PE investors (e.g. Kester & Luehrman 1995; Barber & Goold 2007; Gilligan & 
Wright 2008, 53; Klein et al. 2013). Although, there is no reason to neglect the need for 
complementary investments involved in strategic redirection or operational improvements. 
Active mutual 
funds 
Index funds, 
Public companies 
Hedge funds, 
Private Equity 
Public companies Public companies 
Conglomerates, 
unexploited 
opportunities for 
public companies 
No opportunities 
for investment 
Limited 
opportunities 
for investment 
Buy to sell 
Flexible 
ownership 
Buy  
to keep 
Invest Invest and 
influence 
Invest, influence and 
build synergies 
 Framework 
 
 15  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are potential means for combining a bundle of required resources. 
The question is merely that of business entity or unit of analysis. Focusing on actual business 
to be divested, matrix remains reasonable. For a PE investor of conglomerate to perform exit, 
businesses are more easily sold if they have high independence for core functions. 
2.1.5 Buyout investors in practice 
Typical form of private equity investor is a buyout fund, where capital comes off the balance 
sheet from limited partners (Wruck 2008, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Klein et al. 2013). Thus, 
the buyout firm with its managers will represent the general partner. Typically this kind of fund 
has a predefined life cycle. There is an inherent intention to sell target companies in order to 
release committed capital and perform an exit (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). Thus, the 
temporary nature of ownership is inherent to PE funds. Managing general partner collects a 
fixed percentage of annual management fees and an additional performance-based fee called 
"carried interest", a portion of residual income. 
 
Figure 3. Structure of PE investments (Gilligan & Wright 2008, 18) 
In Figure 3, Gilligan & Wright (2008, 18) describes the structure of a typical PE fund. The 
fund is primarily owned by the limited partners, who benefit from the residual income, capital 
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gains, dividends and interest after the PE fund has collected management fees and carried 
interest schemes. 
In contrast, a diversified company or so called conglomerate has typically no predefined life 
cycle nor management fees. The performance of subsidiaries has a direct impact on the parent 
company, thus constituting a straightforward setting for corporate governance. Although, 
diversified companies tend to have more management layers in hierarchical structure, making 
flat private equity funds seem more like private conglomerates (Klein et al. 2013). If the PE 
firm as a general partner invests its own funds along with limited partners, then the PE fund 
slightly combines elements of conglomerate form. For example, if gathering funds from limited 
partners takes time, it might be reasonable for the PE firm to fund the sudden buyout 
opportunity temporarily with equity of the parent company. Thus, in theory it is not impossible 
for a PE firm to utilize elements of more flexible conglomerate form in a tactic way. 
Private equity investors are usually temporary owners who have specialized in certain activities 
that create value. Such activities might be restructuring of organizational resources, financial 
arrangements and adoption of new management systems (Wruck 2008). Temporary ownership 
implies that PE investors have a comparative advantage in certain activities. As long as the 
active owners can contribute value creation through their advantage, they have incentives to 
hold the firm. Since owner activity is a scarce resource, capability of increasing value through 
ownership should be constantly examined based on the ideas of comparative advantage and 
also the opportunity cost of capital. Rather than becoming passive, active owner will eventually 
need to release the capital and realize the value increase through an exit. Following this cycle 
PE investor can focus on new opportunities based on one’s own comparative advantage. 
2.1.6 Buyout types 
Buyouts can take different forms according to the capabilities and opportunities identified by 
the investor. To structure the variety, Wright et al. (2001a) suggest a matrix according to 
purpose and mindset. They constitute four different buyout types: efficiency, revitalization, 
entrepreneurial and failure buyouts. One important notion is that not all buyouts are necessarily 
focusing on control and the efficient use of resources, but innovation. Thus, the purpose is 
either "efficiency" or "revitalization". Efficiency means incremental, operational 
improvements in internal processes. Revitalization emphasizes orientation to external market 
forces, through changes in business logic. Innovation can be moderate or radical. It will be 
manifested in the mindset between managerial and entrepreneurial ones. 
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Table 2. Buyout types, simplified from Wright et al. (2001a) 
Efficiency buyout in the first quadrant applies managerial mindset in order to improve 
efficiency. Opportunities for efficiency gains exist typically when owners and managers have 
misaligned incentives and control mechanisms. Typically, such problems are a result of little 
managerial ownership, substantial equity funding and little monitoring role or absence of 
institutional investors. Such factors easily allow managers to over-diversify and overinvest. 
Buyout provides means for improving incentive systems such as performance schemes or 
managerial equity. Managerial business leaders are likely to respond positively to monetary 
incentives. Buyout firms with their concentrated ownership stake often provide active oversight 
on target companies. High leverage typical for LBOs places pressure on managers to avoid 
bold and unrelated investment projects. (Wright et al. 2001a) 
The second quadrant describes revitalization buyout. It has a moderately innovative purpose 
by incorporating managerial mindset. This type differs from efficiency buyout by emphasizing 
longer term incentives. Revitalization buyout may emerge when a firm lies in a weak 
competitive position and requires incremental upgrades or incremental innovation. Divisions 
of large integrated firms may face bureaucratic approaches that stifle initiatives and innovation 
resulting in underinvestments. When a division is peripheral to the parent's product line and 
core competencies, business unit may suffer from underinvestments. In order to perform 
successful revitalization buyouts, PE investors may need to acquire skills beyond their core 
financial monitoring skills. High leverage typical for efficiency buyouts may even constrain 
managers from engaging in innovations. Empowerment often involves responsibility in the 
form of managerial equity. (Wright et al. 2001a) 
(1) Efficiency buyout 
Low risk. Value increase by treating 
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and inefficiency. Emphasis on 
systematic data, financial criteria and 
utilization of leverage. 
(4) Failure buyout 
Mismatch of mindset, incentives and 
governance: entrepreneurial mindset 
combined with efficiency-seeking 
management practices. 
(2) Revitalization buyout 
Moderate risk. Value increase by 
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discretion and flexible leverage. 
(3) Entrepreneurial buyout 
Venture capital. Value increase 
comes by fostering strategic 
innovation in flat and flexible 
organization. Long-term incentives 
and managerial discretion. 
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Entrepreneurial buyout in the third quadrant involves strategic innovations and identification 
of growth opportunities that require an entrepreneurial mindset. Such opportunities may exist 
in case of misaligned incentives and frustration resulting in "entrepreneurial release". Another 
buyout opportunity called "busted tech" exists when a technology-based business has run into 
problems. Whereas managerial buyouts focus on monitoring and minimization of downside, 
entrepreneurial release requires substantial emphasis on the upside potential. Managerial equity 
incentives and financial flexibility facilitate a longer-term view. Busted tech buyouts usually 
suffer from absence of governance mechanisms. Dominant entrepreneurial founders with their 
unique decision-making style may pose problems in advancing the business. An individual 
may have suitable skills at the early stages of the business, but not to its later development. PE 
investors may provide different decision orientation and managerial capabilities. (Wright et al. 
2001a) 
Failure buyout of the fourth quadrant is a mismatch of mindset and purpose. PE investors may 
apply control mechanisms that appear to be inappropriate. Entrepreneurial managers may 
become frustrated with control mechanisms. Managerial responsiveness to financial control 
systems may not be easily judged before the buyout has been conducted. (Wright et al. 2001a) 
This potential asymmetry of information between management and investors taking place 
before buyouts relates to the central research purpose of this thesis. The use of MCS might be 
realized and their concepts can be utilized even before closing a buyout deal. 
2.1.7 Different approaches to PE 
PE industry has gained attention and heated discussion among the public, as well as guided 
focus of the researchers to trace sources for value creation in buyouts. Generally, there exists 
a distinction between downside and upside approaches. PE investors' potential to create value 
has usually been linked to treatment of downside effects, such as agency issues. Efficiency 
gains or cost reductions can also be categorized as reduction of downside (e.g. Wright 2001b), 
following the logic that upside refers to growth in revenue or more strategic opportunity 
exploitation. It must be noted that the distinction may appear ambiguous and misleading to 
some extent. Efficiency gains or cost reductions may emerge from restructuring that involves 
creativity and alertness to opportunities. Same processes and capabilities may bring 
improvements in areas that are categorized both downside and upside. However, there have 
been conflicting views on the sources and justification of value creation in PE deals. 
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Active ownership of PE investors has diverse effects on companies and their various 
stakeholders. At this point, findings and interpretations remain diverse. PE firms play an 
essential role in leveraged buyouts where they have a tendency to reach out for majority control 
in firms with adequate maturity (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). This typically results in changes 
in governance of the target companies. PE firms may develop corporate codes and reduce 
agency problems (Cumming et al. 2007). Moreover, monitoring of management is likely to be 
improved alongside with new compensation models and possibly highly leveraged capital 
structures (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). Connelly et al. (2010) find leverage having a 
motivating effect on careful capital allocation. On the other hand, Klein et al. (2013) points 
that debt leverage decreases managerial discretion and "entrepreneurial" initiatives. Whereas 
PE investors have found to increase returns to shareholders, results have indicated reduced 
innovations as well (Cumming et al. 2007). Furthermore, Wruck (2008) suggests that leverage 
has only a secondary role when compared to the four of the successful principles behind PE: 
(1) small board of directors with significant equity ownership, (2) decentralized decision-
making, (3) adoption of new performance measures that emphasize cash flow and long-run 
value, and (4) engineering of compensation system. 
2.1.7.1 Downside approach and agency theory 
Originally, sources of value creation in PE investments have emphasized superior treatment of 
downside issues. In early buyout literature Jensen (1989) emphasized agency perspectives so 
that he even made a prediction that publicly held corporations that typically suffer from conflict 
between owners and managers over cash flow, should become outdated. Typical benefit of 
LBO model is the flexibility of active ownership to align managerial incentives with the 
interests of owners. Managerial equity stakes and substantial use of leverage are classical 
examples of such control mechanisms. Even though publicly held corporations have not lost 
their substantial role after almost three decades since the prediction, the weight of 
aforementioned agency issues to explain value creation associated with PE investments 
remains significant in literature. 
Downside explanations of value creation in PE buyouts and the growing significance of the 
industry have raised concern, if the short-term gains are generated at the expense of long-term 
profitability. Researchers have found some evidence behind these views. Hall (1990) suggests 
that PE firms have little incentive to favor long-term investment opportunities of buyout 
companies. PE firms have been accused of reducing contributions to innovations and 
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stakeholders, such as employees and even broader society. Skeptic views have been expressed, 
if PE investors really invest in management practices. However, the views stated in buyout 
literature are not parallel. Employees can as well benefit from secure jobs and possible 
increased employment resulting from more viable businesses improved by reduced agency 
costs and capabilities. Moreover, international evidence indicates about improved work 
practices, efforts to adapt into cultural context and realize the potential of human capital in 
buyouts. (Bacon et al. 2012.) 
Findings of other researchers imply that claims of PE as short-termist and wealth-capturing 
appear radically simplifying the actual variety of the industry. Ughetto (2010) questions the 
common concern that buyouts would be simply associated with declines in innovation and 
R&D spending. Her results support the view that different types of investors with different 
objectives, policies and perspectives explain outcomes, for example leaning to the framework 
of buyout types of Wright et al. (2001a). Lerner et al. (2011) examine long-run investments of 
buyout companies and find them concentrating in important areas of innovative portfolios. The 
result implies that PE investors may apply strong strategic views on assets and capabilities, 
possibly with the use of control systems. 
2.1.7.2 Upside approach and entrepreneurial nature of PE 
There has been a strong tendency to expand PE research from downside emphasis of agency 
perspectives, cost reduction and financial engineering to upside growth and entrepreneurial 
aspects (Bruining & Verwaal 2005). It is suggested that buyouts can serve as a vehicle for 
strategic innovation and renewal that fosters upside growth opportunities. Buyouts provide a 
means to improve managerial and employee incentives and thus unlock resources that may 
have been blocked as a part of a large diversified organization or state-owned enterprise. 
Additionally, limitations of agency theory have been identified. Increased managerial 
ownership may cause entrenchment, increase managerial risk aversion and under-diversified 
portfolio for a manager, deviating managerial interests from those of owners. Agency theory is 
also limited in its power to comprehensively explain how incentives and monitoring should 
contribute to enhancing actual performance. (Wright et al. 2001b.)  
Bruining & Verwaal (2005) find that successful buyout managers cannot be regarded 
thoroughly entrepreneurial, but they combine the pursuit of opportunities with exploitation and 
control of their resources. Bruining et al. (2013) find that majority PE-backed buyouts 
significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices, while simultaneously developing 
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administrative practices as well. Worth noting here is the chosen particular definition of 
"entrepreneurship". The authors applied Stevenson's conceptualization of entrepreneurial 
management (adapted from Brown et al. 2001), emphasizing opportunity-seeking and flexible, 
non-hierarchical qualities. Thus, it is not equivalent to any other concepts of actual 
entrepreneur as a character or entrepreneurship as a category of action discussed this far. 
Rather than defining PE industry more "entrepreneurial", there have been attempts to construct 
a balanced view. Wruck (2008) discusses the market for corporate control and finds both PE 
and public ownership having own advantages against one another. PE firms are able to utilize 
effective governance and incentives. Publicly listed companies are able to bear risk due to 
diffuse ownership. They can also generate operational synergies. This is a benefit in riskier 
industries with significant economies of scale, requiring large, ongoing investments and 
infusions of equity. On the contrary, PE firms benefit from opposite circumstances: stable cash 
flows and modest investment requirements. Whereas PE investors typically perform radical 
changes in governance and management practices, performance suggests that public companies 
previously owned by PE investors do not completely revert to pre-buyout practices. Rather 
than remaining permanent owners, PE investors have a temporary reorganizing role for a 
limited time, bearing more resemblance to entrepreneurs than investment bankers or traders. 
This balanced role of PE has also been supported by Klein et al. (2013). Based on theoretical 
notions and empirical evidence that both support and oppose the view that PE would be 
unambiguously "entrepreneurial", they suggest that PE is better understood not as a financing 
method, but as a governance structure. 
2.1.8 Summary of Private Equity 
Whether it is academic or popular context, terms Private Equity (PE) and Venture Capital (VC) 
are not always used in a consistent manner. As justified in Private Equity part, I will apply the 
definition favored by recent academic literature. Thus, PE refers to more mature buyouts. 
Among different transaction types, PE industry has been associated to outside-driven leveraged 
buyouts (LBO). Private Equity is best understood as a form of active ownership, where owners 
put effort on influencing the firm. PE can be positioned between portfolio investors and 
industrial organizations by the notion that PE investors invest and influence, but do not 
generally build synergies. Buyout funds typically have pre-defined lifecycles making investing 
less flexible. Buyouts can also be conducted by diversified firms, conglomerates without such 
constraints. Four types of buyouts have been discussed: efficiency, revitalization, 
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entrepreneurial and failure. Effects of PE have raised concern and emerged a body of research, 
whose findings are not parallel. A trend in PE research to explain value creation from downside 
approach and agency theory has emerged to cover aspects of upside potential and 
entrepreneurial issues also. PE cannot be declared unambiguously entrepreneurial, but it is a 
form of governance that has potential for varying means of creating value. 
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2.2 Management Control Systems 
"Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent 
complexity of our behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the 
environment in which we find ourselves." 
Herbert Simon (Simon 1996, 110) 
2.2.1 Introduction to MCS 
Modern organizations of our time typically consist of employees working at different levels 
and on different tasks. This challenges senior management to ensure that actions are purposeful 
and performed within sufficient limits. Utilization of information and responsiveness are 
crucial in market competition. There is not only a challenge to measure and control certain 
aspects of business, but to align the whole organization with the competitive strategy in a 
consistent way. However, excessive control can easily constrain local level responsiveness and 
prevent strategic plan to remain sensitive to emerging initiatives. Management control systems 
(MCS) form an organizational framework for capturing this question of balance between 
empowerment and control, together with practical implications. 
2.2.2 Definition and characteristics 
Variety of definitions and concepts exist for MCS. Generally, some focus only on formal 
controls, whereas others expand their vision to cover informal systems also. Simons (1995, 5) 
defines MCS as "formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain 
or alter patterns in organizational activities". For Chenhall (2003), MCS include management 
accounting (MA) systems as "systematic use of MA to achieve some goal" and also "other 
controls such as personal and clan controls". Merchant & Van der Stede (2007) make a 
distinction between strategic and managerial control, an idea later utilized by Tessier & Otley 
(2012) in their conceptual development of Simons' (1995) seminal framework. Generally, MCS 
combine traditional ideals of control and stability with change, as well as enabling both short-
term and long-term objectives (Simons 1995, Nixon & Burns 2005, Malmi & Brown 2008) 
Notably, MCS terminology has not developed towards uniformity. Zimmermann (2001) 
divides decision-making and control. The former has a function of providing information to 
support decisions. Though, it is only the latter that directs employee behavior, referring to 
control. Flamholtz et al. (1985) see controls serving an important function of organizational 
goal congruence. Malmi & Brown (2008) suggest the use of MCS as a means to direct 
 Framework 
 
 24  
 
employee behavior, thus making a distinction between organizational controls and 
organizational control systems. The latter may include controls not only directed at employees, 
such as quality and inventory controls. MCS appears to be yet more complex, when analytical 
constructions are being contrasted with empirical reality. Requiring behavioral control for 
MCS implies that an accounting information system may or as well may not serve as a control 
system. Its functions and effects determine, if it can be called a control system. Thus, such 
systems cannot be classified as MCS by default, but only after observing the way how they are 
being used. Consequently, identification of MCS requires empirical rigidity and extensive 
attention to organizational structures and practices. 
Tessier & Otley (2012) identify ambiguity in the existing literature caused by failure to 
acknowledge difference between managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions 
of them. The latter represents interpretations of the purpose of MCS by the employees who are 
taking it as given. According to the authors’ perception, that is not a design attribute of the 
MCS. Although, even if these perceptions are not design attributes of MCS as such, they may 
play a crucial role in MCS design. Interaction and intertemporal learning process, for example, 
are likely to link these two aspects. However, aforementioned analytical distinction clarifies 
the way of identifying MCS practices in organizational environment. 
Above mentioned differences make uniform MCS research non-comparable and complicated. 
Malmi & Brown (2008) have recalled for consistency in further MCS literature by examining 
differences. They have gone further to suggest an own conceptualization of a MCS package. 
Yet, different alternatives such as Levers of Control by Simons (1995) have continued to live 
on in recent papers. For example, Tessier & Otley (2012) have discussed weaknesses found in 
the concepts of Simons' (1995) framework. Rather than abandoning the whole framework and 
adopting some other pre-existing one, they improved definitions and suggested a revised 
framework.  
2.2.2.1 MCS as a holistic package 
There has been a general tendency for MCS researchers to understand MCS as a holistic 
package. The first widely recognized conceptualization, "contingency theory" dates back to 
Otley (1980). Since then, further development has embodied in the works of Simons (1995), 
Ferreira and Otley (2006), Merchant & Van der Stede (2007) and Malmi & Brown (2008). 
Arguably, one central element of realizing MCS as a package is contingency, originally 
conceptualized by Otley (1980). It means that there are contingent, context-specific variables 
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which the organization cannot influence directly. Examples of such are technology, 
organization structure and environment. Rather, they need to be taken into account when 
designing management practices. (Otley 1980.) Thus, there is a need to fit MCS package with 
contingent variables in order to achieve desired ends (Fisher, 1998; Chenhall, 2003). 
Though, the only relation is not that between contingent variables and MCS, but those between 
the different systems within the MCS package (Fisher, 1998; Chenhall, 2003). Malmi & Brown 
(2008) second the idea that MCS do not operate in isolation. They concluded that the term 
"package" is important when demonstrating that different "systems" introduced by different 
interest groups do not holistically cover an entire system as a whole, but merely parts of the 
MCS package. Furthermore, the authors believe that treating MCS as a package contributes to 
identification of occasions where different control systems act as substitutes and complements 
in practice. (Ibid.) 
2.2.3 Levers of Control 
Figure 4. Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) 
Four “levers of control” (LOC) of Simons (1995) form a frame for a notable body of 
contemporary research on MCS. Abstractly, the framework demonstrates a division of 
"positive" and "negative", enabling and constraining forces that constitute the MCS package. 
Beliefs systems articulate values, a positive direction for action and pursuit of opportunities. In 
other words, they draw the main idea of strategy in practice. These beliefs are constrained by 
Boundary 
Diagnostic Interactive 
Beliefs 
”Positive” 
enabling controls 
”Negative” 
constraining controls Strategy 
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boundary systems that rule out things to be avoided. As a negative counterforce, they form the 
second lever that clarifies the picture of strategy. Diagnostic systems form the third lever. They 
are used to measure performance against pre-defined standards and thus serve as a feedback 
mechanism (of negative nature). On the opposite side, there is a positive lever for interactive 
systems. It has a purpose to enhance dialogue, information sharing and construction of 
organizational view of strategic uncertainties. (Ibid.) 
The LOC framework introduces a general challenge of organizations to master both efficiency 
in ongoing operations and distinctive way of doing things. The latter refers to unique market 
position and innovative use of resources. Thus, there is a need to find a balance between top-
down control and bottom-up learning. (Ibid, 21-25.) Three tensions have been identified in the 
framework to improve the big picture: (1) unlimited opportunity and limited attention, (2) 
intended and emergent strategy, and (3) self-interest and the desire to contribute. Simons 
(1995) brings up four general notions, how MCS can support to overcome this challenge. First, 
MCS can help to reduce the risk of temptation or pressure by defining, specifying and enforcing 
rules. Second, they can improve focus, direct resources and set targets to individuals that are 
facing the space of achievable opportunities. Third, they have potential to stimulate innovation, 
inspire and motivate. Fourth, MCS can reduce the fear of challenging the status quo. (Ibid, 28-
29.) The four categories of control systems will be introduced more specifically below. 
2.2.3.1 Beliefs and boundaries 
Simons (1995, 41) concludes that beliefs systems and boundary systems transform unbounded 
opportunity space into a focused domain that organizational participants can be encouraged to 
exploit. The author defines a beliefs system as "the explicit set of organizational definitions 
that senior managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic 
values, purpose and direction for the organization" (Ibid, 34). These definitions include basic 
values, purpose, direction and the view, how value is created. Furthermore, these systems 
define desired performance and manners of human relationships (Ibid, 178). For example, 
beliefs systems can be communicated through credos and mission statements. The primary 
purpose of a beliefs system is to inspire and guide organizational search and discovery, to 
determine relevant problems and guide the search of solutions. (Ibid, 33-36.) 
The need for explicit beliefs systems arises from both internal and external complexity. 
Generally, increasing complexity makes it difficult for individuals to constantly realize 
organizational purpose and direction (Ibid, 36). Beliefs systems raise their importance when 
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opportunities expand, strategic direction changes or when workforce needs to be energized 
(Ibid, 178). When organization grows and gains established structure, defining and 
communicating common purpose becomes more difficult. That is especially the phase when 
having a clear purpose throughout the organization raises its importance. There is a need for a 
system that encourages and gives a direction where to search for opportunities. Environment 
of constant challenge and change require a balancing counterforce, strong basic values to 
provide organizational stability and focus. (Ibid, 36-37.)  
Despite their formal nature and utilization of symbolic use of information, notable benefits of 
beliefs systems flow from emerging shared understanding. Ashford & Mael (1989) define three 
ways for managers to establish organizational values in a symbolic manner: (1) asserting 
uniqueness, (2) providing prestige to group membership, and (3) using formal beliefs as 
symbols of what the organization represents. However, significant benefit comes from 
discussion and understanding of the ideas behind beliefs. The LOC framework additionally 
recognizes that discussions around the beliefs systems have potential to increase the 
commitment of participants to organizational goals and mission. (Ibid, 36-37.)  
Whereas beliefs systems motivate and guide opportunity seeking, boundary systems set 
essential limits on them. The LOC framework suggests that purposeful design of these 
constraints should be based on defined business risks. Boundary systems have three categories 
of sources: (1) legislation, (2) organizational beliefs, and (3) practices and codes of industry 
and professional associations. Furthermore, boundary systems emerge by learning, when 
organizations realize the types of behavior that must be discouraged. Other control systems can 
create performance pressures, which LOC framework suggests to be balanced by codes of 
conduct. Explicit boundaries can also be liberating for lower empowered managers to direct 
efforts on creating, rather than continuously judging appropriateness of own individual actions. 
(Ibid 39-47.) 
Institutionalized myths are yet another factor influencing both beliefs and boundaries. Simons 
(1995, 38) refers to the work of Meyer & Rowan (1977) on how organizations incorporate 
practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts institutionalized in 
surrounding society. Adoption of formal processes and structures like beliefs systems may be 
an important legitimating action, an attempt to signal managerial competence. The underlying 
idea of myths can be applied in the case of boundary systems also. Industry standards and 
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professional associations as a source of boundaries challenge organizations to imitate and adopt 
practices for external reasons, rather than purposes primarily related to internal organization. 
As a whole, beliefs and boundary systems define a focused area from the large opportunity 
space. They are used to define both means and ends. As Simons (1995, 57) concludes, they are 
"the formal, information-based routines and procedures that managers use to maintain or alter 
patterns in organizational activities". The LOC framework identifies the need to reinforce 
beliefs and boundary systems continually. It suggests that two key variables, core values and 
business risks should be analyzed in order to realize how control systems can support business 
strategy. (Ibid 57-58.) 
2.2.3.2 Diagnostic 
Diagnostic control systems are used as feedback processes that measure critical performance 
variables against predefined standards. They are the formal information systems that managers 
use to monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from present standards of 
performance. These systems have implications for different organizational levels. Diagnostic 
systems enable subordinates to identify deviations and make individual decisions about 
correction. For senior management, these systems provide assurance that workforce performs 
within desired boundaries. Specifically, there are three factors that define diagnostic control 
systems: (1) measurability of outputs, (2) standards to be used in comparison, and (3) the ability 
to correct deviations from standards (Ibid, 59-60.) As a result, diagnostic control systems 
connect inputs, process, targets and outputs. Once targets are derived from strategy, process 
control becomes a strategic implementation tool (Ibid, 63). 
Critical performance variables as the core of diagnostic systems have been derived from the 
strategy. By definition, they are factors that must be achieved or implemented successfully for 
the business to succeed. Thus, diagnostic systems are essentially an element of the intended 
(rather than emerging) strategy. (Ibid, 63.) Effectiveness to influence the probability of 
successfully meeting goals and efficiency provide the largest marginal gain over time are 
suggested to be the prime criteria for selection of diagnostic performance measures (Anthony 
1988, 34). Furthermore, measures can be financial and non-financial. For example, "balanced 
scorecard", a diagnostic conceptualization by Kaplan & Norton (1992) consists of four 
measurement categories in causal order: (1) innovation and learning, (2) internal business 
organization, (3) customer surface, and (4) financial outcomes. 
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The benefit of diagnostic control systems come from conservation of limited management 
attention. "Management-by-exception" refers to the ideal that goals can be achieved without 
constant management oversight. Thus, despite diagnostic control systems represent control of 
intended strategy, they provide autonomy. Individuals remain accountable for their results 
while having also discretion over the means to achieve desired ends. The LOC framework 
suggests that senior managers should focus their attention to (1) setting and negotiating goals, 
(2) receiving updates and exception reports, and (3) following up on significant exceptions. 
Thus, goal setting is a task not to be delegated. Managing by exceptions means that managers 
use exception reports and discussions as their primary tools. Herewith, little attention is 
required unless a critical variable goes out of desired boundaries. (Simons 1995, 70-71) 
One diagnostic system can serve multiple purposes. Profit planning, planning and allocation of 
resources can be linked to a single system. The framework recognizes motivational role of 
explicit targets. Motivational effects will be enhanced, when individual evaluation and rewards 
systems are based on diagnostic system. Furthermore, actions cannot be corrected consistently 
without benchmarks. However, it is worth noting that the nature (subjective or objective), 
completeness and ability of individual to influence measures determine, whether diagnostic 
control is purposeful or whether it leads to limited control or even dysfunctional behavior. 
(Ibid, 74-77) 
In sum, diagnostic control systems support monitoring and achievement of strategically 
important goals stated in form of critical performance variables. These systems can improve 
empowerment and utilization of specific knowledge in the intended strategy implementation, 
while scarce managerial attention can be released or directed only when exceptional situations 
should occur. 
2.2.3.3 Interactive 
Interactive control systems focus attention and force dialogue throughout the organization in 
order to scan strategic uncertainties and emerging insights. Such systems have four 
characteristics in common: (1) information generated by the system is important according to 
the highest levels of management, (2) system demands frequent and regular attention from 
operating managers at all organizational levels, (3) generated data will be interpreted and 
discussed in face-to-face meetings consisting of superiors, subordinates and peers, and (4) 
system serves as an instrument for continual challenge and debate concerning data, 
assumptions and actions. (Ibid, 96-97) 
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While diagnostic control systems serve implementation of the intended strategy, interactive 
systems support bottom-up emergence of strategy. Diagnostic systems typically constrain 
innovation and opportunity-seeking by focusing on predictable goal achievement. In turn, 
interactive control systems induce double loop learning to find out, what are the critical things 
that business must do well to achieve strategic ends. Furthermore, it not only connects detected 
errors to strategies and assumptions, but evaluates the norms that define effective and desired 
performance. Diagnostic systems support sensitivity to identify external shocks that might 
appear problematic against the vision. Strategic uncertainties are changing continuously, and 
therefore cannot be pre-determined and monitored only on diagnostic management-by-
exception basis. (Ibid, 91-106) 
Definition of interactive systems in LOC has five conditions. First, system must require 
reforecasting of future based on revised current information. It must be understood, what has 
changed and why. Second, an interactive control system must be simple to understand in order 
to maximize participation. Third, such system must be used at multiple levels of organization. 
Fourth, it must trigger revised action plans. Benefits will be realized through action. Interaction 
must provide means how to adjust strategy for a beneficial way. Fifth, a system must collect 
and generate information that reflects the impact of strategic uncertainties on the strategy. (Ibid, 
108-109) 
2.2.4 Contemporary development of LOC 
Conceptual development of MCS packages has not moved towards uniformity. Despite more 
recent frameworks (e.g. Malmi & Brown 2008), the earlier LOC framework has also been 
discussed and improved further. O'Grady et al. (2010) provide insights and suggest that 
research in MCS can be enhanced by developing the LOC framework. In a paper named "A 
conceptual development of Simons' Levers of Control framework" Tessier & Otley (2012) 
suggest a revised framework based on the LOC. Common for these two papers is the emphasis 
on organizational levels and division between operational and strategic aspects. In other words, 
four levers are not able to capture existing complexity, but they are favored as a basis. 
2.2.4.1 Limitations of LOC 
Efforts to realize organizational complexity beyond four levers have emerged in academic 
literature. O'Grady et al. (2010) demand four conditions to be met from an appropriate MCS: 
(1) representation of a complete system, (2) application of MCS to multiple organizational 
levels, (3) explicit consideration of the feedback and communication links between the system 
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components and organizational levels, and (4) encompassing mechanisms for change. Even 
though the importance of communication channels is recognized in the original LOC, the 
framework does not provide instructions how to design communication systems, or how the 
various systems should communicate with each other. (Ibid)  
Explicit links between levers and organizational levels cannot be found from Simons' (1995) 
work. Adopting the viable system model (VSM) by Beer (1994), O'Grady et al. (2010) suggest 
that LOC framework should be enriched by including organizational levels and division 
between immediate vs. future environment. Generally, immediate environment falls under 
diagnostic systems, whereas future environment is primarily the concern of interactive systems. 
However, operational management with its diagnostic nature serves as a link, bringing 
immediately emerging issues to be discussed interactively. (Ibid.)  
2.2.4.2 Revised framework 
Tessier & Otley suggest a revised framework of Simons' (1995) conceptualization. They argue 
that original LOC definitions of positive and negative controls, enabling and constraining 
factors are very broad and general. They can be linked to a more general concept labelled the 
"dual role of controls". (Tessier & Otley 2012.) The concept refers to "competing roles that 
create dynamic tension in an organisation", basically those between empowerment and control 
(Mundy, 2010). Positive and negative controls of LOC are easily mixed with "good" and "bad" 
evaluation of the quality of control, effectiveness and efficiency. Although, only the dual role 
of controls is a design attribute of MCS, while the quality of control is not. Rather than using 
terms "positive" and "negative", explicit focus should be laid on dual, enabling and 
constraining roles of controls. However, positive and negative labels will be used to describe 
employee attitudes towards control. Thus, there is a distinction between managerial intentions 
according to MCS design, and employee perceptions of the system in practice. (Ibid.)  
The revised framework distinguishes two main objectives of controls: performance (“do this”) 
and compliance (“do not do that”). They have been divided into strategic and operational levels. 
Consequently, the revised framework consists of four types of control systems: operational 
boundary, strategic boundary, operational performance and strategic performance systems. 
Originally, Simons suggests that performance should be rewarded, and non-compliance should 
be punished. Thus, plain compliance should not be a reason for extra reward. Empirical results 
do not support this generalization. As a result, the revised framework acknowledges that 
managers can decide whether to reward or punish for both performance and compliance. An 
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important notion is the separation of original interactive control systems category into strategic 
performance controls and interactive use of controls. Notably, diagnostic and interactive 
controls of LOC should be merely seen as ways of using controls rather than distinct systems 
as such. (Ibid.) 
There is notable ambiguity concerning the original beliefs systems of LOC. For example, 
beliefs such as values can be used as boundaries. Notably, before Tessier & Otley (2012), 
Simons (1995, 42) already made this point when defining potential sources for boundary 
systems. Tessier & Otley (2012) suggest that the paradox can be explained by the notion that 
belief and boundary systems operate at different levels of analysis. Beliefs systems can control 
both performance and compliance, while boundary systems are mainly concerned with 
compliance. Boundaries can take social and technical forms, whereas beliefs are purely social. 
Belief systems play a role on all three levers of control. It is not an overall control system per 
se, but applicable to be used in different control systems. Consequently, the revised framework 
divides operational vs. strategic boundary and performance systems into social and technical 
types. Furthermore, the revised framework acknowledges the fact that a specific control can 
have more than one objective, performance and compliance. It can be used at different 
organizational levels, operational and strategic. (Ibid.) 
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Figure 5. Revised framework of LOC (Tessier & Otley 2012) 
 
2.2.5 Levers of control in boardroom 
In their paper "The Levers of Control in the Boardroom" Crombie & Geekie (2010) expand the 
scope of original LOC to cover corporate governance. The authors analyze conceptually, how 
the use of accounting and control systems could be applied in directing CEO behavior. Briefly, 
beliefs and interactive control systems are seen to encourage pro-organizational behavior, 
whereas boundary and diagnostic systems are related to constraining opportunistic behavior. 
Consequently, assumptions of opportunistic or pro-organizational behavior lead to different 
MCS choices. Underlying theories of two opposite behavior models are presented: Agency 
theory (Fama & Jensen 1983) and stewardship theory (Donaldson 1990). Although, the authors 
recall that empirical evidence cannot prove clearly, if one theory has stronger explanatory 
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power over the other. It is also mentioned in the paper that such “straw person” conceptions 
are not realistic. The authors refer to Angwin et al. (2004) by noting that CEO behavior is not 
necessarily homogeneous, static and un-ambiguous. Thus, accounting and control systems 
need to be designed to account for the complex and dynamic behavior of CEOs. 
The paper concludes corporate governance practices for each control lever. Conclusions for 
beliefs systems hold that board of directors should be involved in formulating core values for 
the organizations (Hitt et al. 2007). Furthermore, the board of directors should work with the 
CEO to formulate and communicate the organization's core values through the organization's 
beliefs systems. The board of directors should also work together with the CEO in order to 
realize, formulate and communicate organization's risks to be avoided through the boundary 
systems. Simultaneously the CEO will learn about actions that are not appropriate, thus 
constraining opportunistic tendencies. The board of directors should use the organization's 
interactive systems to increase participation, foster dialogue and debate with the CEO 
concerning strategic uncertainties and performance expectations. Diagnostic control systems 
allow managers to control operations remotely and focus their attention on strategic 
uncertainties. Board of directors should monitor and discuss critical performance variables. It 
enhances CEO accountability and constrains opportunism. (Crombie & Geekie 2010.) 
Aforementioned conceptualization of LOC in boardroom implicitly supports the idea of 
operational and strategic layers of management, aligned with contemporary advances in MCS 
literature. Furthermore, it recognizes that CEO and the senior management team are not the 
ultimate sources of judgment concerning strategy and MCS. They are merely yet another 
intermediate agents under the board of directors, representing the owners. This larger scope 
and recognition of MCS layers becomes necessary in PE investments, where judgment of the 
higher order (owners) will be implemented through board work. 
2.2.6 Earlier research on MCS in PE buyouts 
Bruining et al. (2004) have a paper that employs LOC framework in a cross-case buyout 
comparison. The paper captures interaction between MCS practices, strategy formulation, 
implementation and modification. Findings conclude that buyout managers undertake efforts 
to stimulate upside (opportunity-seeking, learning behavior) and seek balance between 
traditional forms of action. Stronger ties between ownership and control appears to be a general 
benefit. Existing management accounting techniques are employed to communicate 
managerial philosophies. Beliefs systems will be more explicit tools to inspire employees. For 
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diagnostic systems, there appears to be overall improvements in management accounting 
procedures, implying efficiency and readiness for further stages in organizational development 
and potential exit. Diagnostics enable target setting, operational incentives and strategy 
implementation through critical performance variables. (Ibid, 2004.) Nisar (2009) examines 
the evolution of MCS in mature organizations with large restructuring programs, provided by 
leveraged buyouts. The results show that to facilitate decision-making and align owner-
manager interests, buyout companies establish various control mechanisms, including input, 
behavior and output controls. Evidence shows links between output controls and cost 
leadership, while behavior controls are found common among companies emphasizing 
differentiation strategy. Furthermore, board members of buyout sponsors are found to have a 
crucial role. 
2.2.7 Conclusion of MCS 
LOC of Simons (1995) will be preferred to the case study applied with certain contributions 
from the revised framework suggested by Tessier & Otley (2012). The reason for choosing 
these over MCS as a package by Malmi & Brown (2008) relates to research-specific issues 
emerging from the case setting and topic. Case setting involving hierarchical entities requires 
understanding of controls at different stages from strategy to operations. Common for both 
frameworks, LOC (including previous revised framework) and MCS as a package is the role 
of MCS to align behavior with the strategy. MCS as a package divides and covers more aspects 
of control and covers details of organizational setting. Although, single paper cannot provide 
as explicit criteria and conditions than the whole book of Simons (1995). Both original 
frameworks lack sufficient incorporation of organizational layers and distinction between 
strategic and operational controls. However, LOC has already been developed further in this 
sense. The research topic is not established one. Arguably, LOC being clear with distinction 
between enabling and constraining controls, four levers is a simple frame to apply when 
approaching relatively new types of research settings. 
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2.3 Entrepreneurship and Organizations 
"All judgments of value are personal and subjective. There are no judgments of value 
other than those asserting I prefer, I like better, I wish." 
Ludwig von Mises (Mises 1957, 15) 
 
In order to understand PE buyouts and MCS in their context, fundamental and contemporary 
topics of organization science will be incorporated into the framework. PE buyouts imply 
changes in ownership. As discussed earlier concerning existing PE literature, active ownership 
typically influences management practices. MCS are not only separate practices of operating 
managers. Thus, entrepreneurial views and capabilities of the owners are likely to influence 
strategy, its implementation practices and potential to emerge from lower levels. First, the topic 
of entrepreneurship as judgment will be discussed with two conceptual implications: (1) 
identification of original and secondary judgment of resource allocation, and (2) capital 
heterogeneity, referring to asset-specificity and subjective perception of asset value. Second, 
yet relating to asset-specificity, resource-based theory of MCS will be discussed, shifting 
emphasis on issues of capabilities and human capital. Third, the concept of dynamic 
capabilities will be introduced as a contemporary form of resource-based tradition. Fourth, 
microfoundations of strategy will be introduced with examples relevant to MCS. Finally, 
transaction cost theory of MCS will be introduced to build links between asset specificity and 
MCS more robust. 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurship as judgment 
Entrepreneurial theory of firm supports understanding of ownership and particularly its active 
forms, such as PE industry. Foss & Klein (2012, 78) present a concept of entrepreneurial 
judgment as a link between entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm. The authors 
define entrepreneurship by referring to economic concepts and discussions of the last century. 
Judgment will be defined as "residual, controlling decision-making about resources deployed 
to achieve some objectives; it is manifest in the actions of individual entrepreneurs; and it 
cannot be bought and sold on the market, such that its exercise requires the entrepreneur to 
own and control a firm". Entrepreneurs identify chances, imagine opportunities and finally 
decide on which resources need to be assembled, and how they should be combined in order 
to exploit opportunities. As a result, entrepreneurship as resource allocation will necessarily 
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require recognition of ownership. In other words, judgment and finance are inextricably linked 
(Ibid, 237). 
2.3.1.1 Original and derived judgment 
More precisely, this owner-specific judgment described above refers to the "original" or 
"ultimate" form of judgment. Employees that hold decision authority are defined analytically 
as "proxy-entrepreneurs", exercising "delegated" or "derived judgment". (Ibid, 191.) The 
concept of judgment has been apparent already in the work of Knight (1921), who argued that 
corporate governance is a nested hierarchy of judgment. Furthermore, Rothbard (1962, 538) 
stated that "It is the owners who make the decisions concerning how much capital to invest and 
in what particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must choose the managers." 
However, ultimate decision does not imply that owners supply the complete content of 
entrepreneurial plans (Foss & Klein 2012, 195). Fama & Jensen (1983) propose that owners 
practice "decision control" by delegating "decision management" to non-owners.  
A key characteristic of entrepreneurial judgment significant is its subjective treatment of 
ownership. Individuals will reach different decisions, even if they share the same objectives 
and data, because access to different information and ways to interpret data tend to be 
subjective (Lachmann 1977, Casson & Wadeson 2007). The concept of uncertainty by Knight 
(1921) is a central element in entrepreneurial judgment. Not only is the specific outcome 
uncertain, but the whole probability distribution and range of outcomes. Thus, Foss & Klein 
(2012, 81) emphasize the importance of understanding profit not as an automatic rate of return 
on invested capital, but as a reward from successful bearing of uninsurable risks.  
When applied to investing, judgment approach differs radically from the mechanistic theories 
that apply mathematical risk variables. Once risk is being homogenized into idiosyncratic betas 
and individual risk levels, investing becomes a mere calculus problem (e.g. Sharpe 1964). On 
the contrary, entrepreneurial judgment stands for resource allocation under uncertainty (Ibid, 
79). The reason why investments take place is not just a question of having access to superior 
information and having measurably suitable risk aversion. There are no purely objective 
opportunities to be found and exploited, but individuals merely imagine them and act in order 
to achieve desired results. 
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2.3.1.2 Heterogeneity of capital 
The idea of heterogeneous nature of capital has been supported by resource-based approach to 
firm and also Austrian school of economics. Contrary to homogenized, quantitative measure 
of capital, heterogeneity means asset-specificity and limited substitution in capital goods. 
Views on the sources of capital heterogeneity have slight differences. Kirzner (1966) suggests 
that assets are not heterogeneous by objective features, but by the role in specific 
entrepreneurial plans. Foss & Klein (2012, 117) base their idea of capital heterogeneity on the 
subjectively valued attributes of assets. As a result, “an entrepreneur may acquire ownership 
over assets because he thinks they are more valuable in combination with other assets, 
including his own judgment” (Foss & Klein 2012, 236). 
Capital heterogeneity has particular organizational implications. Complex capital structure 
serves as a barrier to competition. It is the entrepreneur who undertakes search in the space of 
possible capital combinations. Ownership rights are normally assigned to assets that include 
valued attributes and unknown attributes. Difficult measurability of attributes implies that 
owners need to experiment in order to realize and exploit them. Thus, experimenting with 
combinations and recombinations of capital foster learning about asset attributes. Due to the 
costliness of such activities, experimenting needs to be balanced or guided. Transaction costs 
should determine, which attributes will be subject to creation or discovery. (Foss & Klein 2012, 
123-129.) Matsusaka (2001) suggests that learning emerges in mergers and acquisitions. 
Argote (1999) emphasizes importance between employees and managers. 
To explain firms, one must move beyond the perfectly competitive model where contracts are 
incomplete and ownership brings benefits as the residual right. Heterogeneity behind the 
factors of production have been incorporated into knowledge-, and capabilities based theories 
of firm. Different capabilities of entrepreneurs lead to different resource combinations. 
Presented approach of entrepreneurship as delegation of judgment under uncertainty together 
with imagined opportunities helps to explain boundaries and internal organizations of the firm. 
It contributes the existing theories of firm (e.g. Coase 1937; Williamson 1975, 1981; Tirole 
1986; Simon 1951) by drawing advanced implications from concepts of uncertainty and 
subjective value, whose traditions date back to the works of Knight (1921) and also Austrian 
School economists (e.g. Menger 1871; Mises 1949). The entrepreneur has to start a firm to 
capture the returns to his judgment (Foss & Klein 2012, 166). 
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2.3.2 Resource-based theory of MCS 
Henri (2005) applies resource-based perspective in MCS context. A study on diagnostic and 
interactive systems of LOC, namely performance measurement systems (PMS) includes four 
capabilities that are critical to strategic choices: market orientation, entrepreneurship, 
innovativeness and organizational learning. The author raises a point that Simons (1995) does 
not make an explicit distinction between innovation and organizational learning, for example. 
LOC framework will not explain comprehensively, why organizations combine diagnostic and 
interactive controls. Therefore, it is suggested that balanced use of PMS emerges dynamic 
tension, which contributes to aforementioned capabilities in a context defined by external 
uncertainty and organizational flexibility. Thus, dynamic tension contributes to organizational 
performance. The paper provides insights into the dual roles of MCS as a tool for both strategy 
implementation and formulation, present in Simons' (1995) LOC framework. Resource-based 
view of MCS moves the analysis from the strategic-choice level to capabilities level, providing 
links between MCS and capabilities. (Henri 2005) 
According to the resource-based view, information and control systems are generally not a 
source of competitive advantage. They encourage firms to realize the benefits of the resources 
they control. Although, such realization cannot generate sustainable rents. Furthermore, 
systems can be readily transferred. (Barney et al. 2001.) Worth noting is that the author is not 
explicitly referring to MCS nor related frameworks such as LOC. The view of information and 
control systems as not being able to generate sustainable competitive advantage can be 
understood, when control systems are taken as separate practices, not holistically as a package. 
The role of MCS as a resource or "capability" will be examined further in this part and in 
synthesis section also. 
2.3.3 Dynamic capabilities 
Whereas resource-based view discusses "capabilities", further academic contributions provide 
means to realize their hierarchy in relation to competitive advantage. Capabilities of the firm 
are among the highest interests of the owners. Teece (2007; 2012) makes a distinction between 
dynamic and ordinary capabilities of organizations. Dynamic capabilities enable business 
enterprises to create, deploy, and protect the intangible assets that support long-run business 
performance. Generally, capabilities are seen distinct from motivations, intentions and 
strategy. They arise in part from learning, existing resources and history of the organization. 
Ordinary capabilities have three categories: administration, operations and governance, and 
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they represent combinations of skilled personnel, facilities and equipment, processes and 
routines, and the administrative coordination. Respectively, dynamic capabilities represent 
higher order capabilities that govern organizational activities. They enable the firm to integrate, 
build and reconfigure internal and external resources. Three clusters are involved in dynamic 
capabilities: (1) identification of opportunities, (2) mobilization, and (3) continued renewal. A 
major distinction between ordinary and dynamic capabilities is that the latter cannot be bought 
from the market. However, dynamic capabilities alone are unlikely to result in competitive 
advantage. They do not operate in isolation, but need to be coupled with other idiosyncratic 
resources and efficient strategizing. (Teece 2007; 2012) 
2.3.3.1 Differences and similarities with MCS 
Connections between dynamic capabilities and MCS are worth further analysis. Even if the 
firm was to enhance ordinary capabilities, they would still remain subject to and dependent on 
the dynamic, higher order capabilities. There exists a gap in the existing literature concerning 
explicit comparisons and connections between dynamic capabilities and MCS. Dynamic 
capabilities and MCS have not generally been applied together in research papers, nor has the 
framework of dynamic capabilities been recognizably present in PE research either. Dynamic 
capabilities go further in search of competitive advantage, yet remaining conceptually narrower 
than all resources and strategies needed in competition. Even though Barney et al. (2001) were 
not explicitly referring to MCS packages, they considered management practices as readily 
transferrable and not able to provide sustainable advantage. Thus, there are merely views that 
regard control practices fully separate from dynamic capabilities. However, overlapping 
aspects between MCS and dynamic capabilities can be found, making it relevant to examine 
interrelations of these concepts. 
The crucial role of MCS in competitive advantage has been implicitly recognized in dynamic 
capabilities framework. According to the approach, in addition to spend on R&D, a company 
must generate and implement complementary organizational and managerial innovations 
(Teece 2007). This notion supports the view of MCS as overlapping set of practices or even as 
an inseparable part of dynamic capabilities. Arguably, contingent and suitable control practices 
can be managerial innovations. With a holistic package they have potential to become 
organization-specific innovations that support exploration and protection of competitive 
intangible assets as well as formulation of strategy. 
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Dynamic capabilities are related to an analytical framework as a tool of sensing opportunities 
and threats as well as comparing relevance and importance to organizational ends. Information 
concerning technologies, markets and competition needs to be acquired both inside and outside 
the enterprise. Additionally, information must be analyzed in order to figure out implications 
for action. (Teece 2007.) Existing MCS frameworks such as LOC may not fully replace 
concerns and implications presented in the dynamic capabilities literature. However, they can 
support aforementioned ends by directing attention and efforts in a clear and complementary 
way. They also provide an approach to increase understanding of organizational goals as well 
as foster interaction concerning risks and emerging issues. 
Teece (2007) identifies sources for constraints of organizational behavior: regulators, standard-
setting bodies and business ethics. They appear very similar to those stated by Simons (1995, 
42): laws, organization's beliefs systems and shared industry codes. Teece (2007) points out 
that once a dominant design begins to emerge, strategic choices become limited: "The 
enterprise's articulated strategy can become a filter so that attention is not diverted to every 
opportunity and threat that "successful" search reveals." Thus, action and interaction may 
improve organization-specific understanding of employees, both clarifying goals and limiting 
alternatives. Even though interaction and strategic understanding may remain informally 
articulated, they may as well transform into formal structures, implying boundary and 
diagnostic systems. Interactive control systems may foster understanding that support formal 
beliefs systems. Additionally, this improved understanding can be interpreted as a social 
boundary system, a lever conceptualized by Tessier & Otley (2012) in their revised framework 
of LOC. 
The focal challenge of balancing between control of ongoing operations (immediate success) 
and strategic alertness (creativity, future orientation) exists in both dynamic capabilities 
framework (Teece 2007) and MCS (e.g. Simons 1995). Discussing dynamic capabilities at a 
more detailed level, Teece demonstrates a mix of four categories that constitute strategic 
decision and execution skills in organizations: (1) designs that delineate customer solutions 
and the business model: e.g. technology and product architecture, customer targeting and value 
capturing mechanisms, (2) enterprise boundaries and "control" platforms that define e.g. asset 
specificity and co-specialization opportunities, (3) selection of decision-making protocols in 
order to identify complementarities and to avoid decision errors, (4) loyalty and commitment 
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that demonstrate leadership, communicate, define values, culture and non-economic factors. 
(Teece 2007) 
Aforementioned categories that specify framework for dynamic capabilities can be interpreted 
against the MCS. First, designs that constitute business model and underlying economics, 
benefit from formal practices that can be defined as diagnostic systems. Second, enterprise 
boundaries and platforms that define asset-specificity and cooperation bear resemblance to 
diagnostic and interactive systems that are required to identify emergent strategic issues. Third, 
decision-making protocols that aim to recognize upside potential and risks bear resemblance 
to the idea of LOC to define boundaries by interaction about strategic uncertainties and 
identifiable risks. Fourth, establishing loyalty and commitment by example, communication 
and recognition of non-economic factors strongly resemble the idea of beliefs systems of LOC. 
Organizational learning, incentive and process alignment are another things that make MCS 
relevant for dynamic capabilities. The approach suggests that rather than having skilled 
individuals, more desirable approach for an organization is to embed scanning, interpretative 
and creative processes inside the enterprise itself. Scanning, learning and challenging routines 
strongly imply interactive control systems of LOC. Furthermore, both MCS and dynamic 
capabilities approach recall practices for strategy implementation: "Business models implicate 
processes and incentives; their alignment with the physical technology is a much overlooked 
component of strategic management". (Teece 2007.) Arguably, dynamic capabilities imply a 
MCS-like package of practices behind strategy implementation and its reformation. 
2.3.3.2 Complementary insights 
Dynamic capabilities have additional implications concerning investment decisions and MCS. 
At a general level, flexible structures are purposeful until the dominant design emerges for 
strategy or business model. R&D efforts and market experiments can introduce and test 
different variations of business models. Once a design has developed and becomes successful, 
more focus will be needed to exploit it. At that point, heavy investments become strategically 
more purposeful. (Teece 2007.) This view of dynamic capabilities and strategic management 
bears resemblance to real options. Investors may not always need to commit the whole 
projected capital at the beginning of a project, but they can invest into exploration and retention 
of already identified potential opportunities. Once new information accumulates, investors can 
decide, whether they want to proceed further and make more substantial investments. 
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Naturally, decision-making will be more efficient and dynamic with concentrated judgment, as 
in the case of active ownership of PE. 
MCS packages can support flexibility and interaction in order to develop a business model or 
more comprehensive strategy. More control and "orchestration" of dynamic capabilities can be 
supported by MCS thereafter. As mentioned by Simons (1995, 116-117), there is a risk of 
applying too many interactive control systems simultaneously, and thus dispersing focus and 
strategic signals overall. Thus, managers in crisis companies typically use many interactive 
systems, but only for a short period of time, in order to find a way to change. Simons (1995, 
158) notes that interactive control requires ongoing and intensive managerial involvement. In 
comparison, diagnostic and beliefs systems require less frequent interventions from senior 
management. These notions support the view that comprehensive use of MCS package belongs 
under dynamic capabilities. Thus, MCS package is not a static set. Practices are thoroughly 
linked with the strategy and decisions of judgment that cannot be bought as best practices from 
even the most professional labor markets. 
2.3.3.3 Applications of dynamic capabilities and MCS in literature 
Conceptual applications combining both dynamic capabilities and MCS packages are scarce. 
Notably, McCarthy & Gordon (2010) provide the only one explicit academic contribution to 
the interplay of dynamic capabilities and MCS. The authors argue that MCS are tools for 
leveraging organizational behaviors and such outcomes that are necessary for dynamic 
capabilities. Their particular focus lies on variations in environmental velocity and feedback of 
it. Different conditions in environment set requirements for the combination of belief, 
boundary, diagnostic, and interactive control systems. MCS direct how firms explore and 
exploit their varying assets. Rate and direction of change in demand, competition, technology 
and regulation define what Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1988) term "Environmental velocity". 
McCarthy & Gordon (2010) recall that this velocity is a contingency factor that affects 
management control in terms of the decision-making processes and rules that firms use. 
Furthermore, the role of environmental characteristics or "rapidly changing environments" was 
already recognized in Teece et al.'s (1997) early work on dynamic capabilities. There are two 
types of feedback: "As-Is" and "To-Be". Whereas the former is normalizing, refining and 
modulating, the latter is searching and anticipatory in nature. These feedback types have MCS 
implications on three central processes: coordination of resources, learning and 
reconfiguration. (McCarthy & Gordon 2010.) 
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Velocity of environment defines the nature of to-be feedback, and, consequently, implications 
for MCS package. High-velocity environment generates to-be feedback that is frequent and 
short in duration, requiring MCS to support adjustment and focus on core activities. The 
authors suggest that boundary and diagnostic systems of LOC framework would support the 
end. On the contrary, to-be feedback of low-velocity environments is sporadic, degraded and 
long-term, setting requirements for MCS to emphasize purpose, search, learning and 
communication. Thus, emphasis on beliefs and interactive systems will be suggested. The role 
of as-is feedback is complementary. It provides performance information that brings the loop 
back to consideration of MCS practices. Thus, errors and deviations from strategic and 
operational goals become detectable after they occur. (McCarthy & Gordon 2010.) Distinction 
between "as-is" and "to-be" feedback provides yet another demonstration of the common 
ground of dynamic capabilities and MCS: there is a need to find a contingent balance between 
support for immediate ongoing operations and exploration of future opportunities. 
2.3.3.4 Dynamic capabilities and heterogeneous capital 
Firm-specific asset management differs substantially from that of pure financial management. 
As Teece (2007) puts it: "The nature of the portfolio balance needed inside the enterprise is 
different from the portfolio balance sought by pure financial investors. The economics of 
cospecialization are not the economics of covariance with which investors are familiar." 
Furthermore, cospecialization and irreversibilities increase the complexity of project- and 
enterprise-level investment decisions. The returns to particular cospecialized assets cannot 
generally be neatly apportioned or partitioned. (Teece 2007.) Although, there already exists a 
great body of capital budgeting literature dealing with firm-specific issues, recognizing 
strategic investments (e.g. Alkaraan & Northcott 2007; Carr et al. 2010) 
Differences between financial and firm-specific investments point the relevance of realizing 
the heterogeneous nature of capital universally. Earlier introduced judgment approach provides 
one explanation. Whereas financial investors with relatively small stakes of equity may 
exercise entrepreneurial judgment, their means of identifying opportunities and combining 
resources still remain very limited. Active owners, on the other hand, may exercise this 
judgment and apply entrepreneurial plans more extensively. They can influence firm-specific 
mechanisms such as MCS. According to Wruck (2008), ability to carry larger risks will be a 
benefit of public corporations with dispersed ownership. Arguably, underlying nature of risk 
in that case tends to seem more homogeneous and calculable. When adopting judgment 
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approach and more subjectivist position, this advantage of public corporations with dispersed 
ownership may not be as clear. Depending on the amount of potential investors with specific 
subjective perceptions of investment opportunities, ability to carry risks can hold for 
concentrated private ownership as well. Even though Wruck (2008) did not discuss these 
specific issues, she mentioned that PE and public corporations are seemingly approaching each 
other what comes to advantages as owners. 
2.3.4 Microfoundations of strategy 
Microfoundations constitute one contemporary categorization of strategy research. 
Microfoundations and dynamic capabilities are often intertwined. For example, Teece (2007) 
refers to microfoundations in constructing dynamic capabilities, and Felin et al. (2015) 
demonstrate microfoundations as an umbrella term that covers dynamic capabilities. Central 
for the approach is its mission to unpack collective concepts and understand how individual-
level factors impact organizations and lead to emergent processes through interaction. 
Organizational-level outcomes, performance and even relations between macro variables are 
thus mediated by micro actions and interactions. (e.g. Abell et al. 2008.) Theoretical basis of 
microfoundations covers transaction cost economics, routines, cognitive psychology and 
dynamic capabilities among numerous other specific subjects. Microfoundations are not a 
theory per se, but a movement and a way of thinking. (Felin et al. 2015.) Some notions from 
microfoundations movement will be discussed in order to strengthen the framework of this 
study and links between its concepts. 
2.3.4.1 Goal-framing 
Arguably, microfoundations bear resemblance to driver-based mindset behind management 
accounting and MCS generally. Especially related to management controls is the approach of 
Foss & Lindenberg (2013) to emphasize microfoundations of individual motivation and 
cognitions. Their notions about selective attention and memory are common factors behind 
MCS also (e.g. Simons 1995, 28). Furthermore, the authors focus on the impact of goals over 
members of organization and value creation. According to one microfoundations approach 
called goal-framing theory (Lindenberg 2008), a particular higher order goal can govern large 
sets of sub goals and thereby change individual or lower order preferences. Three goals are 
identified: (1) hedonic goal, which centralizes immediate easiness; (2) gain goal, which 
expresses the desire to improve, and (3) normative goal, which signifies the desire to act 
appropriately and serve the collective entity. In order to influence behavior, these goals need 
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to be activated by situational cues. Worth noting is that one goal does not completely deactivate 
others, but it pushes these other goals to the background. Rather than being fully active or 
inactive, all goals have different and changing weights. Goal frames have a tendency to spread 
in groups and hierarchies. Top management's changing strategic goals or transformational 
leadership may have behavioral consequences at lower levels of the organization. (Foss & 
Lindenberg 2013) 
In light of sufficient rationality and economic incentive alignment, the gain goal frame would 
be the first-best solution. However, Foss & Lindenberg (2013) argue that the normative goal 
frame is associated with the highest levels of value creation through collaborative activities 
and joint production motivation. Due to the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a 
normative goal frame and joint production motivation, the additional economic surplus 
accumulates in the long run. Normative frame affects the tasks, intensity and coordination of 
the efforts that organizational members are willing to take. (Foss & Lindenberg 2013.) This 
frame is associated empirically to spontaneous sharing of knowledge (De Dreu et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, it implies reduced moral hazard and the need for costly control mechanisms 
(Podsakoff & MacKenzie 1997).  
2.3.4.2 Microfoundations and MCS 
Joint production motivation implies that individuals generate shared representations of actions 
and tasks in terms of joint goals, reducing the need for formal planning (Foss & Lindenberg 
2013). Competitive advantage involves differential beliefs concerning resource value, and the 
ability to influence beliefs will be increasingly important in managing cooperation. One 
explanation is communication and perception of beliefs of others that help game theoretical 
players to move from inferior equilibrium to the optimal one. (Foss 2007.) Thus, beliefs 
systems will be relevant lever for beliefs management discussed above. Furthermore, since 
beliefs influence resource allocation, they will have common ground with delegation of 
entrepreneurial judgment. 
Beliefs behind "joint production motivation" or "normative frame" demonstrate ambiguity 
behind polarized distinction between constraining and enabling, positive versus negative 
(Simons 1995), and agency versus stewardship (Crombie & Geekie 2010) settings. While 
reducing the need for formal planning and turning opportunism into normative orientation, 
beliefs systems of enabling nature can serve effectively as boundary systems without existence 
of formal boundaries. This conclusion is similar to that of Tessier & Otley (2012) discussed 
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earlier. Additionally, interactive systems of enabling nature may foster normative orientation 
and thus prevent opportunistic tendencies, which, according to Simons (1995) and Crombie & 
Geekie (2010) are seen as the tasks of constraining boundary and diagnostic systems. 
2.3.5 Transaction cost theory of MCS 
Speklé (2001) explains management control structure variety in a transaction cost economics 
(TCE) perspective, an approach established by antecedent scholars (e.g. Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1981). Three dimensions to transaction costs are stated: (1) asset specificity, (2) 
uncertainty and (3) frequency. Additionally, there are also two behavioral forces behind 
transaction costs: bounded rationality and opportunism. Combining these aspects and forces 
result in hypothetical situations to be dealt with MCS practices. For example, uncertainty and 
bounded rationality determine, when and why the need to adapt is likely to arise. Asset 
specificity and opportunism explain when and why achievement of successful adaptation 
cannot be taken for granted. In turn, uncertainty and opportunism introduce information 
asymmetry and incompleteness of information. Assuming uncertainty leads to impossibility of 
complete contracts. Learning about desirable properties occurs during the contract execution. 
Thus, there emerges a need to realign contracts and execution with emerging insights. These 
notions bear resemblance to organizational learning and interplay of boundary, diagnostic and 
interactive control systems. (Speklé 2001) 
TCE defines three modes of governance: (1) markets, (2) hybrids and (3) internal hierarchies. 
Markets are defined by free competition, alternatives and low asset specificity. Hybrids 
emphasize long term contracts and transaction specific safeguards for compliance. In such case, 
assets specificity may be intermediate. Hierarchies are defined by authority and internal 
incentive monitoring. It is opposite of market-based competition. Depending on the 
measurability, there are action and result oriented controls. Action controls monitor behavior 
and compliance, whereas result orientation focuses more on target setting and outcomes. 
(Speklé 2001) 
Managers are granted discretion, since goals are often underspecified. The organization cannot 
define specifically, what it expects from its employees. At most, vague terms can be used. For 
an organization to rely on the vague terms, two conditions must be met: (1) individual actors 
must understand how their actions fit with the organization's emergent strategy, and (2) the 
organization must have means to assess the quality of performance. (Speklé 2001.) Apparently, 
vague terms lead to increased role of subjective evaluation. Notions of suitable understanding 
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of employees and means of superior to employ subjective judgment provide the other side of 
the coin for Simons (1995, 77) who suggests that subjective evaluation may be motivating only 
if trust is high. 
As a result, Spekle (2001) demonstrates a decision-tree type of table containing determinants 
leading to different control archetypes. For example, high ex ante programmability of 
contributions with low, moderate or high asset specificity ("idiosyncracy") would lead to 
market control, contractual/outcome control or codified target control respectively. Low ex 
ante programmability with high idiosyncracy would lead to exploratory or boundary control 
tendencies. (Speklé 2001.) "Ex ante programmability", "idiosyncracy" and "impactedness of 
information for post hoc performance assessment" are slightly similar to the attributes of 
diagnostic system evaluation tree already provided by Simons (1995, 77) that includes measure 
completeness and individual influence over measure. 
Ex ante programmability and asset specificity are arguably congruent with the notions of 
entrepreneurial judgment and heterogeneous nature of capital. However, already mentioned 
limitations in the paper included the focus of an individual organization, instead of expanding 
the scope beyond traditional organizational limits (Speklé 2001). In this case, organizational 
focus additionally carves out the question between ownership and management, such as board 
work. In light of judgment approach, organizational goals imply a form of derived judgment. 
2.3.6 Conclusion of entrepreneurship and organizational topics 
Contemporary papers about dynamic capabilities and microfoundations of strategy are together 
compatible with judgment approach. Especially the nature of dynamic capabilities as non-
tradable makes them entrepreneurial in the sense of original judgment. Referring to the idea of 
a balance sheet, whereas no markets for original judgment exists on the equity side, dynamic 
capabilities appear to be the non-tradable equivalent on the asset side. The use of MCS has 
significant potential to support organizations in their challenges pointed by judgment and 
capabilities literature. 
Judgment approach focuses on the complementary capabilities related to ownership of assets. 
Furthermore, it expands understanding of valued attributes and exploration of non-valued 
attributes that constitute potential sources of value for owners. Dynamic capabilities generally 
focus on competitive advantage and orchestration, i.e. the ability to renew strategy. It 
approaches microfoundations of strategy by guiding sources for competitive advantage. Both 
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MCS and dynamic capabilities will not cover all questions concerning strategy. They are 
merely support functions. This applies roughly to judgment approach also. Even though 
original judgment is the ultimate decision behind strategy, its framework concentrates on 
organizational structures and practices. 
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2.4 Synthesis 
This part comprises essential elements from previously introduced areas of research in order 
to support understanding of MCS in a PE context. Basic ideas and findings from PE and MCS 
research will be introduced. Additionally, substantial attention will be paid to specific topics 
concerning entrepreneurship, ownership and contemporary organization science, which have 
not been linked sufficiently to existing MCS and PE research. These theoretical concepts of 
aforementioned fields of research construct an exceptional framework for further research. It 
will demonstrate new potential of these concepts to match with real cases and to support further 
theory building. The following text parts discuss specific combinations of central concepts. 
They approach from the abstract level of PE and ownership to delegation of judgment and 
board work. Consequently, potential conceptual links between MCS, dynamic capabilities and 
different buyout types will be discussed. Finally, the framework and its implications will be 
summarized. 
2.4.1 PE as a channel for original judgment 
PE is best understood as an active form of governance. It expands the means and potential 
influence of the owners to apply entrepreneurial judgment better than in publicly traded 
companies. Recent trend in PE literature to expand explanations for value creation from agency 
theory and downside aspects to entrepreneurship and upside potential have demonstrated rather 
variety of PE industry than plain financial engineering and wealth-capturing. Leaning on 
balanced views (e.g. Klein et al. 2013), emphasized role of active investors may not always 
result in managerial discretion or innovative opportunity exploration, for example measured in 
R&D efforts. Although, such aspects do not comprehensively define entrepreneurship nor 
success. Based on entrepreneurial judgment approach (Foss & Klein 2012), it is the owner who 
imagines opportunities and makes ultimate decisions. Klein et al (2013) remind that 
"Sometimes the most entrepreneurial action is to stay the course rather than follow the herd 
toward the next trendy attempt at innovation (e.g., staying out of the dot-com bubble of the 
1990s)". Referring to endogenous view of ownership (Connelly et al. 2010), firm-specific 
attributes affect investors' willingness to take stakes in companies. In active ownership typical 
for PE, firm-specific practices and assets become more available for the subjective opportunity-
seeking and resource combinations of the investor. 
Setting of a typical PE fund involving investors, fund managers and imagined opportunities 
can be interpreted through judgment approach. Naturally, investors who provide capital to be 
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employed, apply original judgment. At some degree the same applies to managers, if equity-
incentives exist. Notable here is that sources of imagined opportunities and plans to be 
implemented through governance may not need to come only or even mainly from the main 
providers of capital. Judgment approach takes into account that the providers of capital may 
not be in the main responsibility of providing ideas. Foss & Klein (2012, 227-228) discuss this 
“sole-individual bias” and suggest that exploitation of opportunities can be a team or group 
activity. Such notions successfully capture the nature of a typical PE setting: investors apply 
original judgment when deciding on derived judgment, delegating resources and discretion to 
fund management. Once being a customer of a wealth management firm, conscious investment 
decision requires that investor approves entrepreneurial ideas behind it and delegates 
responsibility of entrepreneurial and managerial actions. 
Nature of ownership defines aspects to judge. To start with a typical example, ownership of 
publicly traded companies in a diversified portfolio may be an outcome of purely original 
judgment, such as mathematical calculations based on key figures. Index investing and value 
investing (e.g. Barber & Goold 2007; Puttonen 2009) are defined by a long horizon, rather than 
strictly pre-defined life cycle. Capital allocation among public assets may also be a result of 
derived judgment, a choice of a fund manager or a team. In such cases track record, personality 
and more general investment philosophy may be the most critical features to be judged. On the 
other hand, decision to invest in PE target implies interaction with the wealth management firm 
representative or examination of information provided by the firm. Unlike public assets, PE 
ownership typically has a predefined ownership period. Thus, in the first place, original 
judgment will be involved to examine, if the general partner proposes a sound and acceptable 
plan to create value during a temporary ownership period. Though, an impressive plan is not 
viable to generate desired return for investor. Limited partner needs to be convinced that the 
general partner is able to implement proposed plans. Altogether, judgment approach helps to 
realize differences among asset classes, bringing potential managerial implications for both 
investors and other people employed by financial sector. 
Applied to the context of PE investing, judgment approach implies that original judgment of 
the primary providers of capital, limited partners, will concern beliefs and boundary systems. 
Derived judgment and more extensive use of MCS will be delegated to general partners, the 
PE fund managers. Original judgment of limited partners implicitly includes trust and belief 
that interests are aligned and fund managers are able to implement plans within the boundaries. 
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This thesis examines how the PE fund managers as general partners employ MCS in strategy 
implementation and value creation. 
2.4.2 Judgment of LOC in boardroom 
LOC framework in boardroom expands the scope from a single organization to governance 
issues also. Crombie & Geekie (2010) focus on the use of MCS in governing the behavior of 
CEO. Rather than covering one-way role of MCS in strategy implementation, they suggest 
involving CEO in the design of control systems. Board of directors should work with the CEO 
to formulate and communicate the organization's core values. CEO should also be involved 
when strategic risks are being identified and communicated through boundary systems. 
Interactive systems should be used by the board of directors to foster dialogue and debate with 
the CEO concerning strategic uncertainties and performance expectations. Board of directors 
should also monitor and discuss critical performance variables of diagnostic systems. 
Combining board work and MCS will be relevant from the view of judgment approach. 
Participatory interaction between CEO and the board of directors supports alignment of higher 
order judgment. Especially if notable owners exist among the board of directors, not only 
understanding of strategy, but formulation of MCS will be a clear matter of original judgment. 
Unlike typical MCS literature implicitly takes senior management as the highest authority, 
LOC in board work brings MCS issues closer to original judgment. CEO and the executive 
team are not the ultimate sources of judgment concerning strategy and MCS. This larger scope 
and recognition of MCS layers become necessary in PE investments, where judgment of the 
higher order (owners) will be implemented through board work. 
Recognition of strategic and operational layers of MCS suggested by Tessier & Otley (2012) 
encourages more detailed research. This distinction directs focus on division of labor 
concerning formulation and enforcement of these control systems. Expanding scope from 
interactions between senior management and employees to cover also owners and board of 
directors has potential in exploring new clusters of accountabilities and patterns behind control 
system package formulation. These control layers are especially relevant in PE investing, 
where limited partners and general partners have aligned interests at abstract level, but where 
delegation and operational empowerment are issues to be managed more specifically between 
limited partners and target companies. Worth noting is that in PE setting, MCS practices can 
be used beyond organizational borders through board work. 
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2.4.3 Division of labor in MCS formulation 
Following the original LOC framework, many causal and implicit channels are invisible in the 
static categorization of four levers. For example, operational diagnostic systems can serve as a 
basis for operational correction. It can also motivate and provide performance metrics for 
rewards and compensations in measurable conditions. Interactive systems that deal with 
strategic uncertainties require specially designed incentives. When desired outcomes cannot be 
defined in a measurable manner, incentives need to be based on contributions. Intrinsic 
motivation generating insights can be activated by values. In turn, insights on strategic 
uncertainties that emerge through interactive discussions will have an impact on boundary 
systems as well as diagnostics measuring performance and compliance from performance 
variables. By discussing contemporary insights from MCS and microfoundations literature, I 
have combined and contributed existing attempts to clarify complexity and build more robust 
understanding of MCS. 
Normative frame of behavioral microfoundations should be viewed merely as a potential 
benefit achieved through the use of certain MCS such as interactive and beliefs systems. As 
discussed earlier, contribution-based incentives are suggested for interactive systems. Even 
though desirable contributions cannot be defined ex ante, sufficient relevance and alignment 
will be needed. As Tessier & Otley (2012) suggested, LOC framework should be extended to 
cover both strategic and operational levels, performance and compliance purposes that take 
social and technical forms. For example, beliefs are purely social, whereas boundaries are 
technical. If normative frame and similar behavior is to be encouraged with control systems, 
conflicts between strategic and operational layers of MCS may prevent desired alignment. 
Presented transaction cost theory of MCS by Speklé (2001) suggests that in addition to 
programmability of contribution evaluation, asset-specificity should be taken into account 
when determining control systems. He defines specificity as opportunity losses. Specificity can 
be interpreted through judgment approach and capital heterogeneity. In discussion of strategic 
belief management, Foss (2007) suggests that competitive advantage involves differential 
beliefs concerning resource value. According to judgment approach, heterogeneity of capital 
raises from subjectively valued attributes (Foss & Klein 2012, 117). Furthermore, transaction 
cost economics does not address who should acquire whose assets, and who will be the 
entrepreneur with a business idea (Foss & Klein 2012, 177). Thus, judgment approach has 
potential to complement transaction cost theory of MCS. This point appears particularly 
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relevant in PE industry where control issues expand beyond limits of a single organization. 
Arguably, choice of control systems is not a question of objective costs, but subjectively valued 
attributes and perception of uncertainty. 
2.4.4 Dynamic capabilities as a source of focus 
Capabilities direct and explain efforts on MCS formulation. Resource-based view suggests 
links between MCS and capabilities (Henri 2005). Dynamic capabilities approach (Teece 2007; 
2012) makes a distinction between ordinary and dynamic capabilities. The latter enable to 
create, deploy and protect intangible assets that support long-run business performance and 
competitiveness. Unlike ordinary capabilities, dynamic capabilities cannot be bought from the 
market or transferred like any best practices. It is suggested that alone they are unlikely to result 
in competitive advantage. Nevertheless, applied with judgment approach, they constitute a 
necessary part of the whole resource combination originally imagined or at least confirmed by 
the ones with the original judgment. With mandate to combine assets and design control 
practices according to higher order judgment, PE investors have a significant role in light of 
dynamic capabilities.  
Framework of dynamic capabilities goes further in search of competitive advantage. Teece's 
(2007) categorization of activities that support strategic decision and execution skills includes 
more specific areas to apply management control on. For example, alignment of customer 
solutions and business model, considerations on enterprise boundaries, asset-specificity and 
opportunities of co-specialization, identification of complementarities and potential decision 
errors appear too specific for any discussed MCS conceptualizations. Arguably, dynamic 
capabilities approach focuses more on strategically important processes and microfoundations, 
whereas modern MCS literature is searching for a holistic package that more explicitly 
balances between empowerment and control, existing operations and emerging strategic 
insights. Despite their overlapping areas and similarities, MCS and dynamic capability 
frameworks have potential to complement each other by suggesting practical and strategically 
significant issues to focus on when designing a MCS package. 
There already exists at least one explicit application of MCS and dynamic capabilities in the 
literature. Being sensitive to changes in environment, MCS are suggested to support processes 
of dynamic capabilities: resource coordination, learning and reconfiguration. McCarthy & 
Gordon (2010) suggest that high-velocity environment generating frequent and short feedback 
requires emphasis on boundary and diagnostic systems in order to focus on core activities, 
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whereas low-velocity environments with degraded and long-term feedback require learning 
and communication, implying beliefs and interactive systems. 
2.4.5 MCS from buyout purpose 
Different types of buyouts presented in a matrix by Wright et al. (2001a) demonstrate the idea 
of varying roles and mechanisms of PE investors to create value in buyouts. Combinations of 
purpose and mindset put different requirements for MCS in order to support value creation. 
Two types of buyouts, efficiency and revitalizing ones will be discussed further. Including 
managerial mindset, they appear more relevant in light of MCS and (later stage) PE than failure 
buyout or more radical (VC-type) entrepreneurial buyout. At the moment there exists a gap in 
the literature to realize variety of buyouts in light of MCS practices and other theoretical 
concepts discussed in the preceding literature review. In order to contribute to this research 
space, the following part includes hypothetical managerial implications to be examined in case 
research, and furthermore, preliminary basis for further conceptual development. 
2.4.5.1 Efficiency buyout 
Efficiency buyout is arguably the stereotype of a leveraged buyout. It combines managerial 
mindset and incremental efficiency improvements. Logic of value creation lies in the treatment 
of risk and agency problems with a proper design of incentives and monitoring. Debt decreases 
the required amount of committed equity and increases returns to investors. Furthermore, 
interest payments and debt paybacks limit managerial discretion, which can be seen as a partial 
solution to potential agency problems. Operational efficiency and cost control require financial 
criteria as well as data-based decision procedures. 
Obviously this buyout type implies need to formulate or re-engineer control mechanisms 
associated with downside issues, equivalent to diagnostic and boundary systems of Simons' 
(1995) LOC framework. In efficiency buyout it is more likely that investors share the existing 
core strategy and its beliefs systems at least at a strategic level. When hierarchy of strategic 
and operational control layers (Tessier & Otley 2012) have been acknowledged and identified, 
their evaluation and potential correction may become an issue with all types of levers. For 
example, over-diversified portfolio of activities might not support implementation of the core 
strategy. Improved focus requires explicit and stricter boundary systems. Applying the idea of 
control layers, strategy can be supported with more specific operational performance (beliefs) 
systems also. However, beliefs and interactive systems may not be of the highest concern in 
efficiency buyout. Acceptance of existing core strategy or minimal reconfigurations in it would 
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imply that changes in boundary systems emphasized merely operational performance systems, 
rather than ones of the strategic layer. 
Insights emerging from dynamic capabilities literature support the interpretation of emphasized 
diagnostic systems in efficiency buyout. Processes based on "as-is" feedback (McCarthy & 
Gordon 2010) match with incremental changes of efficiency buyout: exploitation, single loop 
learning and adaptation, as well as evolutionary asset reconfiguration. Diagnostic systems are 
needed to control moderate level of risks involved in the business. Exploitation means a state 
of high awareness concerning critical success factors and resources, which serves as a basis for 
performance measurement, incentives and other corrective actions. 
Whereas thoroughly market-based equity incentives are suitable for long-term value creation, 
internal MCS can support immediate incremental results. Incentives can be based on cash flow 
measures or even non-financial data, provided by diagnostic systems. For incentives to work, 
managerial business leaders are assumed to respond positively to monetary incentives. Even 
though people and personalities would play more significant role in earlier and more 
entrepreneurial settings, PE manager can also improve target company by evaluating and 
aligning its personnel according to responsiveness to MCS. 
Data-driven diagnostic systems provide basis for corrective actions in order to guide managers 
and employees without intervention from the highest levels of judgment. This does not mean, 
however, that interactive systems would not have any role. Arguably, desired practice for a PE 
investor in an efficiency buyout would be what Simons (1995, 70-71) calls "management-by-
exception": interaction and particular attention of higher levels would only be initiated by 
unexpected occurrences detected from diagnostic figures. While efficiency buyouts are not 
motivated by strategic changes and uncertain operations, single-loop learning will be more 
typical and desired process. 
Efficiency buyout would logically fit better into the portfolio of a PE fund with predefined and 
relatively short life cycle. Avoidance of radical changes in strategy and its implementation in 
an established corporate setting brings valuable benefits for PE fund investors. The buyout 
company is expected to be directed on the desired track of incremental improvements soon 
after the initial deal. These relatively minor changes are not implying substantial investments 
in specific assets, making target company appear more attractive in the eyes of later buyers 
also. Thus, risks are more controllable from the very start.  
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2.4.5.2 Revitalizing buyout 
Revitalizing buyouts combine managerial mindset and more significant changes in business 
logic. Unlike in efficiency buyouts, value creation of revitalizing buyouts comes from upside 
issues. Existing strategy may not be taken as granted, but evaluated thoroughly. Thus, it is in 
this type of buyout where the whole variety of MCS, such as four levers of control have 
potential to support reinvention and implementation of strategy. Wright et al. (2001a) suggest 
that revitalizing buyouts take place when there exists established business and a bureaucratic 
organization, whose direction needs to be reinvented. Similarly, Simons (1995, 128) suggests 
that different levers of MCS would be established in different phases of organizational growth. 
Thus, all types of levers would be in use by the time when sufficient maturity has been reached. 
Comprehensive use of MCS can be seen as a way of turning maturity and decline into new 
growth through sensitivity to emerging strategy. 
For an established organization, existing variety of MCS constitutes a challenge for new 
owners to implement desired change. Before defining new control systems, prevalent ones need 
to be acknowledged, and their appropriateness must be evaluated. Transition not only means a 
shift in practices towards the goal, but also decisions about what to change and where to start 
in the first place. Arguably, holistic framework of different control systems has potential to 
improve understanding of necessary changes and conceivable risks even before buyout. 
Particular relevance for this MCS approach in PE buyouts is that unlike in public stock 
exchange, PE investors have a chance to collect exclusive information about potential targets 
before closing a deal. 
Since MCS implications of efficiency buyouts would focus on diagnostic and boundary 
systems, it would be straightforward to suggest focus on the opposite systems, interactive and 
beliefs in case of revitalizing buyouts. However, I would suggest that the use of control 
practices depends highly on the entrepreneurial plan of the PE investor. Active owner may 
have a completely different and completely planned strategy to be implemented with a strict 
control. Such change may require additional work on both beliefs and boundary systems 
starting from the strategic level. Plans may as well avoid pre-defining desired outcome and 
remain sensitive to emerging issues, which may not result in diagnostic systems, but call for 
interactive systems. 
Arguably, dynamic capabilities framework supports the notion that the design of diagnostic 
and interactive systems will be more contingent in revitalizing buyouts. Processes utilizing "to-
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be" information (McCarthy & Gordon 2010) support strategic renewal by emphasizing 
exploration, double-loop learning and even radical asset reconfigurations. In rapidly changing 
environments with fine-grained feedback, focus on core activities with the support of 
diagnostic and boundary systems would be suggested. In low-velocity environments with more 
longitudinal trends, beliefs and interaction would be suggested to support purpose, learning 
and communication. The role of as-is feedback would not be non-existent, but complementary 
in revitalizing buyouts. It provides performance information that brings the loop back to 
consideration of MCS practices. However, sensitivity to emerging strategic insights and 
experiments match better with the idea of revitalization than efficiency. Interrelations between 
market environment, strategy and organization imply the need to use MCS in a comprehensive 
and dynamic manner. 
2.4.6 Summary 
Elements of the framework will be positioned in the illustration below (Figure 6). The grey 
boxes stand for focal areas of research with references to conceptual literature. Whereas parts 
2.1 and 2.2 have been dedicated to PE and MCS, both entrepreneurial judgment and dynamic 
capabilities have been presented under the part 2.3. Each white box between two grey ones 
demonstrate a known piece of literature utilizing them both. Notably, only a few examples 
were found. Lack of interconnecting literature demonstrates an exceptional research space. 
Figure 6. Illustration of the theoretical framework and research space   
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3 Method 
The purpose of this research is to examine the use of MCS in an empirical case of a PE fund. 
More specifically, the focus will be laid on strategy implementation by the PE investors during 
their ownership period of the buyout targets. Additionally, notable for this research is 
sensitivity to factors of PE setting that potentially influence MCS beyond the boundaries of 
target companies. Despite the few existing studies on MCS in PE buyouts, preliminary 
literature does not provide sufficient examples of in-depth research with similar scope. This 
gap imposes the need to construct theoretical framework beyond existing PE and MCS 
literature to match with the exceptional empirical case. To examine the use of MCS in PE 
buyouts, and more specifically, to expand scope from single organization to wider setting of 
PE investing, the research will be conducted as a single case study applying systematic 
combining. The latter term refers to continuous iteration between empirical case and theoretical 
insights in order to improve accuracy of theoretical fit with empirical case. Thus, the method 
has been chosen primarily for the reason that it enables extensive attention to longitudinal and 
context-specific issues implied in the research question. The idea of systematic combining and 
the actual research process by using it will be explained comprehensively in its own part. 
The unit of research is a single PE fund managed by an asset management company. Typically, 
PE funds consist of numerous idiosyncratic targets, which should provide multiple units of 
research. In this case, however, level of analysis will be the whole fund of interrelated units. 
Justification for this fund-level examination will be discussed below. Furthermore, the single 
case method and systematic combining can be supported by various notions emerging from 
case-specific issues, theoretical framework and preliminary methodological literature as well. 
These underlying notions will be introduced below as well. 
3.1 Positioning the method 
Bearing significant resemblance to systematic combining discussed above, understanding the 
position of the method can be improved by using other conventional concepts. Generally, 
Eisenhardt (1989) divides case studies as single case and multiple case studies. Related to the 
distinction, Vaivio (2008) discusses the dilemma of depth versus breadth. In this research, 
single case method has been chosen in order to conduct deep probing instead of comparisons 
across independent entities. Case studies enable embedded design, that is, multiple levels of 
analysis in a single case study (Yin 1984). Sensitivity for multiple level analysis will be 
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purposeful for two reasons. First, the research setting involves multiple organizational levels: 
parent company, limited and general partners of the PE fund, and target companies. Second, 
recent development in MCS discussed in the literature review suggests sensitivity to strategic 
and operational layers. 
Purpose and especially relation of research with existing theories have served as a basis of 
categorization for many scholars. Scapens (1990) suggests descriptive, illustrative, 
experimental, exploratory and explanatory categories for case studies. Ferreira & Merchant 
(1992) introduce descriptive, theory building and hypotheses testing cases. Keating (1995) 
discusses theory discovery and theory refinement cases. The single case research of this thesis 
would not fall into only one clear category. Referring to the categorization of Scapens (1990), 
this thesis would combine descriptive, exploratory and explanatory features, as certain theories 
have been combined in order to explain a single case setting without managerial intentions. 
Thus, the case is not illustrative nor experimental. Due to the unique conceptual framework 
and case setting, this cannot be classified as hypothesis testing case of Ferreira & Merchant 
(1992). In addition to descriptive feature, there is also an apparent theory building side in this 
case. This thesis aims to combine concepts in a way that should illustrate their explanatory 
power. Thus, theory refinement case of Keating (1995) describes this purpose. 
The strength of case studies can be found and exploited in areas where theory is not well 
developed (Dubois & Gadde 2002; Ryan et al. 2002, 149). Even though PE and management 
practices have already been studied at some degree, one could not define MCS and PE together 
as a well established object of research. In addition to the uniqueness of this particular research 
setting in this thesis, especially the theoretical applications of MCS together with dynamic 
capabilities, heterogeneous capital and judgment perspectives have not been developed either. 
Longitudinal case enables extensive theory building, where field setting and framework 
become interrelated. In case research, identifying patterns and developing theory are an 
emerging process, where iteration between theoretical insights and material happens by the 
researcher. (Eisenhardt 1989; Ahrens & Dent 1998.) 
3.2 Case-specific issues 
The PE fund under examination consists of several interrelated organizational entities, which 
results in a more complex research setting than regular industrial organizations as single 
portfolio targets. The original idea of the PE fund was explicitly that of creating a whole 
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business entity. Buyouts and strategic investment projects have spread over the life cycle of 
the fund. In order to understand this setting, intensive, longitudinal and retrospective single-
case research will be more applicable than methods favored by researchers conducting studies 
on more entrenched settings, such as multiple case studies and surveys.  
Presented theoretical framework demonstrates the notion that aforementioned setting includes 
additional complexities, or at least distinctive features compared to earlier MCS and PE 
research. For instance, literature strongly emphasizes the role of MCS package as a tool of 
senior management. In such studies, mergers or acquisitions are typically of very minor or 
nonexistent focus. Even in case of acquisitions, PE buyouts cannot be related to buyouts 
performed by established industrial organizations by default. As analyzed in the framework 
part, PE firms buy target companies in order to sell them within few years. Furthermore, the 
degree of independence in buyout companies will usually remain high. On the contrary, 
industrial organizations tend to perform buyouts in order to integrate critical assets and align 
them with a long-term strategy. Consequently, research implications derived from these 
distinctive features not only support longitudinal research method, but require broader scope 
and sensitivity in data collection. 
3.3 Research space 
Research space of this thesis will be defined by both the research question and the method. 
Even generally, PE buyouts and changes in management practices have not been studied 
extensively. Especially the concepts of MCS packages have been of minor interest among PE 
studies. Moreover, in the few studies on MCS packages and PE buyouts, the approach has been 
very overall. For example, Nisar (2009) applies quantitative methods, and Bruining et al. 
(2004) compare MCS practice changes in buyouts among two cases. Especially substantial 
number of samples in statistical analysis may help identifying tendencies at a very general 
level. Qualitative case studies have potential to improve understanding on changes and 
underlying organizational dynamics, such as conflicting demands and contradictory goals 
(Vaivio 2008). They shed more light on the variety of outcomes and enable to link them to 
contingent factors. Despite aforementioned potential, such studies have been of minor interest 
among combined research of PE and MCS. There exists a research gap for intensive, 
longitudinal single case studies that focus on the whole life cycle of a buyout setting.  
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Common for existing preliminary studies on MCS and PE is their focus on MCS as attributes 
of the target company (e.g. Bruining et al. 2004; Nisar 2009). Target companies or even 
particular management practices are being used as variables or units of analysis. Major 
limitation of this narrow approach is that it cannot recognize factors beyond target companies 
with influence on MCS. In reality, evaluation, planning and implementation of MCS practices 
in PE buyouts are not isolated from interaction between major owners, PE fund and buyout 
(target) companies nor their managers and board member positions. Choices of PE fund 
managers cannot be separated from the strategy and derived management practices of the 
parent company either. Thus, the research space of this thesis will be additionally defined by 
the focus on MCS in the contextual setting of PE. It will be enabled by the chosen single case 
method together with systematic combining. 
3.4 Research as systematic combining 
Process of conducting this research is close to what has been defined as "systematic combining" 
(Dubois & Gadde 2002). An earlier concept known as "abduction" can be found behind it. 
Abduction refers to investigation of relationship between language and concepts (Peirce, 1931; 
Kirkeby, 1994). Systematic combining differs from traditional linear approach by its non-
linear, continuous back and forth integration of theory and empirical observations in order to 
match theory and reality. Constant matching of framework will occur during the research, when 
new insights arise from empirical world. Framework directs the search for empirical data. 
Additionally, these observations may result in identification of unanticipated related issues 
with potential implications for further research. Further exploration of empirical data may be 
redirected, and there may occur need to expand theoretical framework as well. Case studies 
provide unique opportunities to develop theory and utilize in-depth insights of empirical 
phenomena and their contexts. Conventional subsequent phases do not reflect the potential uses 
and advantages of case research. Abduction requires an integrated approach for the reason that 
various elements in such research work are interrelated. Complex structure of research setting 
makes systematic combining relevant method especially for single case studies. (Dubois & 
Gadde 2002.) 
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Figure 7. Research process by systematic combining 
More specifically, fit of the method can be justified by revising the path how the research was 
carried further from the initial theoretical starting point. The study began from the theoretical 
curiosity to study PE case in light of MCS. At that point, the exact case was not known. The 
body of existing literature covering PE cases in light of MCS was scarce. Separate PE and 
MCS literature in addition to only a few papers combining them both provided the initial 
framework and direction that guided first approach towards the case (Figure 7, arrow 1). "First 
information" was informant information. It consisted of the organization structure, history of 
the parent organization and the particular PE fund to be studied. Furthermore, basic points of 
the investment philosophy of the company were stated as well. Words like "ownership" and 
"entrepreneurship" were used with substantial weight. Thus, there was a need to extend the 
framework to integrate ownership and entrepreneurship in order to understand MCS in the 
specific context (Figure 7, arrow 2). 
Aligned with the ideal of systematic combining, Ahrens & Dent (1998) and Vaivio (2008) 
suggest sensitive approach to a priori theoretical orientation in order to maintain empirical 
sensitivity for emerging insights. Especially entrepreneurship was a term that required careful 
attention, since substantially varying definitions of the term were recognized from the 
literature. As a result, two additional theoretical traditions ("OJ + DC") were integrated into 
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the framework, improving both theoretical and empirical understanding of the case. First, 
judgment approach presented in the framework part defines entrepreneurship as ownership and 
resource allocation under uncertainty. Second substantially introduced concept was that of 
dynamic capabilities. It is relative to the older idea of heterogeneous capital and its captures 
the idea of resource orchestration in changing environment. Arguably, it relates to 
entrepreneurial management, having a position between judgment approach and MCS. 
Additionally, useful notions from neighboring literature, such as transaction cost economics 
and earlier resource based view were discussed in order to increase solidity of the parts in the 
framework. As Dubois & Gadde (2002) suggest, investing in theory might improve the 
explanatory power of case studies. After incorporating aforementioned elements into the 
framework, there were more robust means to approach more specific data and match existing 
concepts with the everyday language, as Peirce (1931) and Kirkeby (1994) have defined 
abduction. Additionally, Dubois & Gadde (2002) stress theory development instead of 
generating completely new ideas, as systematic combining builds more on refinement of 
existing theories. By putting effort on understanding and linking existing concepts, this 
research fits better with systematic combining. 
As described being inherent for systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde 2002), enriched 
framework guided further informant data collection (Figure 7, arrow 3). This information 
provided details to construct comprehensive timeline of the Cleantech fund from capital call to 
exit mode. Informant data about the policies of the Asset management company, PE funds 
branch and the specific Cleantech fund were gathered during this time as well (Table 3). Nearly 
simultaneously, informant provided substantial body of the main data (Figure 7, arrow 4). It 
consisted of Power Point presentations about original investment plans from the early phases 
of the fund (Table 3). At the same time, framework was developed into synthesis (Figure 7, 
arrow 5). Writing synthesis part meant connecting and judging the usefulness of different 
concepts and their connections against the empirical context of the case. For example, the PE 
funds branch managing target companies raised a need to emphasize revised framework of 
LOC (Tessier & Otley 2012) in order to distinguish strategic and operational layers of control 
systems. Another example of case-specific matching between context and framework is the 
emphasized role of judgment perspective and heterogeneous capital. Despite their universal 
explanatory power, they are more obvious aspects in the setting of active ownership. 
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Table 3. Complementary data sources 
Four persons were interviewed. These interviews have been specified in Table 4. They were 
selected by their focal role to strategy implementation in the Cleantech fund. Informant 
information and actual interviews reveal that other potential persons would not have such 
relevance for the research subject. Interview questions were drafted based on the preliminary 
framework part and cumulative information about the case setting (Figure 7, arrows 6 and 7; 
Table 3). The interview consisted of four different parts. First, each interviewee was asked 
briefly about the strategy in general: what it is, how it has been formulated, implemented, and 
is it possible to have strategic initiatives. Second, LOC framework was incorporated by asking 
questions concerning practices according to their nature (beliefs, boundaries, diagnostics and 
interaction systems). These questions reflected an existing case study on PE and MCS by 
Bruining et al. (2004). Thirdly, informant information and documents revealed that there had 
been different negotiations and attempts to close M&A deals along the fund history. Each case 
was briefly discussed with interviewees involved in them in order to enrich written valuable 
information for further analysis. Fourth, based on the documents gathered earlier, there were 
certain more operational activities in the fund that took place along the lifespan of the fund. 
Questions concerning accountabilities and roles of aforementioned levers in their 
implementation were asked. 
Informant document 
Informant document 
Power Point presentation 
Power Point presentation 
Type of source 
Detailed summary of the fund and its history 
Organization chart, policy and list of accountabilities 
Material for investors, early 2012 
Strategic plans + buyout of the Technology company 
Description 
Power Point presentation Plans and valuations of different potential facilities 
Spreadsheets Valuation models of different facilities 
Spreadsheets Financial statements of different facilities 
Emails Archived correspondence related to facility projects 
Websites Finnish business news on facility projects 
Websites News on company websites on facility projects 
Documents Contracts related to target companies 
Document Cleantech fund policy 
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Table 4. Interviews 
Interviews and documents were the main source of data for the study. Earlier informant data, 
documents and theoretical frame that helped to structure the interviews served also as the basis 
for writing the case description (Figure 7, arrows 8 and 9). The structure of the case description 
has been influenced by framework. First, the fund and the PE setting will be introduced 
generally. Its strategy and background story reflect especially the framework of judgment 
approach. Second, the essential LOC will be described from the point of view of fund strategy 
implementation. Certain direct operational implications will be included as well. Third, 
activities of strategy implementation with higher operational relevance will be introduced. This 
division into strategic and operational levels reflects the revised framework of LOC discussed 
in the framework part. Finalizing the case description also involved checking certain facts from 
the case organization (Figure 7, arrows 11 and 12). Whereas the case description was structured 
in order to introduce history and reflect topics of the framework, the analysis part was more 
explicitly based on discussing theory through the case description (Figure 7, arrows 13 and 16). 
In few cases analysis part required information from the original data gathering that was not 
yet written into the case description. At these points, case description was extended in order to 
provide better ground for analysis part (Figure 7, arrows 14 and 15). 
3.5 Framework supports single case method 
The choice of a longitudinal and retrospective case research and systematic combining can be 
supported by essential notions emerging from preliminary literature on PE, MCS, dynamic 
capabilities and entrepreneurial judgment. The research setting that expands scope of MCS to 
cover a wider PE setting is exceptional. There is a lack of similar example studies, which 
imposes the need to develop framework of MCS and PE further to match the empirical setting. 
Even without expanding the scope, there no longitudinal and thorough single case studies on 
PE and MCS were found. By far, even case method has been applied with rather limited access 
to rich data (e.g. Bruining et al. 2004, Nisar 2009, Bloom et al. 2015).  
Investment director, PE funds branch 
Managing director, PE funds branch 
CEO, Asset company 
CEO, Technology company 
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Malmi & Brown (2008) remind that one should not assume existing MCS configurations and 
linkages to be somehow optimal. Similarly, Vaivio (2008) discusses the importance of 
qualitative research to reject the economist's notion of the organization as a black box and a 
foundation of the construction of market equilibrium. Consistent examination of the factors 
influencing development of MCS package over time is best conducted with single case study. 
Teece (2012) notes that "The study of managerial dynamic capabilities is challenging because 
they are often tied to complex corporate histories" and refers to Danneels (2011) who prefers 
in-depth qualitative research in the subject. Foss & Klein (2012, 118) emphasize the role of 
capital heterogeneity in entrepreneurial judgment: "In our terminology, capital assets are 
heterogeneous to the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes." 
As discussed in the literature review, capital heterogeneity refers to subjective judgment, where 
individuals identify, or more correctly, imagine opportunities and values in the first place.  
Subjectivism demonstrates sensitivity of the interplay between the specific context and the 
individuals involved. Arguably, it bears slight resemblance to context-specificity and the idea 
of contingency (e.g. Otley 1980). Subjectivism as individual-specificity implies that there 
should not necessarily be any objective view of contingent variables. Views concerning 
optimality of organizational "variables" or "control package" would be related to subjectively 
valued attributes or perception of opportunities discussed above. Analysis of these processes 
requires rich examination and understanding of the wide setting: individuals, ideas, assets, and 
ownership. Processes, by definition, take place over time. Since the research question 
emphasizes context-specific understanding of practices, processes and their evolution, 
longitudinal single case research appears to provide the most suitable means. 
3.6 Reliability and validity issues 
In the case, there are several aspects to be taken into account in order to ensure sufficient 
reliability and validity. McKinnon (1988) discusses reliability and validity and these particular 
issues. Reliability defines the state, where the researcher can rely on the collected data. Validity 
is concerned with the issues, if the research contributes to the original purpose, understanding 
of the intended phenomenon. Furthermore, there are several threats that can alter focus from 
the original intended target and also impair independence of the data from the observational 
circumstances: (1) observer-caused effects, (2) observer bias, (3) data access limitations, and 
(4) complexities and limitations of the human mind. Observer-caused effects refer to situation 
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where the researcher deviates oneself from the natural setting, but ends up disturbing it by one's 
own presence. Observer bias means that such manners are applied by the observer which differ 
from consistent fashion. Unlike observer-caused effects, observer bias consists of researcher's 
selective perception and interpretation. There are three types of data access limitations. First, 
the researcher cannot observe, what has happened before, and what will happen after the 
particular observation. Second, research hosts may impose limits on access and mobility of 
information. Third, limitations may prevent the researcher from studying the complete 
phenomenon originally intended. Complexities and limitations of the human mind mean that 
any statements by subjects may not be taken at face value. The subject may consciously try to 
mislead, for example to sell more rational or acceptable image of oneself. On the other hand, 
purely honest subject may still be affected by human tendencies and fallibilities that prevent 
from giving the most truthful statements. 
Practically there exists minimal observer-caused effects on the research setting for two reasons. 
First, data collection took place during a very short period of time, and second, during the 
interviews and other interactions with the case company, all operations under evaluation and 
examination had been conducted. Generally, there are some factors that might expose research 
to observer bias, but not significantly. I have been working for the case company that operates 
several PE funds. However, I have not been involved with any incentive schemes related to the 
case setting, and my regular tasks have not been related to the operations researched in this 
thesis. 
There are several ways that have been aimed to ease data access limitations, complexities and 
limitations of the human mind. The primary sources of data in this research are interviews. The 
first interviews were held in November 2015, but the story of the PE fund dates back to the 
spring of 2011. As McKinnon (1988) noted, the researcher has reliable data only of the time of 
observation. Vaivio (2008) suggests that in order to overcome this data access limitation, 
interviews should be complemented with other data sources. Hence, different archived 
materials are being used. These materials include internal planning documentations, investor 
presentations and external news about the company. Not only can this material help to check 
facts about issues raised in interviews. Indirect or implicit aspects, such as the emphasis on 
certain issues in materials can be compared with the views of interviewees. In addition, the 
main role of triangulation in systematic combining is not that of verification. Rather, its 
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potential lies in enriching understanding of the case and discovering new dimensions of the 
research problem yet unknown to the researcher (Dubois & Gadde 2002). 
However, research hosts have not imposed limits on access. All available data requested for 
research purposes has been given when asked. Privacy issues have been discussed in the case 
company. Worth clarifying is that certain pieces of information concerning exact names and 
sums are not available for reporting. Though, these limitations to report information do not 
compromise any relevant information needed to truthfully demonstrate the case in light of 
research questions. Complexities and limitations of the human mind that can be expected from 
interviews can be treated by triangulation with other material. Interviews contained a relatively 
extensive list of mostly open-ended questions. Limitations of human mind and time may at 
times result in poor answers. Therefore, interviewees have been informed with a briefing of the 
research, its purpose and abstract question topics. It has been reasonable for the interviewees 
to have time to recall the whole life cycle of the fund and structure facts concerning its 
development. 
In addition to aforementioned reliability issues, limitations of verification and generalization 
are worth noting. Social science deals with abstracted concepts. Thus, no objective standards 
exist to be used against measurement and verification of concepts. The researcher must extract 
a sample from a universe of indicators and manifestations related to the concepts. Because of 
these two constraints, researchers in the social science can never attain perfect validity. 
(McKinnon 1988). Vaivio (2008) notes that qualitative research is not aiming at generalizations 
of a statistical nature. However, qualitative studies can arrive at theoretical generalizations 
(Lukka & Kasanen 1995). Furthermore, Dubois & Gadde (2002) note that there is not one 
single way of matching in conducting systematic combining. They remind that in deep probing 
case studies, theory generation and confirmation are inseparable. As the other side of the coin 
in this research, semi-structured and context specific interviews have poor replicability. 
Therefore, credibility of a theory needs to be evaluated by using other means. Pfeffer (1982) 
suggests judging theories according to their logical coherence. Eisenhardt (1989) recalls the 
need to provide the reader with suitable information in order to enable evaluating research 
procedure and outcomes. The essence of all research is learning, that is, the theoretical 
framework combined with the matching case (Dubois & Gadde 2002). Hence, substantial space 
in this thesis has been reserved for explaining and demonstrating the research path procedure.  
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4 Case and analysis 
This research examines how PE investors used MCS in strategy implementation during 
ownership of buyout targets. Since the brief research question remains open to a set of different 
interpretations, it will be specified more clearly here. Notably, this examination expands scope 
from single target companies to a wider setting of PE investing, such as parent organizations 
of PE investors and their customers as major source of capital. Ownership period covers 
relevant life-cycle of the fund from the first perceived investment ideas through investments to 
exit-mode when assets were sold further. Worth noting is that the exit deal as the final point of 
the fund life cycle will be excluded from the analysis. The research focuses on the actual 
implementation of the PE fund strategy and controls into the portfolio companies. MCS of the 
parent investment organization as such are of minor interest, but sensitivity to them will be 
maintained to some extent. Since the fund strategy implementation begins with exploring and 
evaluating buyout targets, proper attention has been paid to these processes. 
The following parts integrate case description with analysis. Aligned with the discussion in 
synthesis part of the framework, this case demonstrates a distinction between fund-level 
strategic control principles and more operational and activity-specific practices derived from it 
in target companies. Text parts have been structured as follows. First, basic information of the 
case setting will be given. Second, leaning on the insights of original judgment and other 
entrepreneurial topics of the framework part, the case description will continue from the 
subjects such as imagined business opportunities, ownership, strategy and general control 
principles derived from them. Third, explicit control elements of the fund and their implications 
in target companies will be sorted into categories of LOC. Fourth, there have been several focal 
activities and processes closer to operational level, that have required more task-specific 
guidance and control. They will be introduced as activity-specific topics. Worth noting is that 
not all of these MCS findings can be classified solely as operational controls. However, some 
even being closer to strategic level, they have been found indirectly. In order to understand 
factors that influence aspects and the use of MCS package at different phases, accountabilities 
of activities and links between strategic and task-specific controls will be examined as well. 
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4.1 Introduction of the case company 
The object of study is a single PE fund, named here as "Cleantech fund". It was managed by a 
PE fund branch of a larger Finnish asset management company, named here as "Asset 
management company", which is a publicly listed company. The role of the PE funds branch 
was that of providing unique and appealing investment opportunities for asset diversification. 
Altogether, 34 million euros were invested in the Cleantech fund by the customers of the Asset 
management company. The fund consisted of five biogas facilities, which were operated by 
the “Asset company”. These facilities were built by the “Technology company”, which was 
also owned by the Cleantech fund. Figure 8 below demonstrates the final composition of the 
Cleantech fund and its relations to investors and the Asset management company. 
 Figure 8. Structure of the PE setting 
The Cleantech fund was a limited partnership with a legally valid board of directors. Although, 
there was a formally limited liability company "The management company of the Cleantech 
fund" founded alongside the fund in order to serve the actual function of the board of directors. 
More briefly, it was called "Advisory team" among the people who worked with the Cleantech 
fund. According to the organization code, all central decisions were to be made in the meetings 
of this team. Investments were to be stated, acquisitions and exits were to be decided, and the 
Customers 
Private investors 
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Cleantech fund  
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strategy were to be clarified. The team consisted of the CEO of the Asset management 
company, the managing director of the PE funds branch, the investment director and two 
external specialists. The investment director and the CEOs of the target companies had a duty 
to report to the meetings of the team, which were held several times per year. 
Exit for the fund was carried out during the spring of 2016. The core business of the fund was 
bought by an established industrial organization. More specifically, the Asset company with 
its management and facilities were included in the deal, but the share of the Technology 
company was excluded. It is worth noting in this research that the exit process itself will not 
be examined. Empirical data was gathered just before the fund lifespan came to its end. 
Therefore, it is nevertheless realistic to assume that the changes analyzed in this research will 
capture the use of MCS that affected exit value the most. Figure 9 below will illustrate the 
simplified lifespan of the Cleantech fund from imagined opportunity, “Idea” to “Exit”. 
 
Figure 9. Lifespan of the Cleantech fund 
4.2 Fund strategy 
Since MCS are tools to implement strategy and remain sensitive to emerging initiatives, 
examination of MCS must be thoroughly linked with strategic plans of the organization. MCS 
practices will be approached by starting from the imagined business opportunity and strategic 
insights derived from it. Furthermore, while not directly defining MCS practices, the initial 
process of imagining the opportunity and formulating it into preliminary strategy will be first 
examined. Examination will be relevant for judgment and capabilities approaches discussed in 
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the framework. The founding idea behind the cleantech fund was to build a Finnish nation-
wide network of biogas facilities. The strategic plan did not emerge in a straightforward manner 
from a completely new idea. Rather, it reflected past investment experiences, resources, 
capabilities and professional network. Thus, it will be purposeful to start analysis with the 
emergence and implementation of the initial idea. 
 
Figure 10. Path from opportunity to strategy implementation 
Figure 10 above demonstrates the path from existing resources and imagined opportunity to 
execution of the entrepreneurial plan, exploring suitable buyout entrepreneurs, discovery, 
evaluation and acquisitions. The minor role of the acquired Asset company has been identified 
in strategic planning before further strategy implementation. As a part of the strategy 
implementation, the earlier discovered Technology company will be acquired. Strategic 
redirection of the Technology company illustrated in the figure means a dual strategy: partly 
serving the fund strategy, and partly developing business outside the fund. Furthermore, the 
fund “philosophy”, a distinct approach to PE investing and its influence has been causally 
positioned above the phases. However, the most essential task of the figure is that of illustrating 
the relative position of MCS practices in the whole fund strategy implementation. It is however 
worth to note that Figure 10 is an abstract illustration without specific features of the strategy 
implementation. They will be demonstrated in the latter parts of this research. The following 
text parts will construct comprehensive picture of the background of the Cleantech fund by 
introducing the phases and elements illustrated above. 
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4.2.1 Exploring and imagining opportunities 
Differing from portfolio investing, selection of the first buyout target for the Cleantech fund 
had particular strategic significance. Instead of rushing with deals, the fund management spent 
several months exploring and evaluating different operators. Consequently, the target of the 
first buyout, the Asset company, was found only after several potential candidates had been 
evaluated. This procedure of establishing the fund can be explained to some extent with 
corporate history and more significantly with a particular approach to PE investing, labelled 
here as the fund philosophy. The process and its underlying idea will be specified in this part. 
By the time when the opportunity of the Cleantech fund was originally imagined in spring 
2011, the Asset management company had already launched and started to manage another 
cleantech fund of a different industry and technology. Discussions about other opportunities 
were held with business partners of former and existing activities. Information about biogas 
projects and new operators were introduced to the directors of the Asset management company. 
Further discussions were held with new contacts that had strategy and engineering background. 
These preparations gave insights about how the cleantech market and biogas industry were 
going to develop. Having been valuable in information purposes, the very first operators and 
professionals contacted were still not appealing as actual investment targets. However, 
aforementioned exploration of the industry and discussions with operators already served the 
purpose of scanning potential investment targets. Aforementioned findings and insights were 
evaluated against the fund philosophy, which will be introduced next. 
4.2.1.1 Fund philosophy 
The PE funds branch of the Asset management company had an exceptional approach to PE 
investments. This self-stated philosophy combined "entrepreneurs, ideas and capital". The idea 
has been explicitly stated in several company materials, both public and private, as well as with 
the interviews with the managing director of the PE funds branch and the investment director. 
The managing director of the PE funds branch clarified the role of "entrepreneurship" in their 
investment philosophy. Important for implementing the fund strategy has been Finnish 
entrepreneurship and transparency of targets. The latter refers to availability of data concerning 
cash flows, in order to evaluate profitability of a potential buyout target. Notably, the managing 
director emphasized the role of transparent data in communication and planning, referring to 
interaction between PE investors and potential targets: 
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"When these conditions are met, then we can find it to serve as a ground for further 
work. And communication will be much easier than if we just say that we got capital 
and we will see what we are going to do next." (Managing director, PE funds) 
"Central for our strategy is that we believe in the entrepreneur. We give a chance to be 
the entrepreneur. We support the entrepreneur instead of going there and telling one to 
turn left when the entrepreneur is turning right." (Managing director, PE funds) 
Consequently, for the PE funds branch, target company did not just mean a business entity with 
operations and assets. In their philosophy, founding a PE fund started with finding reliable 
entrepreneur(s) with specific knowledge and willingness to cooperate according to a shared 
plan. Without such partners, the whole fund could not have been founded. Thus, the imagined 
opportunity and strategic idea took time to develop and was dependent on a combination of 
complementary human resources. 
"About that I would have stated here that let's start to work on some cleantech facilities 
with this management, I say no. It was a little bit like spinning around and only after 
some time we just ended here." (Managing director, PE funds) 
"So after this kind of background research and through numerous business meetings, 
that is, meeting different operators, we constructed the view of the market. Then we 
ended up making the first deals and then choosing the team and basis, and after that, 
then we went further with the actual strategy, to implement it." (Investment director, PE 
funds) 
Approach described above can be analyzed with concepts of entrepreneurial judgment, 
dynamic capabilities and MCS. Furthermore, other conceptual elements presented in the 
framework, such as TCE appear to contain relative explanatory power in understanding the 
forms that the philosophy took when it was implemented in the Cleantech fund. Generally, the 
fund philosophy can be better understood as a people-oriented approach to buyouts. Not only 
have company assets and the current business become evaluated, but the emphasis was laid on 
founding and leading individuals behind it. As the managing director of the PE funds branch 
said, in addition to technical aspects of any potential target company, background of the 
entrepreneur and the feeling of a person bore significant weight. Likewise, the investment 
director described the importance of trust. People had to fit into the big picture and division of 
labor. Like the managing director of the PE funds branch stated, the fund, which was 
accountable for investors, had to be in lead strategically. In turn, the role of entrepreneurs was 
to be more business-specific and operational from the perspective of the whole fund. 
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Worth noting is that the element called "entrepreneurship" in the fund philosophy is not 
equivalent to the concept of entrepreneurial judgment discussed in the framework of this thesis. 
The term referred to more common perceptions in commercial materials and presentations. 
Especially in the interviews the term "entrepreneur" was used to describe a person who is in 
charge of developing business organization with specific knowledge of one's industry. In light 
of judgment perspective, the fund philosophy did not require an "entrepreneur" to remain actual 
financial investor, unlike Foss & Klein (2012, 78) define the term for judgment approach. 
Rather, the fund philosophy implies role for an “entrepreneur” as a potential source of 
emerging strategic insights and ideas for strategy implementation.  
There was no thoroughly thought out and fixed plan to be implemented exclusively by the ideas 
of the Cleantech fund management. Rather, the plan was continuously influenced by the new 
information that emerged from communication with the potential and finally chosen 
entrepreneurs. Example of such is the strategic position, which was realized together by the 
fact that the Asset company had substantially similar vision than the fund management (to 
expand biogas business). Although, realization of the market and its deficiencies took place 
during interaction. Similar views were presented by the entrepreneur-CEO of the Asset 
company and the managing director of the PE funds branch. As quoted above, the fund level 
managers did not see early strategy implementation as a straightforward process. 
In light of dynamic capabilities, strategic significance of finding capable and reliable 
entrepreneurs implies that buyouts aimed to acquire more than just operational capabilities and 
assets. Buyout companies were not seen as just a bundle of tradable assets, but human capital 
was valued for its potential to contribute to the main fund strategy as an idiosyncratic 
component. Exploration and selection processes described in this part demonstrate that the PE 
funds branch had accumulated cleantech-specific knowledge. Connections and experiences 
from another cleantech fund of a different industry formed a path for the new one under 
examination. Furthermore, exploration process itself helped to acquire valuable information, 
foster learning and future opportunity seeking. By integrating target companies and 
establishing strategic division of labor, the Cleantech fund management practiced 
orchestration. Further examination in this thesis relates to the role of MCS in these 
interconnecting activities that increased idiosyncracy of resources. Through interaction and 
involvement into different activities, the target company management had a focal role in this 
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orchestration. Hence, despite the decision control of the fund management, target company 
entrepreneurs can be regarded as a complementary source of dynamic capabilities. 
4.2.1.2 Exploration of the first target company 
Five companies were considered as potential buyout targets during the period from spring to 
late fall in 2011. These company names were given as an informant data and checked from 
archived documents before conducting the interviews. Thus, these specific business cases were 
discussed during the interviews with both the managing director of the PE funds branch and 
the investment director of the Cleantech fund. The managing director of the PE funds branch 
explained that the investment philosophy of the PE funds branch was applied in this case by 
evaluating technology, background of the entrepreneur, and feeling, if those people seemed to 
be suitable for the fund. 
Soon after the preliminary idea of investing in biogas industry, discussions with the first 
potential company were held during the same spring 2011. Compared to the other cases, the 
plans with the first one went relatively far. This notion can be supported with documented 
evidence concerning letters of intent. However, the plan collapsed. According to the investment 
director, there were too little credible investment opportunities. The investment director 
recalled that the company really had appealing ideas, but it turned out that they could not 
accomplish projects for the whole fund. Consequently, the case was discontinued. 
After the first case, two business cases were conducted in the summer 2011. They were also 
discontinued by the PE funds branch. The second potential company was owned by a foreign 
investor. Discussions were held in the summer 2011. Described by the investment director, it 
was a smaller case that appeared not to be a credible basis for the fund. There were three main 
reasons behind this view. First, the team was not seen to have enough competence for executing 
the plan of the fund. Second, it was too small as an operator in the industry. Third, they did not 
have enough experience and evidence of actual credentials. The PE funds branch decided not 
to proceed further with the discussions. The third business case did not get far either. According 
to the investment director, the company was mostly dependent on one single person with no 
existing evidence of capabilities to accomplish projects and functioning technology. The case 
was discontinued by the PE funds branch. 
The fourth and the fifth cases took place in the fall 2011. Having been a bigger company, the 
candidate in the fourth case differed from the earlier ones. Although, the case was soon 
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discontinued by the PE funds branch. The investment director mentioned two reasons for this 
in the interview. First, despite the evidence of cleantech capabilities, people in the company 
had not accomplished anything related to biogas industry in question. Furthermore, personal 
chemistry was perceived not to be supporting enough for desired collaboration. 
The fifth business case and the first actual buyout target, the Asset company was found in the 
fall 2011 through a complex setting. The PE funds branch was supposed to be a co-investor in 
a project targeting at the biogas industry with two other partner entities. One of the partners 
owned the Technology company that had already successfully built a functioning biogas 
facility, operated by the Asset company. At that time, the Technology company owned a 
minority share of the Asset company. However, the partner behind the Technology company 
backed out from the deal, meaning that the original plan collapsed. 
4.2.1.3 Discovery of the Asset company 
As indicated above, the fifth case was not a failure for the PE funds branch after all. During 
the process, the Asset company was found. Direct communications continued with it after the 
original plan had been abandoned. According to the managing director of the PE funds branch, 
certain aspects made the Asset company especially appealing and considerable. There was a 
functioning biogas facility with a suitable production technology, and, with local technological 
support. 
"That instead of just talking and making Power Point slides, those people had built a 
facility, they had taken entrepreneurial risk and made just that kind of a facility that 
they wanted.. And the economic figures of the facility, those were the best of the whole 
market. So, it was a profitable facility in every way. Very good concept, and before 
most, the people. We found entrepreneurs, which had like a realistic plan." (Investment 
director, PE funds) 
When reflecting causes behind the results of the cases, both directors seemingly emphasize 
different, position-specific aspects. The managing director recalled that "gut feeling" has been 
more important than thorough formal analysis. Although, examination of further discussion 
reveals that evaluation of entrepreneurs has reflected certain control derived from the PE 
investment philosophy and the logic of the Asset management business. 
"For us it has been important in the whole process to be in charge and lead the 
process, since we in a way enable it, that is, we bring the capital. -- We have, like, the 
strategy, and they have the operational part. Capital and entrepreneurship. That is the 
thing. If there is anything like that the entrepreneur would immediately want to jump on 
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our side, then apples and oranges get mixed. It has been like that in many cases, that 
we've just had to say that you do not fit, not possible." (Managing director, PE funds) 
"If we were like Private Equity investors in the back seat and some other would drive, it 
would be possible, but not desirable. That is because we are accountable for the 
investors. -- Then otherwise they would ask that what the heck has your role been here, 
since you have even collected management fees. So, therefore this distinction has been 
important. (Managing director, PE funds) 
When looking back at the cases, the investment director emphasized the role of trust. According 
to him, alignment of vision and experience had been a significant foundation for trust. There 
had to be evidence of capabilities and achieved results as well as a realistic vision of the 
industry and opportunities, connected with these resources. Furthermore, communication, 
behavior and other implicit personal characteristics behind trust were mentioned to be even 
more significant factors. 
"Crucial lack of skills or vision was not as such a reason for abandoning any case. 
That wasn't the strategic thing, but the most important was particularly that we 
developed trust with the persons." (Investment director) 
According to the interviewed directors, the Asset company met these requirements. On top of 
relevant industry-specific capabilities, personal characteristics of the entrepreneurs behind the 
company supported trustworthy image of potential collaboration. 
4.2.2 Strategic planning and implementation 
The discovery of the Asset company with a suitable entrepreneur brought in the necessary 
strategic element and enabled the fund to proceed with the plan. The fund was established soon 
after the strategic plan was formulated. It was demonstrated to potential investors. Early 
information materials included the basic idea about the business opportunity, strategic plan, its 
general implementation, business logic and related risks. In February 2012, 34 million euros 
of capital was raised for the fund by the parent Asset management company, for whom the PE 
funds branch was providing investment products. Consequently, the fund bought 100% of the 
Asset company in March 2012. In practice, Asset company included a biogas facility built in 
2010 and its operating personnel. The entrepreneur-manager behind the Asset company had 
engineering background. 
Business logic of the Asset company included revenue coming from handling input and selling 
output. First source of income was formed by the gate fees that were paid for receiving bio 
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waste. The waste served as an input, which were to be processed for valuable forms of output. 
Bioenergy, or more precisely, biogas was the primary output. As a side product, leftover was 
seen possible to be processed into fertilizers. A figure in early presentation slides for investors 
from 2012 demonstrate bioenergy and fertilizers as two equally sized output arrows. However, 
the latest income statements and discussions with the managers revealed that whereas 
production of biogas had been profitable, fertilizers had not been managed to utilize in a 
profitable manner. 
The plan of the fund was to build a network of biogas facilities similar to that of the Asset 
company. Early slides for investors included a notion that by the end of 2013 the network 
should have consisted of five to seven facilities. When interviewed, the investment director of 
the fund mentioned about the same target numbers: at least five were constructed in a tight 
schedule. At the time of these interviews in November 2015 the fund consisted of four 
operating facilities and one under construction. According to the estimates, the fifth facility 
should be ready to operate by the end of 2016. In summer 2015 the fund had finally closed its 
investment phase and turned into exit mode. Investment phase was defined in the fund policy 
code earlier when the fund was originally launched in 2012. This meant that investments into 
new facility projects were not possible anymore. Compared to the original target of having 
facilities built by the end of 2013, the fifth facility project, that is, fulfillment of the strategic 
target, had started in 2015. Both the managing director of the PE funds and the investment 
director admitted that even though they had managed to construct 5 facilities, the target was 
not reached on the desired time as scheduled in the original materials. 
When interviewed, the managing director of PE funds, the accountable investment director and 
the CEO of the Asset company defined the original strategy very similar way: to build the first 
nation-wide cleantech network of local operating facilities. The CEO of the Asset company 
emphasized the goals to (1) become the largest biogas company in Finland, and (2) develop 
Finnish bio waste disposal into a new level. 
One of the leading guidelines had been strategic positioning, which required thorough analysis 
of the existing field and behavior of competitors. The CEO of the Asset company noted that a 
distinguished profile has been built on purpose. Failures and deficiencies of others have been 
significant factors behind more virtuous approach. 
 Case and analysis 
 
 81  
 
"When we operate in waste management business, then there are all kinds of dishonest 
and non-reliable operators. We don't want to operate in a way that our competitor 
might do." (CEO, Asset company) 
Strategic positioning was clarified by noting that compared to the other existing operators 
identified in the market, the fund aimed at "functionality" rather than one-sided price 
competition. 
"In our point of view, the way others operate is not functioning. They disturb the 
markets, like applying competitive bidding in the flow of raw materials, focus on the 
price in purchasing, and not until then, they just try to figure out what to do with the 
stuff. And by functioning we also mean that there was already an existing technology 
that had been in use." (Managing director, PE funds) 
Altogether, examined evidence supports a view of a clear division of labor in fund strategy 
implementation. Interviews with the fund level directors and the CEOs of the target companies 
have revealed that there was a shared understanding concerning strategic position. Through 
board work, there has existed an interactive surface between the fund as the higher strategic 
layer and the target companies as the operational side. Furthermore, interviews with the CEOs 
of the target companies have not only demonstrated their understanding of vertical cooperation 
with the fund. Target company CEOs, both with engineering background, understood their own 
distinctive roles compared to each other. For example, the CEO of the Asset company 
expressed understanding of the challenging dual role of the Technology company as a 
horizontal partner. This dual role will be introduced next. 
4.2.3 Dual strategy of the Technology company 
As a part of the Cleantech fund, the Technology company had held two strategic roles. 
Primarily, aligned with the general fund strategy, it was delivering facilities for the Asset 
company to operate. Secondly, it had an independent strategy for its own business involving 
other projects than the facilities ordered by the Cleantech fund. While the fund strategy merely 
controlled the primary role of the Technology company, the fund was not constraining its 
secondary role, that was, development of further business. In this thesis, "fund strategy" refers 
to the idea of biogas facility network discussed above. A quote by the managing director of the 
PE funds branch captures the reason behind this strategic dualism: 
"Now that we are in exit-mode, then our challenge will be that what we're going to do 
with the Technology company. That's because, our facilities will probably be sold to 
some industrial party, who decides just to operate them. One asks, where would the 
whole engineering company be needed anymore?" 
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4.2.3.1 Acquisition of the Technology company 
The facility operated by the Asset company was designed and constructed by another entity, 
the Technology company. According to company websites and the interview with the CEO, 
the Technology company, founded in 2003, was delivering solutions for waste disposal 
business and other organizations facing challenges with their own waste or sewage. After the 
buyout of the Asset company, the Technology company, in turn, was mainly owned by another 
organization originally involved with the early business plan involving the Asset company. 
Additionally, other significant competitors were as a role of minor owners of the Technology 
company. Soon after the buyout of the Asset company in spring 2012, the Technology company 
faced financial distress due to the lack of projects. Furthermore, a foreign technology company 
was planning a buyout of the Technology company.  
At that time, the strategic role of the Technology company for the whole Cleantech fund was 
recognized by the management of the PE funds branch. Interviews with the directors of the PE 
funds branch as well as early documentations are aligned with this notion of concern. Based 
on the interviews and documentations, the fund strategy included an idea of minimizing 
technology risk by replicating a functioning technology. Thus, the Cleantech fund had a 
strategic interest of becoming the owner of the Technology company, that was, ensuring that 
own facilities would become built successfully like the one delivered for the Asset company. 
Interviews with the fund directors in November 2015 are notably parallel concerning the 
strategic consideration: 
"The challenge we faced was that the Technology company was owned by wrong 
people. They weren't willing to develop it, but we accepted it at start, since we just 
wanted to ensure that the Technology company would build our facilities without 
focusing on some other projects. It was a strategic decision." (Managing director, PE 
funds) 
“If the Technology company had become an asset of some other owner not suitable 
from our point of view, success of the whole strategic investment plan of our fund 
would have been jeopardized. For us, buying the Technology company was partly 
mandatory. It was a strategic move to take it over.” (Investment director, PE funds) 
"According to the original plan, the Technology company was not needed at all. We 
thought that we were able to buy facilities from whoever operator without owning the 
contractor. (Investment director, PE funds) 
In September 2012, the PE funds branch became the major owner of the Technology company. 
The remaining minority of the shares were owned by the operating management. The 
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entrepreneur-manager behind the Technology company had engineering background. 
According to documentations and interviews, the organization had six employees at the time 
of the buyout. By the time of the late interview with the CEO of the Technology company in 
December 2015, the number of employees had grown to 22. 
Above description asset integration, a central element of dynamic capabilities, both in the sense 
of balance sheet assets and intangible human capital. After the buyout of the Asset company, 
the biggest asset integration was the acquisition of the Technology company. The decision was 
made dynamically due to changes in external environment. Acquisition helped to safeguard 
strategy implementation by reducing risks and securing delivery of planned facilities. 
Furthermore, the Technology company had industry-specific strategic information that was 
employed interactively with the fund management, when there were negotiations of potential 
new acquisitions. This role will be introduced further in the following parts of this thesis. 
4.2.3.2 Strategic reconfiguration 
Having been owned by the PE funds and as a part of the Cleantech fund, comprehensive 
strategy of the Technology company become a matter of the PE funds branch as well. 
Maximizing return for committed capital required development of the business, that is, 
ensuring that there were projects for the Technology company in the future, on top of the 
facilities ordered for the fund. Thus, there was a need to bend the rules of the fund in this special 
case. Compared to the fund and the Asset company, the Technology company deviated from 
them by significant strategic exceptions. Boundaries concerning industry and country-
specificity of the fund were not meant strictly for the Technology company, which was allowed 
to expand and seek new opportunities alongside with the facility projects for the Cleantech 
fund. 
"With this connection to the Asset company, the Technology company forms an 
independent strategy, which is in a way a spin-off of the fund strategy. Once the 
projects in Finland have been completed, consequently with these references the 
Technology company can start to deliver international projects. So, 
internationalization of the Technology company has been alongside a part of the 
strategy path." (Investment director) 
Strategy formulation behind the Technology company, however, was all but straightforward. 
According to the CEO (and entrepreneur) behind the Technology company, the strategy had 
been changing radically over time, back and forth even before the buyout. The original business 
was consulting. Providing professional services with only personnel and other expenses 
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without materials and fixed assets was seen as a way to minimize financial risks. Consequently, 
the business extended to cover technology solutions. The managers concluded that even 
technology was not viable to deliver comprehensive solutions for the customers. Therefore the 
Technology company decided to participate more intensively into projects, that was, financing 
and executing solutions as an associate. The first facility delivered for the Asset company 
before the involvement of the Cleantech fund was an example of such business logic. In 
practice, the Technology was a minority owner of the Asset company. 
"These facilities that we were about to deliver and partly own were to generate 
growing revenue. When there were to be few similar facilities, it should have enabled 
us enough cash flow to build new ones. It was a great idea. However, it just didn't work 
since we only had capital for one project." (CEO, Technology company) 
After the Cleantech fund had acquired the Technology company, the strategy of the target did 
not change radically. According to the CEO of the Technology company, the fund proceeded 
similar strategy, to build facilities based on a pre-existing technology. Although, the fund 
enabled substantial resources in order to carry out several projects. Even though the strategy of 
the Technology company did not change substantially, its function as a part of the fund implied 
a return to an earlier strategic form, excluding financing. 
"At that point we were not the comprehensive provider of the solutions. We in a way 
returned back to the technology and construction focus without elements of finance and 
ownership." (CEO, Technology company) 
"When the fund came along, we had six or eight people at the moment, and now we 
have twenty, and it has also enabled us to put more effort on different development 
procedures and to search for new business opportunities with more credibility." (CEO, 
Technology company) 
According to the investment director, opportunities of learning and international business 
related to the Technology company were acknowledged from the very beginning. However, 
approach towards seizing these opportunities varied back and forth. The Technology company 
was not encouraged to go international at the beginning. According to the investment director, 
Finnish projects were prioritized due to the reason that the company was small, and its 
resources were engaged with its own projects. After some time, international demand was 
recognized. It stimulated the fund to encourage the Technology company to make an 
international path. Entering into British and French markets was an experiment in 2013. It 
turned out to be more challenging to get international projects than what was previously 
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thought. Actualities were recalled: internationalization was a very difficult path. On the other 
hand, Finnish demand was seen coming to an end for such projects that were the core 
competence of the Technology company. Thus, internationalization was still seen as a must.  
"We are tied to observe the international development of the industry, and all the time 
we are learning about what's going on in the big picture internationally." (Investment 
director, PE funds) 
"Now when the fund strategy approaches its final stage, then again we have to consider 
our own strategic direction. Like, should we explore opportunities by returning to the 
idea of partly owning projects? At the moment, we are exploring opportunities in the 
developing countries with financing of a third party." (CEO, Technology company) 
In conclusion, the fund had contributed strategic considerations according to the emphasis on 
internationalization, resulting in interaction and learning. 
4.2.4 Alertness to strategic initiatives 
Since the beginning of the Cleantech fund, flexibility to handle strategic initiatives had been 
dependent on the phase of the life cycle. Originally, room for emerging issues was defined in 
the early documents stating fund policies. There were certain inflexible fundamental principles 
that remained unchanged along the fund life cycle. On the other hand, sensitivity to emerging 
issues within those conditions had been considered in a discretionary manner. Originally, 
essential implementation of the fund strategy taking place during the investment period 
required more sensitivity towards strategic and operational initiatives. Ever since the fund 
developed further towards exit mode, less room was left for significant strategic changes 
involving investments and structural changes. However, since active and independent 
entrepreneurs on the operational side constituted a crucial element in the fund strategy 
implementation, they were still encouraged and even expected to present relevant initiatives to 
be considered at the fund level. 
Investment director noted that freedom to respond to emerging strategic issues had been 
defined in the fund policies by the investment contract. Ideas that are aligned with the strategic 
frame, both operational and strategic initiatives were allowed to be proceeded. When looking 
back, several emerging issues had been discussed actively. 
"For example we have been offered acquisition opportunities, which we could not know 
at that point when we started. And of course we started to seize these opportunities. 
And even though they didn't lead to closing deals, there was still this, that when ideas 
appeared, they were checked." (Investment director, PE funds) 
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From a strategic point of view, the managing director of the PE funds branch recalled that once 
being in exit mode, the fund and its target firms were not likely to face significant changes 
under the current management. On the other hand, more operational insights reveal that the 
portfolio of the fund was far from a settled state, implying sensitivity for strategic 
considerations as well. Recent interviews were in line with the earlier news links and website 
information, especially about a strategic project being in progress. The CEO of the Asset 
company mentioned that in such mode, strategic initiatives are possible. The interviewee even 
emphasized the importance of development and critical evaluation of the existing strategy. 
"The targets are derived from markets, that is, competitors and the whole environment. 
When it changes, then observing it may generate such insights that make it necessary to 
check our strategy." (CEO, Asset Company) 
In addition to the ongoing progress of the Asset Company, another potential source of strategic 
initiatives was the Technology company. Due to its dual role and scarcity of managerial 
attention from the fund level, the CEO of the Technology company was expected to take care 
of business development apart from the fund strategy. That means, the CEO of the Technology 
company was in charge of exploring and seizing opportunities in order to discuss them with 
the fund directors. 
Related to strategic initiatives, the managing director of the PE funds branch mentioned 
opportunities that were recognized, but not carried further in the end. Business opportunities 
related to side products, fertilizers, serve as an essential example. Even though the potential of 
fertilizer business was recognized in the original investor materials, refining insights 
concerning business opportunities emerged during the fund life cycle. There was no predefined 
plan for developing fertilizer business, but rather sensitivity to discuss and prioritize the plans 
according to each situation and circumstances. 
"Our side product business was left fully unfinished. That specific leftover has no 
required legal status. It is just a cost to the corporation, even though our original 
strategy included the idea of making it a product. Also, we could have developed 
strategy more into that direction, that let's go abroad." (Managing director, PE funds) 
From the early phases of the fund, there had been a clear strategic plan, which was focused and 
prioritized. Although, it did not absolutely limit efforts to develop separate business from the 
same resource base. Significant experiments that would have risked the primary plan were 
avoided on purpose. For example, new facility projects were not used as platforms for radical 
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innovation development. Instead, technology risk was minimized by favoring replication of 
already functioning technology. However, potential of emerging side paths for business 
originating from the existing assets was acknowledged. These opportunities were not blocked 
by default due to the deviation from the original strategic plan. At times, opportunities outside 
the frame were discussed and considered in order to explore further business opportunities. 
Once the primary strategic path was proceeded and not contradicted, the fund had an 
encouraging approach towards strategic side paths. 
4.2.5 Analysis of ownership 
The following topics will analyze ownership of the Cleantech fund, enabled by the evidence 
introduced this far. Approaches from PE literature and judgment approach will be utilized. 
4.2.5.1 Cleantech fund as an investment 
Positioning the fund into the matrix of different investment types by Barber & Goold (2007) 
requires cautiousness. Whether the fund had flexible approach to ownership or intention to buy 
and sell, depends on framing. The same holds with the question, whether the fund was only 
investing and influencing or building synergies on top of that. More specifically, the chosen 
relevant unit of analysis guides positioning. The case demonstrates that even though the 
facilities were invested separately, they were inseparable from the parent Asset company 
operating the network as a whole. Notably, synergies were built between the Technology 
company and the Asset company, while the Technology company had a dual role. These two 
business entities were not completely integrated. Rather, the expansion of the Asset company 
as a strategic plan was secured by controlling the Technology company responsible for building 
facilities. Only the Asset company was sold in the exit. 
The type of ownership for the Asset company was "buy to sell" in terms of Barber & Goold 
(2007). For example, the fund had a predefined life cycle and a schedule for exit. In turn, the 
Technology company was owned in a "flexible" way, without any strict plans written in 
advance. The fact that synergies (division of labor) were utilized between the Asset company 
and the Technology company implies that the purpose was to "invest, influence and build 
synergies". Since the synergies were temporary, and the Asset company developed into a stand-
alone entity, clear integration did not happen. Emphasis on that point would suggest that the 
fund merely "invested and influenced". According to aforementioned authors, in flexible or 
temporary ownership typical for PE industry, there would be none or at most limited 
opportunities to build synergies on top of investing and influencing. Notably, this research 
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provides a real empirical example of what such unlikely existing setting can be. Furthermore, 
the case provides extensive description of MCS that have been used to manage it. 
4.2.5.2 Delegation of judgment 
In light of entrepreneurial judgment, the customers of the Wealth management company, who 
were to invest in the Cleantech fund and provide capital were the ones practicing original 
judgment. A notion of Foss & Klein (2012, 195) appears relevant in the case of the Cleantech 
fund: original judgment does not imply that investors supply the complete content of 
entrepreneurial plans. Investors were not the first ones to imagine the whole entrepreneurial 
opportunity, but the ideas were presented to them by the Asset management company, 
including the PE funds branch. Additionally, original judgment of minor substance was 
practiced by the fund level directors. For example, the directors of the PE funds branch owned 
shares of the Asset management company. Furthermore, the investment director had a facility-
specific reward system bearing resemblance to equity incentives. However, investments in the 
Cleantech fund imply that the limited partner investors shared the perception of business 
opportunity being potential and appealing. As well, that perception included that the fund 
management had sufficient abilities to seize the imagined opportunities in the first place. After 
the investments were made, the fund level directors started to practice derived judgment of the 
highest order. 
In the case of the Cleantech fund and its facility projects, not only did the fund provide capital, 
but for new facility projects, it restricted financing roles of the target company entities. 
Especially after the fund acquired the Technology company, direct financing and ownership of 
facilities were no longer parts of the target company strategy. Although, the founding CEO-
entrepreneur of the Technology company had remained as a minority owner. In turn, the CEO 
of the Asset company was hired with a specific, performance-based reward system. 
Entrepreneur of the fund philosophy has still common ground with academic concepts of 
entrepreneurship. For example, having specific information and initiative towards business 
development, entrepreneurs of the fund are those "discovering" or "imagining " opportunities 
and even making at least derived decisions about resource allocation or influencing judgment 
of higher order through interaction. 
4.2.5.3 Buyout type 
The examined Cleantech fund demonstrates examples of elements from both efficiency and 
revitalizing buyouts conceptualized by Wright et al. (2001a). An important point emerging 
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when examining the whole lifespan of the fund is that the control activities varied depending 
on different phases. Whereas the first phases consisted of elements typical for entrepreneurial 
and revitalizing buyouts, further development brought elements of efficiency buyout also. 
However, this shift was not straightforward nor plain. These features will be examined here in 
order to demonstrate complexity related to classifying buyouts using the aforementioned 
framework. 
A fundamental difference can be identified between the examined buyout case and 
conventional conceptions of buyouts identified in the PE literature (e.g. Wright et al. 2001b; 
Barber & Goold 2007; Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). Usually buyout strategies strongly depend 
on the path of a target company. In other words, buyout companies themselves are taken as 
starting points for crafting a new strategy or improving implementation of an existing one. 
However, in this research case it was the fund management that originally had a clear business 
idea, independent of any specific buyout target. No sooner were the actual buyout targets, the 
Asset company and the Technology company found for transaction. Notably, both their assets 
and entrepreneurs served as a means for the implementation of a greater strategic plan. During 
the selection process of a suitable buyout target it was evaluated, if the buyout entrepreneurs 
were compatible with the fund level control systems derived from the higher PE fund 
philosophy. The entrepreneurs were required to share the fund level beliefs systems and to 
cooperate independently within the boundaries, diagnostic and interactive control mechanisms, 
such as extensive board work. 
Before analyzing the case against efficiency and revitalizing buyout types from the synthesis, 
other two less fitting buyout types of Wright et al. (2001a) will be briefly checked as well. 
Plain analysis of the fund philosophy would easily suggest that combining entrepreneurial 
mindset with requirements of efficiency and narrower focus contain high risk of becoming a 
mismatch called "failure buyout". This risk was apparently managed by the fund management 
that put substantial effort into exploration and selection of suitable entrepreneurs before any 
transactions. Furthermore, latter emergence and realization of that risk was controlled by the 
use of interactive control systems. Central for this was the fund level approach "to challenge", 
as the managing director of the PE funds branch put it. Original buyout entrepreneurs were 
evaluated and challenged to develop managerial business thinking by face to face discussions.  
Since the buyout targets were relatively young and small companies, they could easily be 
categorized as entrepreneurial buyouts. As introduced in the framework part, entrepreneurial 
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buyout type is typical for enabling activities within a non-bureaucratic flat organization. 
However, entrepreneurial buyouts mainly concern strategic innovation and efficient strategic 
decision-making. In this research case, strategy implementation went beyond technical 
capabilities of original entrepreneurs. Higher order beliefs systems did not emphasize bold 
innovative exploration. Rather, there was a need to establish a division of labor while avoiding 
too bureaucratic practices. Approach to technological development was rather incremental than 
radical. 
Approach towards technological development in the research case resembles more managerial 
than entrepreneurial buyout types. Strategic level beliefs and boundaries about utilizing 
existing and duplicable technology implied more focus and meant that any considerable buyout 
target should have reached relatively established phase. Examined beliefs systems implied that 
the industry was not primarily defined by rapid innovations, but expansion of the business for 
sufficiently functioning solutions. Therefore, it was not consistent for the fund to bear 
unnecessary technology risk involved in fostering radical innovation. Many more MCS 
practices in the case were also found to have supporting role in developing operational business 
orientation. Thus, the buyout type very early adopted managerial approach implying elements 
from "revitalization" and "efficiency" types of buyouts. 
From all of the four buyout types conceptualized by Wright et al. (2001a), the most similarities 
will be found from the revitalization buyout. As in efficiency buyout also, the idea of future 
success was based on already proven capabilities. However, the buyout was mostly upside 
driven instead of emphasizing treatment of downside problems. The fund had an enabling role. 
Target company beliefs systems were not taken as given and controlled with enhanced focus. 
Rather, there already existed a greater strategy and capital as higher order elements. Beliefs 
and boundaries brought stability and general guidelines for the buyout entrepreneurs who were 
granted substantial discretion. Since the entrepreneurs became operational managers in the 
fund wide division of labor, they were expected to develop their skills from technical aspects 
to more general organizational management and leadership. Effectively, the original business 
logic was not changed radically. Although, the fund served a revitalizing task by originally 
having a clear business idea and resources needed to expand it and support operational 
implementation. 
The fund strategy implementation had elements of typical efficiency buyouts as well. Like in 
any typical LBO, significant amount of debt leverage was utilized in the investments. 
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Although, aligned with the finding of Wruck (2008), its role was not primarily managerial, but 
that of increasing returns on investor equity. Emergence and the use of diagnostic systems in 
form of financial monitoring and bonus compensation push the buyouts closer to the concept 
of efficiency buyout. However, common features with efficiency buyouts can be understood 
from upside view of revitalization buyout as well. Closer examination of the case reveals that 
the fund management did not prioritize implementation of sophisticated diagnostic systems, 
but they were developed more as a necessary outcome of the expansion. Again, the words of 
the operational level management ("entrepreneurs") had a lot of weight when information was 
gathered and operational systems were designed for decision-making through interaction. 
Furthermore, agency problems were not emphasized by the fund management as the core 
challenges of board work nor management control systems. Bonus compensation can have 
more dimensions than supporting compliance. For example the revised framework by Tessier 
& Otley (2012) identifies rewards as a distinct sphere that can support "performance", standing 
for beliefs systems of the original LOC. 
In summary, positioning the examined PE fund against earlier introduced framework is not a 
straightforward task. Two distinctive features position the buyouts of the Cleantech fund apart 
from conventional buyout classifications. First, even before finding the buyout target, the fund 
management had imagined a business idea. Second, particular approach to PE emphasized the 
role of an active entrepreneur as a focal capability to be acquired. Thus, buyout was merely a 
tool to integrate complementary resources for a comprehensive entrepreneurial plan imagined 
by the fund management. This exceptional approach can be seen as an opposite of popular 
perceptions of LBOs where mature and badly managed companies are being restructured even 
by firing key personnel. 
4.3 Strategic level of LOC 
The Cleantech fund management did not explicitly apply any recognizable MCS package 
framework in its strategy implementation and formulation. Such frameworks were not used 
independently by any target company either. Interviews and other materials do not include any 
mentions about comprehensive strategy implementation frameworks. However, thorough 
examination of materials and interviews reveals that strategy implementation and fund 
management consists of different aspects that can be categorized using the LOC framework. 
Furthermore, following the idea of revised framework (Tessier & Otley 2012), a distinction 
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between strategic and operational level of controls can be identified as well. This part 
emphasizes higher fund level approach and is defined as strategic level. Although, some 
implications into the target companies (operational side) with relevant direct links will be 
analyzed. Activities of strategy implementation with more operational relevance will be, 
however, introduced more comprehensively in the last part. Identified control elements will be 
analyzed by using both the original and revised framework of LOC. Furthermore, other 
elements of the framework, such as judgment approach and dynamic capabilities will be 
incorporated as well. 
Figure 11. Strategic level of LOC and its direct implications 
Strategic level of LOC (fund perspective) 
Beliefs systems 
Imagined opportunity: 
Facts and vision on 
- Finnish markets 
- Raw materials 
- Technology 
- Desired profitability 
- Potential synergies 
- Megatrends  
 (recycling, environment 
friendliness) 
Fund ”philosophy” (approach to PE investing) 
Boundary systems Diagnostic systems Interactive systems 
Operational level of LOC (target company practices derived from strategic level) 
Beliefs systems Boundary systems Diagnostic systems Interactive systems 
Division of labor: ”capital + entrepreneurship + ideas” 
Quality system 
(Technology company): 
routines of bottom-up 
information sharing 
Boundary side of beliefs 
systems: specify, what 
the opportunity is not 
Strategic risks: 
reputation management, 
what had been promised 
to investors 
(Scarcity of critical 
resources and time) 
Financial monitoring: 
Income statements, 
facility level drivers, 
assets, IRR 
Advisory team: 
comparable to board of 
directors 
Council of investors: 
interactive supervision, 
strategic insights 
Communication with 
target company CEOs: 
conducted frequently by 
the investment director, 
often informal 
Communication with the 
fund management: 
readiness and initiatives 
to discuss with the 
investment director 
Development of 
diagnostic systems: 
improve information 
systems, integrate 
customer perspective 
Quality system: 
(Technology company) 
operational quality 
standards 
Brand reform: 
(Asset company) 
Symbols, unity, group 
prestige 
Values for performance: 
aligned with the fund level 
Quality system: 
(Technology company) 
culture, handbook, weekly 
letter 
Capital: the fund management as the highest authority responsible for strategy 
Entrepreneur: suitable, trustworthy, insightful, independent and capable buyout manager to be empowered 
Ideas: sensitivity to opportunities 
Quality system: 
(Technology company) 
handbook 
(Empowerment) 
Avoidance of 
micromanagement by the 
fund level, managerial 
discretion 
Market-based drivers: 
Directed internal action + 
sparked interactive 
discussion 
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Figure 11 illustrates strategic and operational layers of MCS, defined by the distinction 
between fund level and target companies. Furthermore, MCS practices have been positioned 
under the influence of the fund philosophy. Major findings of strategic MCS and their direct 
influence on the target company level (operational side) have been summarized. 
Aforementioned elements of the figure will be discussed more specifically in the following 
parts. 
4.3.1 Beliefs systems 
Imagined business opportunity and the fund strategy were articulated by stating explicit beliefs. 
They guided strategy implementation by grounding business logic and indicating a direction 
for further actions. Various origins of these beliefs with strategic emphasis will be introduced 
here. Changes and the use of beliefs systems by the fund level will be examined also. Generally, 
strategic beliefs have been derived from the opportunity imagined by the fund-level 
management. In turn, target company CEOs have had discretion over formulation of 
operational beliefs systems. Examination shows that they were not always directly derived 
from the higher strategic beliefs, but drafting still took place within the strategic boundaries. 
In addition to description of identified beliefs, there will be analysis of how they meet the 
definition of Simons' (1995, 34) beliefs systems: communication and systematic reinforcement 
of basic values, purpose and direction for the organization. Furthermore, essential distinction 
between strategic and operational beliefs can be found from the evidence. 
4.3.1.1 Origins of beliefs systems 
Generally, strategic direction was based on both facts and a vision, or "imagined opportunity" 
in other words. Assumptions about the markets defined approach to domestic demand, raw 
material availability, realistic technologies, potential profitability and synergies within the 
portfolio. They all were pragmatic aspects that communicated and clarified the perception of 
opportunity. Furthermore, they signaled directions for further activities concerning market 
exploration, raw material deals, technology implementation, business development, financial 
engineering and exploitation of synergies. The investment director described the role of beliefs 
that guided opportunity seeking: 
"It was like partly based on facts, and partly visionary, standing behind a view. So, it 
required beliefs behind the view, how it should work. Some beliefs have gained 
strength, that the understanding has been accurate, and for some parts we have needed 
to correct them. The big picture has still appeared to be such that it has been right." 
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Both the managing director and investment director told that the base for beliefs systems was 
in the explicit list of strategic assumptions concerning the original views of the market, its 
direction and the business opportunity. There were five strategic assumptions in the 
presentation slides from 2011 when initial planning took place: (1) The markets: In Finland, 
there would be possibility to construct a nation-wide network of cleantech facilities of 
particular type by the end of 2013. (2) Raw materials: Required amount of certain input 
material would be available from the areas of new facility investments for the right price. (3) 
Technology: Input materials could be processed into four particular forms of outputs that have 
value. (4) Business: The production process would be profitable, providing desired rate of 
return for the investors. (5) Synergies: There would be business synergies between the 
facilities, making the portfolio more valuable than its parts combined. 
Megatrends and environmental development were external drivers that influenced formulation 
of beliefs and were often stated to support them. The early investment materials from 2011 
explained the growing role of renewable energy in national and EU-level future strategies. In 
addition to this alignment with societal strategies, several other reasons to invest in biogas 
industry were presented. One slide contained two columns of aspects that were recognized 
valuable. The first column described biogas. For example, input resources were mentioned to 
be domestic and "free". Technology and production process was presented as CO2 and 
emission free, being friendly to climate, water and soil. Especially the biogas industry was seen 
to have potential to increase independently produced capacity to electricity markets. In addition 
to biogas, the other column mostly described fertilizers as the side product of production 
process. Organic flow and utilization of waste was described in many bullet points. Reference 
to foreign countries using the same technology successfully was an additional point. More 
generally, job creation and investment in Finland were mentioned as well. Altogether, some 
points were directly derived from technical facts, and some demonstrated future prospects and 
potential development paths. 
The managing director shed more light on the details concerning aforementioned strategic 
assumptions. At the beginning it was recognized that a law decree taking effect from 2016 
would "kill" composting and increase demand for a particular type of waste disposal. Other 
trends behind market assumptions were discussed by both fund level directors. For example, 
recycling and environmental awareness were identified as societal ideals and growing trends 
leaving space for new business opportunities. Arguably, green values can be identified as 
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rationalized concepts that organizations are effectively adopting from surrounding society in 
order to gain legitimacy. Simons (1995, 38) recognized their role for beliefs and boundary 
systems. Altogether, these trends were explicitly stated beliefs that gave direction for 
opportunity-seeking. 
The first role of the strategic beliefs (and boundary) systems of the Cleantech fund was to 
communicate the abstract plan to potential investors. The investment director recalled that the 
business idea was partly based on facts and partly on vision. The business opportunity was 
demonstrated to investors by stating assumptions, facts and trends in the early materials for 
investors. Thus, applying the judgment approach, capital was raised by using strategic beliefs 
and boundary systems to reach people with original judgment aligned with the plans of the 
fund. 
Development of these beliefs was not straightforward. The fund management had constructed 
their views based on their past experiences related to slightly related cleantech business, as 
well as meetings with already existing operators. This information was not formulated in highly 
detailed form, nor was there an approach to gather extensive amount of specific information 
and conduct further studies before entering into business. Rather, the materials that were 
distributed to investors communicated facts and beliefs of the fund, implicitly requiring the 
investor to rely on the expertise of the fund managers. 
Not all aforementioned beliefs were beliefs systems in the sense of LOC. They all may have 
supported investors' perceptions of opportunity and decisions to invest. However, in order to 
serve as a control lever in strategy implementation, a system must have implications for further 
actions within the organization. For example, environment-friendliness became comparable to 
beliefs systems when it really defined decisions concerning technologies and practices 
throughout the fund and its subsidiaries. After the core business was specified, abstract notions 
about future trends and job creation that were apparent in the investment materials did not 
specify direction nor imply actions as such. Thus, they were not effectively beliefs systems in 
the sense of LOC. 
When asked, if the aforementioned vision behind beliefs systems had been common for all the 
entities and personnel, both fund level directors first confirmed it at a general level. The 
investment director defined the vision as follows: 
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"In broad view, the red thread is the same, that is, even though the companies are 
separate, this fund has a shared idea of building a network of cleantech facilities." 
About formal manifestations of this vision and beliefs, the managing director was more 
prudent: 
"I must reverse a bit with my words as such that the vision was at the owner level just 
like I said. The original entrepreneur of our buyout company shares the view that these 
things are possible, but that, if these views have been implemented further in the 
organization to its employees, then I don't actually know." 
The next parts will examine the role of the strategic beliefs systems further and analyze direct 
implications to operational level. 
4.3.1.2 Implementation of beliefs systems 
CEOs of the target companies had discretion over formulating and practicing beliefs systems 
in their organizations. Beliefs that were responsibility of a particular CEO covered strategic 
issues in organizational sense. However, in the big picture of the whole fund they were merely 
operational. Fund level strategic beliefs did not imply strict operational practices, but they have 
left space and need for further specification. Roots of this distinction and its accountabilities 
can be traced back to the fund philosophy which recognized the role of an active entrepreneur. 
Thus, importance of initially picking the right entrepreneur had implications for beliefs 
systems. 
Especially the interviews shed light on the shared mentality of respecting culture-sensitivity 
and specific knowledge. The managing director of the PE funds branch defined the background 
of fund management as "bankers" without specific knowledge about operational biogas 
production. Things that could be communicated further were the fund level codes and ideas, 
and that there were Finnish PE investors with them, proud of their part as owners. According 
to the investment director, target company CEOs shared the main beliefs and originally 
supported their viability with business-specific knowledge. A notion made during the 
interviews of the fund level directors supports the view of delegation and empowerment: the 
aforementioned directors were able to give very little examples of target company practices 
related to beliefs systems. 
The CEOs of the target companies ("entrepreneurs") were trusted with discretion to formulate 
those ideas into their organizational contexts. Meanwhile, the fund management stayed out of 
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the way and avoided micromanagement. Arguably, the fund philosophy and active interaction 
between the fund management and target company CEOs filled preconditions for this 
empowerment to work. The managing director stated that the fund management did not 
implement major changes in culture. It was the entrepreneur of the buyout company who was 
left with discretion over such issues. Any clear discrepancies cannot be found when this view 
was compared to those of the investment director. The latter, who had been more involved in 
interaction with the buyout company, seemingly identifies more cultural aspects. They 
resemble notions made by the CEO of the Asset company on operational performance, 
discussed in the next part. 
"Certain culture exists. We don't have actual written.. like values, nor that we would 
have held cultural discussions inside the buyout company. But some cornerstones exist, 
like for example when we operate in the field of environmental technology, then it is, 
like ethics. We are not allowing any risks of operating in non-ethical ways, which has 
happened in the industry. It is like in a way in the code, a thing that is in the inner 
practices. -- If someone started to diverge, then one would know what the consequences 
were." (Investment director, PE funds) 
The following part demonstrates more specific examples of how culture was specified in the 
target companies. 
4.3.1.3 Recent changes in beliefs systems 
Brand reform 
There were relatively little everyday examples of visible formal fund level beliefs systems. 
Although, one fund-level idea of implementing strategic beliefs into formal everyday 
organizational life was found. The Asset company was originally a local business without a 
brand signifying cleantech and network nature of the business. The need was recognized when 
the management of the Asset company, originally one local facility expanded and started to 
operate other facilities around Finland. The new brand emphasized network nature of the 
modern industry. Compared to the previous name, the new brand name referred to cleantech 
facilities more generally and explicitly. Additionally, the new logo was more colorful, and it 
included a leaf symbol as a graphical signal of environment-friendliness. The managing 
director described how the fund level management originated the brand restructuring: 
"When we had the buyout company with its facility in the beginning, we created a 
whole new brand for this emerging network. We wanted to make it something bigger 
than itself, and it should also be seen there as a shared vision among the personnel, 
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that hey, I work in a nation-wide cleantech company, not just in a regional facility." 
(Managing director, PE funds) 
The idea was partly directed to the employees around Finland to feel unity and have an identity 
of being part of something bigger than just a local facility. A brand implying greater purpose, 
meaning, image and unity are closely related to the beliefs systems of LOC. More specifically, 
Simons (1995, 37) leans on Ashford & Mael (1989) when describing three ways for 
establishing organizational values: asserting uniqueness, providing prestige to group 
membership, and using formal beliefs as symbols of what the organization represents. Modern 
cleantech network and bigger business signify uniqueness and provide prestige group 
membership. Furthermore, cleantech industry was creatively included in the name and the logo 
of the company. 
Operational performance 
The CEO of the Asset company noted that despite accountability and empowerment, 
operational and business-specific virtues or values were aligned and formulated together with 
the investment director representing the fund management. At some part this interaction helped 
to generate a shared understanding and align strategy implementation. Very little new beliefs 
systems were adopted top-down, but the investment director gave feedback and confirmed 
ideas and actions of the target company CEOs. On the other hand, this interaction related to 
formulation of beliefs systems helped the fund level to catch insights from operational level. 
For example, the CEO of the Asset company knew examples of non-ethical ways that had been 
apparent among the operators in the field. These views influenced strategic positioning of the 
whole business owned by the fund. Examination of operational side reveals that there had 
existed more formal statements about beliefs systems, such as mission and values. 
"Our mission is specifically that we want to bring Finnish waste disposal into more 
sustainable and resource-wise level. According to our view, currently it is not at that 
level. With our business, we are able to contribute a lot to it." (CEO, Asset company) 
"When we talk about the values, let's take three values that we have stated and 
explained. They are conventional but important, and they have dimensions as well. Our 
values are trust, respect of others and honesty. They are conventional in a sense that 
we want to do it internally this way, but it is not always self-evident for all in this 
business that operators are honest and trustworthy." (CEO, Asset company) 
Recent events in the business had influenced those beliefs, according to the CEO of the Asset 
company. As discussed earlier, especially the mistakes of other operators had driven the 
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company to find another, improved position and profile. The Asset company had been 
accountable for the strategy implementation with high managerial discretion. Due to the 
frequency of interaction with the fund level investment director, many specific practices had 
been figured out together in a way that their exact origins could not always be traced back to 
any single person. Having more implicit nature, this construction of shared understanding 
resembles the idea of interactive use of performance (beliefs) lever, conceptualized in the 
revised framework by Tessier & Otley (2012). 
Quality system 
More operationally, the fund started an implementation of a quality system in both target 
companies. Implementation of the system was not sufficiently completed in the Asset company 
to get insights in the interviews. However, it was first implemented in the Technology 
company, which had grown from a team of several people to cover twenty people. There was 
a challenge to remain flexible and agile, while people focused and specialized in their own 
tasks instead of having general and varying roles as they used to. According to the managing 
director of the PE funds branch and the CEO of the Technology company, the idea of a quality 
system came from the fund level. It was first implemented in the Technology company during 
2014, and similar project was started in the Asset company in late 2015. Especially in the 
Technology company, where the implementation had been finished, the system brought 
implications for all control levers. 
Implementation of beliefs elements in the Technology company took a form of a quality 
handbook and a weekly letter. The first one was mandatory reading for every employee. Those 
documents included purpose, vision and values of the business. The values included honesty, 
trustworthiness, know-how and ambition, which seemingly reminded those of the Asset 
company. Thus, the quality handbook constituted a typical beliefs system. Secondly, the 
principles and ideals were reflected continuously in weekly letters. The practice of sending 
weekly letters developed during the quality system implementation. Significant part of the 
system was top-down communication to employees: 
"Let's say that the biggest change is probably the change management in a way that we 
have hired new personnel. Everything in our organization is not anymore like it used to 
be in so called good old days, when we were small and agile, and when everybody used 
to do everything. I mean, in that point it was significant if we did 180 or 90 degree turn 
to some direction. Then folks were in a way comprehensive that they could do the turn 
quite easily. Today even with that twenty people it is already bigger, and we have such 
tasks and employees that have more specialized in their own things. I would say that 
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informing about changes, it has become quite a lot more challenging, or I would rather 
say, at least that is a thing that has required more effort." (CEO, Technology company) 
Background of the quality system was in the organizational growth and need to give new 
orientation to more robust organization. 
"I have had this weekly letter. It is such that I usually write some small talk about what 
I have done, and if there is something, like there usually is, then it's nice to pick some 
specific people who have worked hard and used their elbow grease somewhere, then 
it's nice to give recognition that way." (CEO, Technology company) 
The CEO described how he used letters to give praise to employees that had worked hard on 
common goals. In light of MCS, Simons (1995, 38) states that beliefs systems have a central 
role in articulation of vision and the role of participants as well as public recognition and 
reward. That notion fits well with the idea of aforementioned quality system and weekly letters. 
Thus, these examples are very typical forms of beliefs systems in LOC. 
4.3.2 Boundary systems 
The most central boundaries of the fund level strategy served two purposes. First, they clarified 
focus and supported realization of opportunities aligned with the core beliefs. Certain 
boundaries were directly being derived from the beliefs systems of the fund. Whereas beliefs 
systems defined markets and activities to be focused on, boundary systems, in turn, ruled out 
the ones to be strictly avoided. Secondly, they helped to take identified strategic risks into 
account. Certain boundaries prioritized and clarified organizational focus in a way that it 
supported achievement of sufficient rates of drivers behind desirable performance and return 
on investments. Additionally, formulation and practice of these boundaries in the fund setting 
will be introduced in this part. 
Examined boundary elements generally bear high resemblance to boundary systems described 
in the LOC framework. As Simons (1995, 178) concludes, boundaries are formally stated rules, 
and explicit limits. Typical sources of boundary systems are business risks, legislation, 
organizational beliefs and shared industry codes (Simons 1995, 38-47). Boundary elements 
found in the case evidence will be analyzed against this framework. Two major aspects of the 
revised framework by Tessier & Otley (2012) will be utilized in the analysis as well. First, 
distinction between strategic and operational boundaries can be found in the case. Second, the 
definition of boundary systems will be extended to cover situations where shared understanding 
and interpretations of boundaries were clarified through interactive and diagnostic ways. 
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Generally, strategic boundaries were mostly derived from the strategic beliefs systems and 
strategic risks. Typical for boundary systems in the fund was the avoidance of 
micromanagement. Consequently, fund directors had not focused on designing detailed 
operational target company controls. Aligned with the fund philosophy, target company CEOs 
were granted managerial discretion over design of operational boundaries. 
4.3.2.1 Boundary side of beliefs 
Strategically, what had been promised to investors served as the ultimate boundary. In this 
case, strategic boundaries defined limits to the strategic beliefs systems, the markets to be 
avoided, including industry, technology and location. In addition to certain return on investors, 
these promises of positive nature included strategic cornerstones. Orientation to focus on 
biogas in Finland meant directly that investing in biofuels or expanding abroad were ruled out 
as strategic options. In other words, strategic beliefs had direct boundary implications too. 
Furthermore, such boundaries that helped to specify and enforce the implementation of the 
original business idea served the investors with original judgment by guaranteeing that the 
capital was not used in opportunities outside the selected frame. 
The role of beliefs systems as the source of formal boundary codes was emphasized by the 
investment director. Fund policies that defined specific industry and country to focus on were 
originally core beliefs systems of the business. Additionally, they instantly served as boundary 
systems too. Concerning enforcement of boundaries, there were no detailed rules, and thus no 
predefined punishments either. Interference aimed at improving shared understanding. After 
these mechanisms, target company CEOs were relied not to deviate too far from the core 
beliefs. 
"There are actually no predefined exact rules. Our approach has been more like 
interfering to that thing or these things when they have appeared, without that we 
would have steered anything in beforehand." (Managing director, PE funds) 
"There are no sanctions, but there exists a shared understanding, that if one behaves 
dishonestly, and before most, if one behaves unethically, it will be clear, that one will 
have to leave." (Investment director, PE funds) 
Generally, construction of extensive formal boundary systems was to be avoided, if necessary. 
Especially the interviews with the fund level directors revealed that the mindset and attitudes 
towards boundary systems had been defined by avoidance of micromanagement. Non-
existence of strict pre-defined codes and policy documentations supported this view. However, 
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this does not mean that these issues would not have been thought out continuously. Rather, the 
need for certain boundaries both strategically and operationally had been identified and brought 
further on situation-specific basis through interaction. 
Through more detailed examination of the fund management and target companies several 
boundary mechanisms can be found. 
4.3.2.2 Boundaries from strategic risks 
In addition to beliefs systems, identified risks were another source of strategic boundaries. As 
a source of strategic risks, boundary implications of beliefs systems seemed to overlap with 
strategic risks. Notably, in the PE investment setting, perception of strategic risks included 
those related to the business of the Cleantech fund and investor relations, the customers of the 
parent Asset management company. Diverging from what had been promised to investors 
(beliefs and boundary implications) was forbidden. Breaking fund policies and not fulfilling 
promises implied critical business risks for the whole parent company.  
As noted above, strategic principles both directed and clarified focus. Strategic risks behind 
boundary mechanisms were identified against the fund strategy: 
"All risks must be evaluated in relation to the original idea of the fund. So, that is, what 
has been promised to the investors. And that the return should be at a certain level, 
means, that it must be evaluated, at which risk rate will the particular project yield the 
target return." (Investment director, PE funds) 
Identification and explicit formulation of more specific business risks played a significant role 
in the early phase of the fund. Being promises to investors, they specified boundary systems of 
the fund. Original investor information materials from 2011 included a comprehensive slide 
about risks involved in both specific targets and the fund structure. First, nature of each risk 
was described. Additionally, for every identified risk there was a preliminary plan how the 
fund should control it. For example, risk of paying too much for a target entity was planned to 
be managed by requiring comprehensive valuation and due diligence process. Risks related to 
price and availability of raw materials was planned to be minimized with long contracts and 
requirement of sufficient basis before making the investment. Risks related to unexpected 
strategic occurrences and the need to change had been taken into account by reserving 
managerial labor for active ownership from the PE funds branch. Operational and key 
personnel related risks were seen to be dependent on initial fund level decisions concerning 
selection of the entrepreneur and facility projects. Fund-level risks concerning low liquidity 
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and conflicting interests of investors were seen as inherent risks, typical for the nature and 
structure of any PE investment. For an investor, the role as a limited partner meant that the 
fund management as the general partner had always the final word on decisions. The initial 
decision of an investor to invest in the fund and understand its conditions was crucial. Thus, 
aforementioned boundary controls left less room for unspecified features of investment 
contract and reduced uncertainty to be judged. 
4.3.2.3 Boundary implications from scarcity 
Partly related to strategic risks, certain inherent limitations or critical constraints were 
recognized in the business managed by the fund. Capital, time, managerial and sometimes even 
suitable operational labor were scarce. Despite their constraining nature, these "boundaries" 
cannot be interpreted as control systems as such. Control system is an intentional and 
purposeful practice in organization. It is rather the implications that defined control systems. 
Failure in optimizing scarce resources was seen as a risk to reach desired IRR on time. Both 
strategic and operational resources needed to be allocated in right activities one at a time. As a 
result, there was an extensive interplay between boundary and diagnostic elements, since 
shareholder value was continuously derived from operational performance drivers. Strategic 
decisions that did not have chance to generate enough value, were ruled out. Arguably, 
diagnostic and boundary controls of LOC are difficult to distinguish in this activity. Revised 
framework suggests that there exists rather diagnostic and interactive "ways" of using beliefs 
and boundary systems. Following that conceptualization, diagnostic "way" of using boundary 
controls describes this situation more unambiguously. 
Interviews enabled to gather causal insights behind design of the boundary systems. Open-
ended questions about boundary factors in organization led managing director and investment 
director to shed light on their personal perceptions. They both emphasized the inherent limits 
of the business case and overall scarcity of resources. Required rate of return, capital and time 
were mentioned as limitations by both directors. Consequently, opportunities that had no 
potential to yield the required rate of return had to be ruled out. Procedure of raising capital 
had its own transaction costs. Therefore, the initial amount of capital raised for the fund 
effectively limited the number of potential investment projects. Furthermore, the fund had a 
predefined life-cycle and even a schedule. Investments could only be made during the 
investment period before the exit mode. Additionally, the managing director emphasized 
scarcity of task-specific capabilities as a constraining factor. In practice, there were no market 
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supply for able operational management and other staff. Even training of new personnel was a 
critical issue depending on scarce managerial time. Together these factors challenged the whole 
organization. 
"Education of the staff. That was yet another big challenge, since those operating 
people are not graduating from any school. Then everybody needed to get educated and 
trained for the job by our side. And maybe it was then that kind of a big risk that has 
been all the time included, and that has been obvious all the time from the point of view 
of the investors, that the IRR has been at risk." (Managing director, PE funds) 
The managing director went further in explaining strategic risks and even the ways they were 
implemented in diagnostic systems. Notable was the way how scarcity of resources was linked 
to strategic risks. Profound analysis of spreadsheet valuation models reveals that there existed 
a driver-based explanation connecting operational performance and shareholder value. These 
critical factors were not only measured, but prioritization and focus on critical activities had 
been guided by instructions and supervision. These aspects will be discussed more extensively 
in the following parts concerning diagnostic systems and project evaluation. 
4.3.2.4 Formulation and implementation 
There was a clear division of labor concerning strategy formulation and implementation, about 
how the strategy and its boundaries should be managed among the fund entities. Strategic 
choices implied things that needed to be avoided. They had been given by the fund level, and 
the fund management was responsible for accepting the strategy of each target. In turn, the 
target companies were responsible for implementing the strategy further. Based on the 
interviews and other material provided, there were no unified formal operational codes in the 
background. Rather, the fund management and the directors of target companies constructed 
shared understanding during their board work. For example, the investment director mentioned 
about the role of the general fund policy for governing the target companies. 
"Well, actually these cornerstones have been integrated into the strategy of each target 
company, and their strategies have been founded by these principles. So, their strategy 
is based on these." (Investment director, PE funds) 
"The whole investment plan of the Asset company has been founded on the principles of 
this fund. Technology company, on the other hand, has some exemptions, that is, it is 
allowed to operate outside Finland, and it is allowed to have different customers than 
the Asset company. On top of that, then we even began to build new business for the 
Technology company, that is, extending from biogas. And the justification for this was 
that we saw that this is the way to grow the shareholder value of the Technology 
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company, and our fund was to benefit from these procedures." (Managing director, PE 
funds) 
Aligned with the idea of having trustworthy and independent entrepreneurs in the fund, 
cooperation between the fund management and the target company CEOs was significantly 
upside driven. There were no exact predefined rules and sanctions in case of wrongdoing and 
breaking the explicit boundaries. In turn, these independent CEOs had managerial discretion 
over implementation or non-implementation of formal rules in their organizations. Target 
company activities were not steered straight by the fund management. Despite the expansion 
of business, these companies did not implement significant practices of micromanagement 
either. Their operational employees were trusted independence as well. Mindset in this case 
was seemingly aligned with both strategic and operational levels. 
Apparently, aforementioned mentality came from both the investment philosophy emphasizing 
independent entrepreneurs with initiatives, and also from the ideal of division of labor, 
specialization of the fund managers and target company CEOs. For example, by defining the 
fund management as "bankers", the managing director of the PE funds implied that their core 
capabilities did not relate to operational control or process restructuring. However, focus on 
strategic aspects required the fund management to understand and analyze target companies in 
order to distinguish strategic aspects from more operational ones. This took place in form of 
interaction. Information was collected from the operational level for the fund management to 
revise. Shared understanding of desired focus for activities was clarified through interaction 
between the fund management and the target company CEOs. Thus, following the idea of the 
revised framework, the fund management used boundary control in an interactive way. 
4.3.3 Diagnostic systems 
Diagnostic elements at the strategic level of the fund have supported boundary systems and 
directed focus more specifically. Primarily they focused on the critical drivers behind return 
on capital. The most extensive use of measurements was related to new project evaluation. 
Similar function was continued in the form of supervision after the facilities were built. Actual 
outcomes were communicated from target companies to the fund level, which compared them 
to projected performance and updated estimations of return from investor perspective. Such 
activities had potential to spark both strategic interaction and operational corrective actions. 
Furthermore, there were minor diagnostic elements that the fund implemented into the target 
companies. Certain ones will be introduced in this part. 
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Typical characteristics of diagnostic control systems are measurability of outputs, standards 
and ability to correction (Simons 1995, 179). Generally, the fund management had scarce 
strategic diagnostic control mechanisms combining aforementioned elements. Strategy was not 
primarily implemented by creating a universal monitoring system for the fund. Despite the 
importance of valuation models used in project evaluation, there were no formal, ultimate and 
extensive diagnostic systems as a backbone for evaluating and correcting operational efforts. 
Diagnostic systems were rather used selectively and occasionally in order to specify and clarify 
boundaries. Again, central for the fund philosophy was empowerment and avoidance of 
micromanagement. Target companies had been using their own operational diagnostic control 
systems. Notably, some examples demonstrate how the fund management supported 
development of diagnostic elements. They will be examined further in latter parts of this thesis. 
4.3.3.1 General role of monitoring 
Diagnostic elements had a central role in financial monitoring based on new project evaluation, 
which will be discussed further in its own topic. Spreadsheet models were used to generate 
estimations of shareholder value based on target company performance drivers. The use of 
such models was irregular and facility-specific. Comprehensive diagnostic models of the whole 
fund valuation were dated to June 2015, close to the exit mode. However, the fund management 
supervised financial statements quarterly with an eye on certain potential red flags to direct 
potential focus for further actions. No strictly regular routines to collect and supervise all 
possible metrics existed. However, the use of internal performance metrics was being 
developed continuously during the fund lifespan. For example, there was a bonus scheme 
introduced to link financial performance of the Asset company to the pay of its CEO.  
When being in use, the aforementioned valuation sheets had both internal and external sources. 
Information input with market oriented emphasis was identified. Market information was 
collected regularly, including prices and other indicators of industry development. While not 
having been direct and continuous metrics of internal performance, this external information 
had at least indirect impact on both strategic considerations (interaction) and the way existing 
operations were carried further (diagnostics) more operationally. For example, profitability 
estimations behind projects relied on negotiated deals and market prices. Spreadsheet 
valuations included sensitivity analysis concerning the impact of input and output price 
variables on the project IRR. Furthermore, overall picture of the markets was gained both 
explicitly and implicitly through the negotiations. Scarce managerial resources were adjusted 
 Case and analysis 
 
 107  
 
according to the strategic view based on these experiences. However, these indicators were 
managed with less formal systems, such as informal communications. 
Financial monitoring conducted by the fund management was the most central diagnostic 
control system identified in the Cleantech fund. Aforementioned notions mostly align it with 
the concept of diagnostic system defined in the LOC framework. Spreadsheet models were 
used to generate estimations of shareholder value from internal operational performance 
drivers, gathered from the target companies. Actual outputs were compared to target levels. 
Thus, there existed output and standard elements. If the calculated IRR fell below the desired 
(boundary) rate, corrective actions were to be considered interactively with the target company 
CEOs. However, the system was used irregularly and not comprehensively. Return rate 
estimations were facility-specific and mainly served the purpose of getting a facility 
established. As mentioned above, universal and formal information system did not exist. Target 
companies rather communicated their data further, which was analyzed by the fund 
management using own spreadsheets. Arguably, diagnostic nature of aforementioned financial 
modeling can be positioned better by using the revised framework. Diagnostic elements or 
"systems" had inseparable supporting role for underlying boundary systems, such as desired 
IRR and more operational resource allocation requirements derived from it. 
4.3.3.2 Diagnostic elements implemented by the fund 
Diagnostic systems were developed in the target companies during the late phases of the fund 
lifespan. The fund management had a central supporting role. Even though it was not actively 
involved in their practical development, interaction and ideas from the fund level originated 
implementation of certain systems into the target companies. Again, aligned with the fund 
philosophy, discretion and accountabilities were delegated further to the target company 
managers. This effect was caused rather by pull of the business expansion and its requirements 
than pushing a bold vision. The fund management did not prioritize implementation of 
extensive information systems. Apparently, it was not their core competence. Furthermore, 
actions and lack of supporting evidence imply that the fund management did not regard it as a 
major driver of value in fund strategy implementation. For example, there was no urge to 
integrate complementary resources concerning extensive information system transformation. 
Due to expansion of business, there was a need identified to replace and unify smaller ad hoc 
systems with established ones. Thus, causally the role of the fund was an intermediate one. The 
fund management had minor orientation towards leading major information system changes 
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and building extensive monitoring. For a long time they were not seen as strategic priorities. 
As the quote below demonstrates, expansion and growth were seen as inherent drivers that 
eventually forced to start considering improved diagnostic systems as well. 
"After the fund came into the scene, absolutely we have developed systems and 
monitoring, but that is already directly related to the fact that earlier there was a 
facility, and now we are building the fifth one, and this growth has been fast, and for 
that reason there has been a need to develop these systems." (CEO, Asset company) 
"If we get some feedback, then we take it seriously and fix if there is some problem to 
be fixed. Even if it should cause us costs, then it is just self-evident that we are going to 
take responsibility of it and fix it." (CEO, Asset company) 
Overall business mindset was increased in the Asset company by the operational use of 
diagnostic elements that directed focus on basic business operations. Especially reclamations 
and other feedback from the customers were paid attention, as can be seen from the latter quote. 
In light of dynamic capabilities and the fund as a whole, integrated capabilities of the target 
companies were built further to support an idiosyncratic combination. In this example, 
extending market orientation in a company that had a strong engineering focus was supported 
by MCS imposed by the fund level. 
Even though the Technology company had a dual role in the fund strategy, worth noting is that 
the fund management supported implementation of their market oriented mindset into the 
Technology company by fine-tuning diagnostic elements and organizational accountabilities. 
Customer surface was added into the organization chart as a visible element. 
"Now in the brainstorming event of the board this organization chart and structure 
have been changed in a way that the customer surface has been included. That is for 
that we understand it this way also, how important sales aspect is for the company, and 
that it is not just about the board, the CEO, finance and different units, but that there 
are also sales and international customers as well as Finnish customers. It is not purely 
an idea of the fund management, but it has developed during this board work" (CEO, 
Technology company) 
Yet another form of fund strategy implementation with diagnostic elements was a consideration 
and an attempt to introduce a financial incentive system into the Technology company. Aligned 
with the fund philosophy, the CEOs of the target companies were granted discretion over their 
own incentive systems. According to the CEO of the Technology company, potential annual 
bonus reward per average employee for exceeding the desired performance would have been 
so little amount that the idea was abandoned.  
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Simons (1995, 74-77) identifies role for diagnostic systems as a backbone for individual 
evaluation and reward systems. One minor example of such use is the bonus scheme for the 
CEO of the Asset company. If results in a monthly income statement of the Asset company 
reached certain level, the CEO could earn bonus income on top of the monthly salary. 
Following the definition of LOC, direct income statements were used as a diagnostic system 
by providing formal practice of standards, measurability and ability for correction. TCE 
approach to MCS (Speklé 2001) suggests that action controls monitor  behavior and 
compliance, whereas result orientation focuses more on target setting and outcomes. Aligned 
with the fund philosophy, aforementioned incentive scheme emphasized outcomes. The 
revised framework would imply realizing it as a diagnostic use of "performance" (beliefs 
lever). However, summarizing the variety of diagnostic elements of the fund, they were more 
related to activity-specific and operational side. They will be discussed more in further text 
parts. 
4.3.3.3 Diagnostic side of the quality system 
Notable fund level initiative for implementing diagnostic systems into the target companies 
was the quality system. Practices of regular supervision and standardization supported 
corrective actions, if needed. Thus, the quality system bears resemblance to the diagnostic 
control system of the original LOC framework. However, further examination reveals that the 
core of the system was not just that of evaluating performance and improving quality of specific 
internal processes. As the managing director of the PE funds branch mentioned, quality of 
operations was not about technology as such. It was meant to support improvement in the 
organizational culture. Especially the CEO of the Technology company introduced the quality 
system by describing its role for supporting communication and clarifying orientation in form 
of a handbook and weekly letters.  
As already discussed, the fund imposed an implementation of a quality system into the target 
companies. Relevant in light of diagnostic elements, it had standardization practices in order 
to supervise and direct performance. Thus, the fund was involved in implementing operational 
diagnostic elements as well. According to the managing director of the PE funds branch, the 
quality standardization in the Technology company was an important control mechanism. 
Similar quality system implementation was started in the Asset company, but very recently at 
the time of the interview. Thus, the CEO of the Asset company did not have comprehensive 
examples to be given in the interview. 
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"A big thing, which we did there, especially in the Technology company, was that they 
prepare standards for quality. So they did this ISO quality definition. The idea came 
from us like from the owner side. It isn't so much about technology as such, but it 
relates to the culture and processes, like quality of the operations." (Managing 
director, PE funds) 
Aligned with this culture and process approach is the fact that target company discussions of 
the quality system were more related to beliefs aspects, as can be seen from the beliefs part 
above. Especially the CEO of the Technology company discussed rather cultural than 
mechanical effects of the quality system, relating to communication of the big message and 
giving major orientation. Whereas big picture and orientation were "positive" implications of 
the system, quality standardization refers to explicit control in a "negative" or constraining 
sense. Once again, the revised framework of LOC contains explanatory power by paying 
attention to interconnected nature of different control levers. The diagnostic side of the quality 
system can be understood as identifying diagnostic ways to use beliefs and boundary systems 
in the target companies, that is, operational "performance" and "compliance". 
4.3.4 Interactive systems 
Interactive elements had a significant role as a backbone connecting management layers and 
control mechanisms. Board work formed an interface between the strategic and operational 
levels, that is to say, the fund management and the target companies. In addition to its 
interactive nature, the whole strategy implementation, communication of beliefs systems, 
general enforcement of boundary systems and the use of diagnostic elements occurred in form 
of interaction. Especially the investment director had a central role in these activities. 
Examined interactive elements are generally recognizable by using the MCS framework. 
Original definition of interactive control systems in LOC emphasize dialogue about strategic 
uncertainties throughout the organization. Diagnostic system has four characteristic features: 
(1) importance according to the highest levels of management, (2) it demands frequent and 
regular attention from managers at all levels, (3) generated data will be interpreted and 
discussed face to face, and (4) it serves continual challenge. (Simons 1995, 180.) Utilizing 
ideas of the revised framework of Tessier & Otley (2012), interactive controls were found from 
both strategic and operational levels. The first mentioned refers to interaction between fund 
level management and target company CEOs. In turn, the latter describes activities of the target 
company CEOs to discuss and enable employees to question and share insights operationally. 
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4.3.4.1 Strategic interaction 
The Asset company did have an own board of directors, including the investment director. 
However, its role was rather nominal. More effective channel of interaction was the advisory 
team, described earlier at the beginning of the case part. All central decisions of strategic nature 
were made there with the key personnel involved in the fund. Serving the central interactive 
role, it effectively replaced the task of the board of directors. Notable for this team composition 
was the involvement of the CEO of the parent Asset management company. In addition to CEO 
of the PE funds branch and the investment director, two external specialists were included as 
well. Again, the investment director served as the link connecting the target companies with 
the strategic level and higher order considerations. 
"There were two external people as members, and we invited them because they might 
have views concerning this kind of business, strategy and its development. We took 
them in order to have external discussion and support. In this project, this thing has 
been more advanced than in any other project we have had before, and it has really 
been useful." (Managing director, PE funds) 
Furthermore, the fund had a council of investors including three representatives of the original 
investors. According to the fund policy documentation, the role of the investment council was 
that of supervising the general partner. Thus, no decisions were prepared among the council. 
The investment director was responsible for presenting current issues at the meetings. 
However, the managing director of the PE funds saw more interactive and strategic elements 
in the work of the council of investors: 
"All the time we have had different discussions and it has varied from side to side. We 
talked about technology, about if the original plant was the right one to choose and so 
forth. Then we have talked about the market situation, and they have been informed all 
the time about this schedule of ours. It has been very important for one investor that we 
invest all the money they have committed to. -- But if these discussions have generated 
anything new, I'd say no." 
Unlike in diagnostic systems, there were extensive routines for interaction. First, as mentioned 
above, the Cleantech fund had an advisory team serving the function of the strategic board of 
directors. As an interactive communication channel, it supported alignment of the fund 
management with the interests of the owners and the Asset management company that had the 
investors as their customers. However, control in constraining sense was not the main priority. 
As examined above, discussions were motivated by strategic uncertainties and opportunities. 
Additionally, inviting industry professionals to the team as a source of interactive discussions 
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can be interpreted as a dynamic capability. The aim was to integrate relevant human capital 
from external sources.  
Interactive links throughout the fund setting were highly dependent on the investment director. 
Both target companies had their own boards of directors. The accountable investment director 
of the fund served as a member of the advisory team as well as a chairman of the board for 
each target company. He was also invited to share information and insights with the council of 
investors. Thus, the investment director formed a link between strategic and operational 
entities. Discussions held in the meetings were of strategic nature, based on insights and 
information throughout the hierarchy. As the managing director of the PE funds branch 
mentioned, they had a mentality "to challenge" the target company CEOs to complement 
insights on uncertainties that the fund management had left open for discussion. Furthermore, 
these CEOs were expected have own initiative to share their ideas and insights too. Therefore, 
these interactive elements are clearly recognizable as interactive control systems defined in the 
LOC. 
4.3.4.2 Implications in target companies 
Interaction worked both top-down and bottom-up inside the fund. Enforcement and 
specification of other control systems often took place in form of interactive discussions, rather 
than extensive use of technical monitoring. Bottom-up potential of interactive elements was 
utilized, since interaction enabled emergence of new strategic discussions originating from 
operational insights, for example information gathered from diagnostic systems. In addition to 
regular board meetings, frequent interaction between strategic and operational staff took place 
in more informal ways, such as on the phone and via email. Readiness to interaction was a 
general cultural element. Additional specific examples of interaction will be described in the 
latter parts of the case description and analysis. 
Remarkably, development of diagnostic systems and their interactive use were enhanced 
during the ownership period of the fund. Although, fund level influencing was not 
straightforward. The late quality system implementation in the Technology company 
introduced more information sharing in form of executive board. Furthermore, those members 
communicated own notes and background material further to the members of the board, which 
included the fund level investment director. The CEO of the Technology company defined 
these routines not as "interactive" in one's own words, but anyway working in both directions. 
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Altogether, the fund level management had a notable role in increasing interaction at the target 
company level. Implementation of the quality system, an idea from the fund, introduced more 
information sharing into the Technology company in form of executive board. Even though 
the CEO did not use the term "interactive", resemblance to interactive control systems of the 
LOC framework remains significant. Information flow happened in both directions and had 
potential to spark strategic discussions both in the target company and even in the Cleantech 
fund. Furthermore, interaction was hard-wired into the culture. For example, the investment 
director could contact the CEOs of the target companies informally and regularly. As discussed 
in the case part, interaction was a backbone and closely related to many activities such as 
business and technology development. Not all will be discussed here, but later in their own 
topics. 
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4.4 Activity-specific use of MCS 
Figure 12. Activities of strategy implementation 
Figure 12 above demonstrates the path of fund strategy implementation into the target 
companies. Most of the activities followed new facility projects, but the path was opened for 
acquisitions as well. Based on the strategic planning materials, specific activities were 
identified. They have been realized in the figure, and they serve as the structure for the 
following text parts. These activities consist of (1) evaluating and launching new projects, (2) 
business development, (3) technology development, and (4) negotiation of acquisitions. Each 
entity, PE fund (parent company), Asset company and Technology company had their own 
roles and emphasis depending on the activity in question. Evaluation and launching of new 
Invest 
Build 
facilities 
Acquire 
companies 
4. Negotiate for acquisitions 
1. Evaluate and launch projects 
2. Prepare and develop business 
3. Develop technology 
MCS 
1. Encouraging belief: Beliefs system that encourages to proceed under 
uncertainty 
2. Technological boundaries: boundary system that defined approach to use 
and development of technology 
3. Focus for business preparations: boundary system that define 
accountabilities, redirection from diagnostic systems, interaction on emerging 
insights 
4. Information for decision-making: Boundary and diagnostic systems to 
evaluate profitability. Boundaries to define division of labor, slight interaction 
MCS 
1. Preparation and 
2. Customer relations: Beliefs and interactive systems that encouraged to 
proceed independently, symbolic actions to show support 
3. General business development: 
Interactive considerations about strategic uncertainties. Boundaries: 
compliance supervised interactively 
MCS 
1. Incremental development: beliefs and boundary systems defined focus for 
incremental development 
2. Operational redirection and…  
3. Strategic considerations: emerging insights from diagnostic systems 
sparked interactive considerations at the fund level 
MCS 
1. Expectations of PE investors: Beliefs systems, PE culture 
2. Employing expertise of subsidiaries: Boundary systems that define 
division of labor and accountabilities. Interaction: insights and considerations 
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projects (1) were intensive processes that mostly took place in the establishment phase of each 
facility. Business and technology development (2-3) have been more continuous processes in 
the background. Negotiation of acquisitions (4) relates to the nature of PE industry and the 
option of the fund to seize appearing opportunities of inorganic growth. Strategy 
implementation by these activities involved MCS practices, which have been summarized in 
the figure. These MCS will be identified and analyzed comprehensively in the following text 
parts. Notable for these controls is that they are being examined indirectly by interview 
questions based on formal materials concerning strategic activities and processes. They have 
potential to reveal MCS practices and their influence that are not explicitly stated in formal 
materials or interviews concerning explicit LOC categories. 
4.4.1 Evaluating and launching new projects 
New facility projects, so called "green field investments" were the primary element of building 
business and implementing the fund strategy. Throughout the investment period from 2012 to 
2015, the fund started five facility projects. Behind these implemented projects were altogether 
15 plans for different municipalities. This work required clear roles for each party: the 
Cleantech fund management, the Asset company and the Technology company. Both directors 
of the fund, as well as the CEOs of the target companies expressed it in the interviews that the 
fund brought required capital (equity and substantial debt leverage), whereas the Asset 
company was in charge of implementing facility projects, to constitute the entrepreneurial 
element at that part. In turn, the task of the Technology company was to deliver, design and 
construct the facilities for the Asset company. This division of labor was also stated explicitly 
in the early planning documents and Power point slides from 2012. In addition to bringing 
financial capital into the set of resources, according to the managing director of the PE funds 
branch, the fund level management was accountable for strategic control and decisions 
concerning these projects. Accountabilities and decision rights were formally stated in the 
organization structure, policies and contracts. Approach towards new projects was supported 
by encouraging belief from the fund level. Focus was brought by technological boundaries and 
division of labor among fund entities. Additionally, information required in decision-making 
was gathered by involving all fund entities with their specific knowledge. 
4.4.1.1 Encouraging belief 
More detailed level of strategy implementation in launching new projects involved aspects that 
can be categorized following the four levers of control. A clear fund-level strategic decision of 
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taking over the markets required bold entrepreneurial courage and initiative rather than time-
consuming data gathering, analysis and preparation. Thus, implementation of such strategic 
move was not supported mainly by diagnostic and boundary controls, but by beliefs. The target 
companies were explicitly encouraged to be active and take initiatives. This encouragement 
was based on fund level assumptions concerning the markets and the impact of own operations 
on the environment. Furthermore, strategic interaction took place between the investment 
director and the CEOs of the target companies in form of board work and informal 
communications. 
"One thing about our direction was that we stated it to be worth leaning forward and 
taking risks, so that the thing goes further and investment decisions will be made even if 
there were a slightly insufficient information at the moment. So, we saw that it would be 
fruitful to engage municipalities and carry on implementation. We had this belief that 
when you make the initiative first, then the markets will follow, and more input waste 
will become available." (Investment director, PE funds) 
"Such operating instructions have been given to us that we in the Asset company have 
started to make raw material contracts and contracts of selling biogas on the other 
hand. Then, assessment of the risk, that if we have enough base of these deals, and if we 
believe in the potential amount of deals in each project in order to reach profitability, 
then we have had discussions with the fund management also." (CEO, Asset company) 
"This initiation of new projects has been typically conducted together with the CEO of 
the Asset company. They have brought in their own part, but we have in practice 
explored the markets and evaluated the routes of each raw material supplier, and how 
end products could be utilized." (CEO, Technology company) 
In sum, the fund management encouraged target companies to lean forward and proceed with 
operations instead of hesitating too much. Primarily, it was a fund level belief of the potential 
market. However, it was not stated formally, but rather through guidance in form of interactive 
discussions with the target company CEOs. The CEO of the Asset company mentioned that 
these discussions concerned risks. Diagnostic drivers such as deal values were involved as well. 
Arguably, the revised framework will clarify understanding of the control systems used in the 
case of encouraging belief. There were interactive and diagnostic uses for the strategic 
performance (belief) system. Furthermore, encouraging beliefs system could be interpreted as 
"action rationalism" (Brunsson 1982) or judgment that recognizes value for rapid responses 
and agile operations in order to seize opportunities, rather than spending time and resources for 
additional assurance of viability of the opportunity. 
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4.4.1.2 Technological boundaries 
Clear roles in new facility projects were supported by focus and boundary elements as well. 
According to the managing director of the PE funds branch, very few explicit boundaries were 
used in strategy implementation. One of them was the choice to stick with already functioning 
technologies, resulting in avoidance of new technologies. As discussed earlier, the fund 
strategy was based on finding a suitable entrepreneur with evidence of capabilities and 
functioning technology to be applied in new projects. The idea of replicating a whole facility 
concept served as a boundary policy of constraining nature. Consequently, it imposed strict 
limits on practical design alternatives of each facility area. 
“More or less big statement is that we aim to focus on this basic business of ours. We 
don't proceed very easily to develop something, for example production based on the 
input materials, and to do experimentations. -- Quite cautiously will we invest in some 
new development path. That comes from the fact that we have an ambitious growth 
target and scarce resources.” (CEO, Asset company) 
"When the house is full of engineers, they got a tremendous spirit to develop those 
processes all the time, and even when a project is being built. Unfortunately, that leads 
or can lead to a situation that eventually the customer gets a better product, but also all 
our money goes to development, and nothing will be left for salaries. Thus, it has been 
stated in the quality documentation that when some project is being sold, then it will 
not be developed further than what is promised." (CEO, Technology company) 
In brief, technological boundary systems were mainly generated from the strategic belief of 
achieving success by replicating already functioning concept. It was a beliefs system that had 
a direct boundary side. Sometimes there were opportunities to invest in further development, 
and they were evaluated through interactive controls. The quotes above demonstrate how 
limitations and scarcity had their impact on control systems, as discussed before. Eventually 
the approach to technological boundaries in the target companies as operational boundary was 
aligned with the strategic fund level boundary. 
4.4.1.3 Focusing business preparations 
The task of gaining customer base before launching a facility was mainly the task of the Asset 
company. The fund management guided and focused target companies to prioritize certain 
operators when potential business partners were approached. According to the investment 
director who contacted the CEOs of the target companies even at daily basis, the Asset 
company was informed to start contacting from waste disposal companies, cooperate with them 
and carry on planning suitable locations for facilities. The Asset company gained new insights 
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from these operations, which were communicated interactively to the fund management level, 
mainly to the investment director. Again, the investment director had intensive strategic 
considerations together with the managing director of the PE funds branch.  
"How we see the fund, its management has given us strong support to do the things like 
our operational management and also the Technology company suggests. Little have 
they had to claim otherwise. It has worked out properly, and they have counted on the 
own expertise of the entrepreneurs." (CEO, Asset company) 
Both directors of the fund mentioned that the Asset company and especially the CEO were held 
accountable for gathering customers. This task was also stated explicitly in the original 
planning documents from 2012. These preparation activities will be discussed again in the part 
of business development. 
To sum up, business preparations were mainly the task of the Asset company. Focus was 
supported by fund level instructions that served as operational boundaries. Content of 
instructions, such as priority list of activities was derived from fund level analysis described 
before as diagnostic systems and diagnostic use of boundaries. Furthermore, the Asset 
company gained new insights from their operations, which were shared and evaluated 
interactively with the strategic fund level. Notable is that these boundaries were not stated nor 
enforced formally in the sense of the original LOC. Definition of these boundary systems will 
be recognized better by the revised framework, which acknowledges social type of control and 
interactive way of using boundaries. 
4.4.1.4 Information for decision-making 
Boundary and diagnostic elements were applied together in evaluating and implementing new 
facility projects. Major aspects that were taken into account in decision-making were location 
and required rate of return. The latter included figures from initial investment, business and 
capital structure. Generally, there was a division of labor among the companies in the fund. 
Different entities were accountable for generating their own parts into the calculation. 
As discussed earlier, nation-wide network as a strategic belief meant that facility locations were 
at suitable distance away from each other. The fund management took significant role in this 
exploration of locations. Achieving this network of facility positions was a strategic target. 
Thus, there were no specific locations such as central municipalities that would have had 
particular strategic significance. Within this frame, cannibalization was a major risk that was 
identified. Both fund management and target companies had their roles in controlling this risk 
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with diagnostic elements. Exploration of suitable target locations was supported by 
geographical distance measures and costs. Due to delivery costs of waste as production input, 
operating a facility within a radius of 150 kilometers from waste disposal customers was seen 
as a prerequisite in order to remain profitable. Generating this boundary element involved 
interaction with the already acquired target companies, who had business-specific knowledge. 
"We estimated our market potential using the map of Finland, drawing with a compass 
around certain municipalities. We drew circles with a radius of 150 kilometers and 
then explored the markets within those areas, all potential sources of waste. Then, that 
way we found location for each facility." (Investment director, PE funds) 
Scarcity of resources set a challenge to allocate them and bring focus to finish one project at a 
time. Otherwise multiple simultaneous facility projects would have risked the fund strategy, 
time schedule and financial performance. 
"The biggest risk in a sense is that if you have too many ongoing projects at the same 
time. When we built this chain of facilities, and did not buy it, then it meant that you 
could not have many simultaneous facilities in progress. Because, that you could build 
one project, you needed to have it functioning on the same day it was finished. It means 
that you needed to have those input flows, customers, and all other things managed and 
in place, and that was like a big job. And then if you had taken too much at one time, 
then you had the risk that construction was finished, but the rate of capacity in use 
would have been down, meaning that the risks would have then followed to the 
financial side: covenants, general development and financial performance and stuff..." 
(Managing director, PE funds) 
Investment decisions were made by filtering proposals through strategic constraints, required 
rate of return, location and time. Behind each project was a calculation that involved 
information gathered from target companies. Final decision, whether to invest in a facility in a 
certain location was always made by the fund management. Therefore, final calculations were 
made at the fund level by the investment director together with analysts. Calculations were 
multi-page spreadsheet models including operational data, financial income statements, 
balance sheets and financial contracts with financial institutions providing leverage. Task of 
exploring information was delegated to the CEOs of the target companies. As discussed earlier 
about diagnostic aspects, it was considered that the target companies focused on those drivers 
behind the income statements that required specific information, and the fund management 
focused on the balance sheet measures, allocation of capital. A quote from the CEO of the 
Asset company expresses the notion that knowledge of profession-specific and tacit nature was 
utilized by interaction with the CEOs of the target companies. 
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"Well, actually it has gone so, that to a large extent decision-making and preparation 
of new facility proposals have been in the hands of the Asset company, and the fund 
management has counted on the knowledge we have. All acquisition of market 
information has been the task of the Asset company." (CEO, Asset company) 
The CEO of the Asset company was in charge of checking internal operational and business-
related assumptions behind the valuation models. Waste, energy and fertilizer-specific 
revenues and costs were included, to name a few. The most important operational data 
consisted of contracts divided to certain and potential ones. They determined amount of input, 
majority of the revenue and the actual percentage of capacity to be utilized. Additionally, 
potential capacity was an important measure with behavioral implications for the management 
of the Asset company. Unused capacity directed efforts to explore new customers, which was 
a crucial element behind revenue and financial performance. In turn, good capacity levels 
released more attention to other issues. This effort alignment was supported by providing 
financial incentives. If figures in monthly income statement reached certain level, the CEO of 
the Asset company could earn bonus income on top of the monthly salary. 
In turn, the CEO of the Technology company participated in the investment evaluation by 
estimating costs of the initial investment. They had specific knowledge to conduct calculations 
at that part. Interviewees appeared to have very parallel and informative views concerning the 
role of the Technology company in new facility projects. The managing director of the PE 
funds branch emphasized the in-house nature and results: 
"We have known the investment costs on behalf of the facilities, since we have had the 
in-house company working on them. Therefore nearly all cost overruns have been 
minimal. So, the projects have worked out just as planned, on schedule, but also 
according to costs and quality as well. Then it forms good basis for the facilities to 
build business further." 
The investment director made an additional point, that the Technology company bore 
significant risks involved in budget estimations. Consequently, interests were aligned. 
"When they put the numbers on the table, then they were accountable for building the 
facility for that price. They had a clear role." (Investment director, PE funds) 
However, comments and material at the fund level revealed nothing about actual practices 
behind project estimations. In turn, the CEO of the Technology company shed light on the 
specific task of their company: 
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"In practice, when we build a facility, we have like 1200 rows different articles for 
which we prepare a budget for ourselves, for implementation, and then in practice each 
row will be observed, if we have managed to operate for within the limits we have 
estimated. Also, monthly and sometimes even more frequently we follow, if our 
expected project-specific margin remains, and in which direction it is going." 
The division of labor behind generating information and making decisions concerning new 
facility projects can be seen from the comments of Investment director and target company 
CEOs: 
"We abandoned all projects that had no chance of achieving the desired rate of return 
with the basic assumptions. That was clear. Then we also abandoned such projects that 
would have taken too much time to develop. They would not have been finished within 
our time horizon." (Investment director, PE funds) 
"We have not endorsed any projects that wouldn't seem profitable at our point of view, 
and that view has been practically linked to it, that the investment director has 
conducted the final round, done the calculations, thrown some own assumptions on top 
of ours and checked if the IRR spawns the decision to go or not." (CEO, Technology 
company) 
"It has gone so that the investment calculations have leaned on the expertise of the 
Asset company and the Technology company. Then the advisory team may have taken a 
stand on some issue, like questioning something, and then we have worked more 
intensively on it and clarified things." (CEO, Asset company) 
Interactive aspects were essential. According to the investment director, who was the most 
central character operating on the interface between strategy and operations, the fund and the 
target companies, interaction was continuous. The Cleantech fund management had meetings 
concerning new facility projects on a monthly basis. CEOs of the target companies met with 
the chairman of the board (the investment director) on a weekly basis. Furthermore, they 
contacted each other on the phone and via e-mail more frequently, often on a daily basis. This 
view of the past experiences, which was supported by the CEOs and the investment director in 
the interviews, can also be verified by noting the vast amount of archived emails between these 
people on the subject.  
External communication was an additional aspect, which linked indirectly to internal strategic 
interaction. Whilst it was the task of the Asset company to communicate with potential 
customers, that information required frequent strategic focus from the fund management layer. 
According to the investment director, frequent emerging information provided by the CEO of 
the Asset company was in a central role in building the case. Part of the cases were 
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discontinued, since the external potential partner was not willing to proceed within the schedule 
proposed by the fund. In other words, cooperation was ruled out by pre-defined strategic 
boundaries of the fund. 
In summary, fund level decision-making required information gathering and processing. 
Calculations were conducted in order to evaluate, if proposed facilities could achieve sufficient 
IRR. For example the strategic risk of cannibalization was taken into account by calculating 
boundary distance of 150 kilometers between each facility. Thus, strategic boundary and 
diagnostic systems or "diagnostic use" of boundary systems had operational implications. 
There was a division of labor where parts of the necessary information were to be collected by 
the target companies from their own operational diagnostic systems. Relevant operational 
information was communicated and evaluated regularly through board work as a strategic 
interactive system. Following the idea of the revised framework, boundary systems were used 
in interactive ways as well. Notably, part of the cases were discontinued, since the external 
potential partner was not willing to proceed within the strategic boundaries of the fund. 
4.4.2 Business development 
For the fund strategy, business development of the Asset company was central throughout the 
life cycle of the fund. This topic covers three kind of activities that had strong market 
orientation and interface with business partners. The first business development operations 
took place even before facilities were built. They shaped the whole outcome of strategy 
implementation and determined future prospects. Second, particular emphasis will be laid on 
maintenance and development of customer relations. Orientation to markets was a focal aspect 
under development, since the operational managers having engineering background were given 
more business responsibility. The fund level directors were more involved with overall 
business development in cooperation and interaction with the operational CEOs. Thus, general 
business development will be described additionally as the third aspect. 
4.4.2.1 Preparation activities 
The first business activities concerned contracts for raw materials. According to the investment 
director, these deals were mostly about public bidding. Winning these bids was a strategic 
factor that enabled facility projects to proceed in planned locations. Efforts in communication 
with potential customers was held as an important driver for success in winning. 
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According to the old planning materials from 2012, the CEO of the Asset company was to be 
responsible for seizing opportunities related to raw material deals. Latter interviews with both 
the CEO of the Asset company and the fund level directors noted that this plan was followed, 
and the practical tasks were mainly carried out by the Asset company. According to the 
managing director of the PE funds, active control over these activities had been minimally 
practiced from the fund level. Any involvement was rather of supporting nature. An interview 
quote by the CEO of the Asset company demonstrates, how the operational values had a real 
effect on deals: 
"We cannot enter into such price competition when we know that our competitor's 
practices do not fit with our ideals. So, the values have effects. It will not always benefit 
us immediately, but we have a strong belief that in the long run it will, and our image 
will remain good." (CEO, Asset company) 
4.4.2.2 Customer relations management 
Soon after the early facility projects started to proceed, maintaining and developing customer 
relations further became an essential driver for financial performance. The fund level 
encouraged to allocate resources for these tasks and hire professionals. Notably, the investment 
director participated in many customer meetings. According to the director, one's presence 
served two purposes. First, representative of the owners from the fund level raised credibility 
of the Asset company in the eyes of potential business partners. Second, participation was 
supposed to signal cooperation and enhance belief of the Asset company that the fund was 
seriously implementing the plan. 
"It was before most the task of the operational management. The CEO of the Asset 
company was in charge of those operations. And since we saw it to become so 
important thing, we hired two more persons to work on it. Altogether there were 
actually three new people in the Asset company focusing on customer relations with 
waste disposal, energy companies and like farmers also." (Investment director, PE 
funds) 
Thus, the fund management paid attention to support operational activities of customer 
relations management. They encouraged the Asset company to allocate resources for it, that is, 
to hire new people. Behind those considerations were interactive discussions about the 
operational situation. Furthermore, the investment director even attended to the meetings with 
some customers. That presence supported the fund philosophy and symbolized beliefs systems 
about unified fund and sufficient resources to implement the strategy. 
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4.4.2.3 General business development 
In overall business development of the Asset company, the fund level directors were more 
actively involved. Both fund level directors emphasized their role in interactive board work. 
The investment director emphasized the division of labor between strategic and operational 
issues and that the issues of the fund were limited to strategic questions. In turn, the managing 
director of the PE funds branch mentioned that the fund level management offered conceptual 
ideas and even brought model of organization structure for the Asset company. Furthermore, 
central management practice of general business development was "to challenge", as the 
managing director of the PE funds branch put it: 
"Now when you suddenly have x number of people working for you and several 
concepts, you have to think about branding, organizing... you cannot do it all by 
yourself as an entrepreneur. Then this way we have challenged the operating 
management, that you have to change the approach. And also in the way that if one has 
been the most suitable person for being in charge of production. Should there be a 
manager for logistics accountable for those things, and should there be somebody to 
take care of the sales, and that kind of stuff. Systematically. And then of course we have 
challenged the CEO as a person and as a leader, that should one develop leadership as 
a person as well" 
"Discussions which we had in board meetings and through which we have developed 
this business, they were based on challenging the operational management about 
viability of the model in question. If I may use one facility as an example, and input, 
which were meant to be collected from nearby municipalities, we asked about the 
region. Will there be better prices, secure supply, longer contract, what uncertainties 
related etc. In these kind of things we were systematic, but we had no predefined model 
for management practices." (Managing director, PE funds) 
Altogether, general business development and its preparation activities took place following 
the idea of division of labor. Strategically, accountabilities for different entities of the fund 
were defined explicitly in the examined materials concerning strategic planning, resembling 
typical boundary systems. However, facility-specific business development emphasized 
discretion of the operational management in the Asset company. In light of strategy 
implementation, support rather than control defined these activities. Thus, there were no 
specific operational boundaries found to be used for business development. Rather, beliefs and 
interaction systems were recognized. Mostly the CEO of the Asset company directed the efforts 
to negotiate raw material contracts. The fund did not practice formal enforcing and testing for 
boundaries. Since the target company CEOs and the fund level management communicated 
continuously with each other on daily issues, alignment was essentially based on underlying 
beliefs systems and interaction. Following the conceptualization of the revised framework, 
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beliefs and boundary systems can be seen used in an interactive way in the case of business 
development. Again, managerial discretion and the absence of formal boundaries can be seen 
as an outcome of the overall fund philosophy implemented by the fund.  
In light of dynamic capabilities, improved business understanding in the target companies 
together with fund-wide division of labor extended external market observation. For example, 
location-specific market information was accumulated in the Asset company during business 
development. This ability to process specific information independently from a business 
perspective complemented scarce resources of the fund management to identify and imagine 
opportunities. It was the use of MCS that enabled expansion of dynamic capabilities. Beliefs 
systems supported independent and capable role for target company CEOs. Aligned with these 
beliefs systems, cautious approach to micromanagement and moderate amount of predefined 
boundary control from the fund level left space for emerging insights. Additionally, frequent 
use of interactive systems effectively linked parts together to serve the division of labor. 
4.4.3 Technological development 
The Technology company was in charge of major technology development due to its expertise 
and dual strategic role. Additionally, incremental and more operational development took place 
all the time in facilities of the Asset company. Even though the fund strategy strongly 
emphasized already functioning technologies and minimization of technology risk, it did not 
disable technological development or experiments completely. Generally, strategic beliefs and 
boundaries directed focus to incremental innovations, rather than radical ones. The fund level 
management had not imposed strict operational limits on the target companies, but rather relied 
on interaction and alertness to emerging ideas. Operational redirection with diagnostic 
elements could yield incremental technology development in the Asset company. More 
substantial technology development and technology changes required interaction with the fund 
level. 
4.4.3.1 Beliefs and boundaries for incremental development 
The general message down from the fund level encouraged to put effort into incremental 
technological development and generating new ideas, according to the investment director. 
Then these ideas were discussed in the board with the investment director. Moreover, the 
investment director who had been representing fund level management in the boards of both 
target companies concluded that technological development in the Asset company emphasized 
fertilizers, whereas the Technology company focused on production processes. Notably, the 
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CEO of the Asset company emphasized the focus on business and prudence with technology 
development. 
"These facilities have developed significantly on the way. The first facility didn't 
include handling of bio waste, but the others do. Then this latest facility is like version 
3.0, if the first was 1.0 and the others 2.0" (Investment director) 
"I'm not saying that we wouldn't follow technologies, for example, and how they 
develop and stuff, but we are not the first ones to test them. We are not the operator 
who tries everything. Then, we would rather want to implement and invest in already 
tested solutions. Of course, then we follow, how different technologies develop." (CEO, 
Asset company) 
In comparison, approach to technology development was more straightforward in the 
Technology company. 
"We are doing it always when there are some resources free. I mean mostly human 
resources. We are doing this kind of internal product development somewhat all the 
time. -- Not so, let's say management development maybe, or that kind of experiments, 
but things related to our own products." (CEO, Technology company) 
The fund strategy was not based on a belief of radical innovation, but replication of existing 
solutions and rather incremental development. Thus, beliefs and boundary systems were used 
to bring focus. Especially the Asset company was assigned to focus on business development 
and at most developing fertilizers, which was originally defined in the fund strategy. Actual 
technological development took place mostly in the Technology company. Due to its dual 
strategy, attitude towards technology development was more liberal and straightforward. 
4.4.3.2 Operational redirection 
Technological development had not been steered from fund level with notable diagnostic 
elements. In turn, diagnostic practices imposed by the target company managers had a 
significant role in technology development. Interactive use of diagnostic control elements in 
the Asset company had sparked initiatives that required higher level considerations. For 
example, how facilities follow water balances, the CEO of the Asset company described basic 
diagnostic correction procedure: 
"When we have followed how we have operated and then noted that it requires some 
changes, then it has been made, and we have continued monitoring how it will do after 
that." 
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The same procedure had generated interactive discussions that resulted in incremental 
production development within the frames of the fund: 
"Concerning this same water balance issue, actual investment decisions have been 
made in order to develop production." (CEO, Asset company) 
The target companies were expected to share their emerging technological insights with the 
fund management. Operational diagnostic systems served as a basis for operational redirection 
and incremental technological development. These diagnostic systems provided basis for 
interactive discussions. To some extent, aforementioned control systems supported and 
specified asset reconfiguration as a dynamic capability. 
4.4.3.3 Interaction for strategic considerations 
New business opportunities and immediate revenue with the latest facility sparked 
technological development in order to include fertilizers in the process. The practical idea 
originated from operation-specific knowledge, which was discussed interactively with the fund 
level. Resources and permission to proceed came from the fund level. 
"For example in the latest facility project, new raw material, new waste has made us to 
arrange the fertilizer scheme differently. That is where we are doing a new kind of 
solution. As such, it didn't start from that we had this kind of fertilizer stuff available 
for some kind of use, but from that we had a new raw material and the revenue from it 
enabled us to arrange the last production phase differently. So, there was that element, 
and we identify potential in it." (CEO, Asset company) 
"That fertilizer side is, well, a big challenge, which we have tried to develop inside the 
Asset company. How we could generate fertilizers and bring it further as an own 
process. Now, looking back, that has come from us, that we enabled the experiment, 
allowed and not rejected it. We had to hire an extra person, and that cost was like an 
investment. Although, about that it would have come from us that take a look at this, 
start making mold out of this output and get it done, it didn't come from us" (Managing 
director, PE funds) 
Apparently, there were times when diagnostic redirection implied need for strategic permission 
and resources. For example, the latest facility project required strategic fund level attention in 
order to allow certain experiments and process re-engineering. Apparently it was not clear, 
whether some ideas could fit within the boundaries of "incremental" development. Thus, these 
beliefs and boundary systems were used both diagnostically (operational level) and 
interactively (strategic level). 
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4.4.4 Negotiations of acquisitions 
In addition to so called “green field” investments of new facilities, inorganic expansion was an 
alternative path, enabled by the original fund policy, as discussed. The fund management was 
active in exploring and seizing opportunities related to acquisitions, meaning that the fund 
management led these operations. Seven negotiations took place during the investment period 
between 2012 and 2015 altogether. Even though any of them did not end in closing a deal, they 
were focal processes in implementing the fund strategy. Exploring opportunities for inorganic 
expansion were a fund level belief. Furthermore, these activities gave fund management 
valuable and real time information about the markets. In addition to the fund management, 
target companies were not completely isolated from these negotiations, which again made them 
objects of strategy implementation. Especially the expertise of the Technology company was 
employed. Finally, several example cases of negotiations and potential acquisitions will be 
revised in light of control mechanisms. 
4.4.4.1 Expectations of PE investors 
The role of PE investors was found out to be an additional strategic level belief that guided 
fund management to seek opportunities from other established businesses. 
"There was a belief that when you're with PE investor, acquisitions are relevant and 
can be expected. These discussions were held. We both contacted actively ourselves, 
opened discussions. Then we were contacted, since it was known that we had capital, 
and by default people tend to belief that PE investors is willing to buy, if the idea is 
good." (Investment director, PE funds) 
"We have had an approach that in order to get the fund started with good velocity, 
inorganic growth would be okay. Then we had two other operators in the same market, 
so we had to approach them." (Managing director, PE funds) 
4.4.4.2 Employing expertise of subsidiaries 
Whereas substantial efforts were put on the negotiations supported by the strategic beliefs of 
the fund, basic fund level controls concerning profitability evaluation, strategic alignment, 
operational values and schedule served as strict boundaries. The fund management introduced 
a division of labor for the target companies in order to evaluate potential targets, their 
profitability and compatibility with the fund. Key persons of the fund management and the 
target companies worked interactively in order to build common understanding. 
"Communication related to acquisitions was my responsibility. I held negotiations, it 
was my duty. I asked opinions from the CEOs of our target companies, and they were 
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discussed. Each of them had a chance to take a position and state their views. And well, 
before most, the views of the CEO of the Asset company had a lot of weight in a sense 
that one would have become the leader of those new ones, if acquisitions should have 
occurred. That was significant. The CEO of the Technology company, in turn, had 
technical view of the project." (Investment director, PE funds) 
According to the CEO of the Technology company, they were actively supporting the fund 
management with technical issues. Interviews with the fund level managers support this view. 
In addition to the traditional due diligence process, managerial evaluation of potential 
acquisition and organizational integration, technical aspects were central as well. Assets and 
their compatibility have been evaluated mostly by the Technology company. According to the 
managing director of the PE funds branch, technical expertise of the Technology company was 
employed in specific calculations and profitability evaluation. Furthermore, these views 
formed a basis for interactive, qualitative strategic considerations as well. 
"Alongside with our primary business, we have conducted technical due diligence for 
the fund when there have been potential business cases. Sometimes we have done it all 
by ourselves, and sometimes there has been a third party with us in order to raise 
credibility, but still we have always checked those cases thoroughly." (CEO of the 
Technology company)  
4.4.4.3 Effect of controls on negotiations 
Example cases shed light on the control systems that affected negotiation activities and 
decisions. In addition to formal calculations, the managing director of the PE funds branch 
described other qualitative reasons and comprehensive judgments about cases. There were 
three example cases that were particularly discussed. The first example did not seem promising 
at start, but the belief to explore acquisition opportunities increased optimism and prolonged 
negotiations. Collapse of the second example case illustrated the fund strategy of combining 
entrepreneurship, ideas and capital. Ownership of that business was dispersed over twenty 
people with occupational interests related to the case. An independent entrepreneur was 
lacking. The manager representing the owners did not have suitable professional background 
in order to serve the entrepreneurial function stated in the fund philosophy. Thus, the main 
concern were not the fixed assets in terms of accounting and production, but business mentality 
and alignment of behavior. The third example case was not concerned seriously, since the 
operator represented too different business that of biofuels, not gas. However, exploration was 
not terminated directly. Due to strategic boundaries, that option was still ruled out eventually. 
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In sum, opportunities for inorganic expansion were explored as a part of the fund strategy 
implementation. This procedure was based on the beliefs systems originating from PE culture. 
Industry practices are recognized as a typical source for beliefs systems in the original LOC 
framework (Simons 1995, 42). This belief not only enabled negotiations, but affected them 
strongly. For example, one case was prolonged even though it did not seem promising at the 
start. Furthermore, one divergent business outside the strategic boundaries was considered, but 
still it had to be ruled out. Exploration was affected by the beliefs and boundaries derived from 
the fund philosophy as well. This beliefs system that supported exploration of opportunities for 
inorganic expansion apparently supported asset integration, an activity of dynamic capabilities. 
Furthermore, aforementioned negotiations were supported by employing the expertise of the 
target companies. Thus, the target companies complemented the source for these dynamic 
capabilities. This division of labor was not static and of boundary nature, but rather ad hoc 
practice resulting in interactive discussions within the fund.  
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5 Discussion 
The aim of this research was to match theory with an empirical case on how PE investors used 
MCS in strategy implementation during ownership of buyout targets. The case examined what 
MCS were used and how. Furthermore, the factors that influenced the design and use of MCS 
were of notable interest. Distinctive motivation behind this research was to realize MCS of PE 
buyouts in a wider context involving parent organization and its customers as investors. Similar 
case research had not been conducted before. Thus, expansion of scope in aforementioned way 
raised the need to integrate additional and relevant theoretical insights into the framework. 
Systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde 2002) was chosen as the research method. 
Consequently, the research was defined by continuous and incremental matching between 
theory and empirical findings. Variety of different data sources were used to construct a 
longitudinal view of the fund strategy implementation. This approach shed light on the use of 
MCS practices during the whole ownership period until the final exit mode. The research was 
retrospective in a sense that the research took place during the final phase of the PE fund 
lifespan. This exceptional case illustrates how MCS were not designed and used in isolation 
from factors such as ownership, parent organization and capabilities. Such aspects have been 
of minor or even non-existent interest among earlier MCS research. This will be discussed in 
the first part identifying factors of MCS in PE context. Second, strategy implementation by 
MCS design has been covered in the second part. Third, emerging complementary insights to 
MCS, processes of strategy implementation, dynamic capabilities and their interconnections 
will be discussed.  
5.1 MCS in PE context 
Understanding MCS within the context of PE investing requires recognition of several 
interrelated elements that have direct implications on MCS. In this case, there were three major 
aspects that influenced MCS above the fund management. First, complex organizational setting 
requires expansion of scope to cover issues related to the parent company and investors as its 
customers. When the Cleantech fund represented the Asset management company, they had to 
consider risks related to much bigger reputational assets of the parent company. Second, the 
PE funds branch had an exceptional approach to PE investing that emphasized division of labor 
and the role of an empowered entrepreneur. In light of MCS, such philosophy implied 
interaction and had cautious approach to extensive formal control. Third, MCS that defined the 
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particular Cleantech fund under examination was used in early investor relations when capital 
was gained. What had been promised to investors constituted beliefs and boundary systems. 
Generally, beliefs and boundaries were defined by the imagined business opportunity. In turn, 
the abstract tendency of implementing beliefs and boundaries with diagnostic and interactive 
controls were derived from the fund philosophy. 
5.1.1 Implications from the organizational setting 
Judgment approach provides the big picture that captures the original source of capital and 
delegation of decision authority, which had their own impact on MCS practices. The Cleantech 
fund under examination was one of the many PE funds operated by the PE funds branch, a 
subsidiary of the parent Asset management company. The Cleantech fund was offered as one 
investment opportunity exclusively for the customers of the Asset management company. 
Thus, the customers were the source of capital, practicing judgment of the highest order in 
examination, either by owners (original judgment) or treasurers (derived judgment). 
This setting has strategic implications for the MCS practices of the Cleantech fund. Even 
though returns for the parent company and the customers were diversified among a variety of 
asset classes and even different PE funds, risks of the Cleantech fund were not completely 
isolated. In addition to directly financial perspectives, different risks related to fund 
management could be interpreted as strategic risks of the parent company. Failure in keeping 
promises to investors and fulfilling qualitative expectations to investors were a threat to the 
reputation of the PE funds branch and the parent Asset management company. Management 
practices and concern of risks within the Cleantech fund signaled competence and culture of 
the whole parent company. Thus, potential investors were informed explicitly and implicitly 
about the fund philosophy and management practices that were planned to be used in strategy 
implementation. These elements will be discussed further in the following two parts. 
5.1.2 Exceptional fund "philosophy" 
There was a distinctive approach to PE investing in the PE funds branch, a shared "philosophy" 
that was stated to combine "entrepreneurs, ideas and capital". Practically, it meant a dynamic 
division of labor. The fund brought capital and took responsibility of strategic issues and final 
decisions. In turn, entrepreneurs of the buyout target companies were expected to be reliable, 
independent, motivated, and insightful persons with provable business-specific capabilities. 
Thus, the fund philosophy can be understood as a people-oriented approach, where buyouts 
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aimed to integrate human capital as a focal element. The fund was based on an idea of an 
opportunity, but the buyout targets were treated as complementary sources for ideas and 
exploration. Comparable investor-specific, distinctive and yet abstract approaches to PE 
investing have not been identified in the existing PE literature reviewed in the framework. 
Having further MCS implications, influence of the fund philosophy relates to the parent 
company and proves the importance of realizing bigger organizational setting in PE and MCS 
research. 
MCS implications of the fund philosophy are tightly linked to capability approach. The fund 
philosophy was not apart from the organizational setting. This exceptional approach to PE 
investing emphasized interaction, empowerment and dynamic mentality, which required the 
use of multiple control systems aligned with these features. Practical implementation of such 
philosophy would not have been possible without capabilities suited with it. For example, 
extensive diagnostic systems and non-existence of interactive channels would have resulted in 
a conflict with the philosophy appreciating division of labor and operational independence. 
The parent company and the fund managers had their own history with gained experiences and 
capabilities. Thus, the philosophy reflected the capabilities and motivations available for the 
PE funds branch. 
5.1.3 MCS in investor relations 
Before discussing MCS variety identified in the Cleantech fund and its strategic activities, 
formulation and purpose of fund-specific MCS can be traced back to early investor relations. 
The imagined business opportunity was demonstrated to investors by explicitly stating beliefs 
systems that could guide further actions. They combined facts and vision. What had been 
promised to investors as beliefs systems, constituted the ultimate boundaries as well. 
Communicated beliefs systems were of abstract and strategic nature without many operational 
details. In turn, boundaries were specified with identified risks and suggested mechanisms to 
control them. Other elements of the LOC framework, diagnostic and interactive systems were 
not clearly identified from the early fund-specific materials for investors. At most, investors 
could only realize vague implications of other MCS practices from the abstract fund 
philosophy. The role of independent and reliable entrepreneurs as a focal element for the fund-
wide division of labor implied emphasis on interactive elements and avoidance of extensive 
diagnostic control. Altogether, beliefs systems were communicated to investors in an abstract 
form, whereas strategic boundary systems were specified even further. Suggested diagnostic 
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and interactive control systems were not introduced explicitly. However, their roles were 
somewhat implied in the fund philosophy. 
As being customers of the Asset management company, investors made their capital allocation 
decisions in the context of above mentioned information on MCS practices. When potential 
investors shared the same subjective perception of opportunity and its implementation with 
suggested controls, investments were made. On top of realizing opportunity in quantitative 
financial returns, qualitative aspects can be seen as an additional source of subjective value for 
an investor. Performance and compliance of values, such as domestic business development 
and environment-friendliness were controlled with beliefs and boundaries. Despite being 
vague, also the role of diagnostic and interactive controls were implied in form of fund 
philosophy. As part of investor relations, it had potential to influence alignment of judgment. 
Especially against the fact that approaches emphasizing entrepreneurs and combinations of 
capabilities in buyouts have not been widely recognized in conventional PE literature, the 
examined fund philosophy was distinctive. 
5.2 Strategic level of LOC 
Analysis of controls that were defined by the Cleantech fund management would resemble the 
core of any typical MCS research that focuses on strategy implementation by senior managers. 
However, the setting of a PE fund consisting of the general partner and the portfolio companies 
means that MCS implementation has to cross firm boundaries. Consequently, fund level 
controls and decisions have been defined as the strategic layer, whereas target companies 
represent the operational side. The following to parts will discuss theoretical matching of this 
exceptional setting and findings that show the Cleantech fund using unexpectedly rich variety 
of MCS for a growth business. 
5.2.1 MCS across firm boundaries 
This research on MCS expands scope that has conventionally focused on single organizations 
with senior management as the highest authority. In the Cleantech fund, there were target 
companies under the governance of the fund management (PE funds branch). Thus, 
implementation of strategy and the use of MCS crossed firm boundaries. Interactive board 
work appeared to be a focal mechanism in this task of controlling and enabling dynamic 
functioning of fund-wide division of labor. MCS that cross firm boundaries with board work 
demonstrate the idea of LOC in boardroom (Crombie & Geekie 2010). Apparently, in the case 
 Discussion 
 
 135  
 
of the Cleantech fund and its underlying philosophy, desired buyout entrepreneurs resembled 
a profile typical for stewardship theory than agency theory. Despite being used in boundary 
purposes also, the nature of interactive board work was strongly upside driven. 
The case illustrates a clear distinction between strategic and operational layers of MCS. 
Whereas Simons (1995, 128) briefly notes boundary systems having separate "strategic" and 
"business conduct" types, explicit layers of LOC have been conceptualized in the revised 
framework of Tessier & Otley (2012). Contemporary development of this MCS approach 
improves realization of the case and provides better tools in matching theory and empirical 
world. Issues that were strategic to the target companies were usually operational in point of 
view of the fund. Issues that were strategic to target companies were regarded as operational 
in the fund-wide strategy implementation. Notably, operational control mechanisms of the 
target companies were not actively designed by the fund management. Aligned with the fund 
philosophy and division of labor, target company managers were given discretion over their 
MCS details. 
5.2.2 Variety of MCS for a growth business 
Notable variety of different MCS were identified in the Cleantech fund. Simons (1995, 127-
128) suggests a path of MCS evolution over the life cycle of the firm. According to the idea, 
extensive use of different control systems would take place only after the firm has become 
large and mature. Interactive control systems are the last MCS in the path to be implemented. 
The business operated by the Cleantech fund was not mature, established or large at any 
measure from age and personnel size to revenue. However, despite being new and relatively 
small business, the Cleantech fund had multiple diverse MCS in use from the very start. 
Against the suggested path, interactive control systems were used from the start even more 
frequently and widely than identified diagnostic systems. In summary, the Cleantech fund as a 
growth business used MCS much in a way that is conventionally (Simons 1995, 128) seen as 
an orientation of a large and mature company. 
Derived from the fund philosophy, the fund management had a cautious approach towards 
extensive design and use of formal constraining controls. Shared understanding concerning 
beliefs and boundaries was generated frequently with interactive channels. Identified fund level 
use of diagnostic controls, such as financial performance measures appeared to be closely 
related to strategic boundaries. As examined in the case and analysis part, many examples of 
diagnostic and interactive controls were difficult to separate from other control systems. 
 Discussion 
 
 136  
 
Arguably, Simons' (1995) original LOC defines MCS with such emphasis on formality that it 
has limited power to match theory and empirical case. Tessier & Otley (2012) provide helpful 
insights that improve aforementioned matching. Their revised framework treats diagnostics 
and interaction as ways of using actual performance (beliefs) and compliance (boundary) 
controls. Hence, this case illustrates how the revised framework that puts original control levers 
into a causal hierarchy can clarify identification and analysis of MCS. 
5.3 Activities for strategy implementation 
The case of the Cleantech fund illustrates the importance of examining focal activities and 
capabilities of strategy implementation in MCS research. Frameworks that provide a static 
view of a MCS package may not sufficiently capture relevant activities for strategy 
implementation. Notably, poor attention to such activities may even prevent realizing aspects 
of existing MCS practices. The following part demonstrates this with evidence from the 
Cleantech fund. Additionally, the second part summarizes findings in light of dynamic 
capability approach. 
5.3.1 Activities for strategy implementation 
The strategic plan consisted of focal activities that were defined in the internal planning 
materials. Strategy implementation was not originally perceived as a composition of any MCS 
package. These processes, such as building new facilities and developing business constituted 
the explicit strategic roadmap. As apparent in the case and analysis part, they were often subject 
to multiple control systems that supported and controlled them. Furthermore, research of these 
activities revealed additional MCS on top those identified during examination of explicit 
documents, formal practices and interviews. Especially interview questions about MCS 
practices in terms of LOC did not sufficiently cover control of aforementioned activities. In 
turn, additional interview questions emerged during examination of other data sources. 
Additional findings that were not of formal and explicit nature are still relevant in light of MCS. 
The revised framework still recognizes the possibility that beliefs and boundary systems can 
be practiced interactively. Two examples demonstrate this. The fund management 
continuously encouraged the target companies to lean forward and proceed under uncertainty, 
instead of hesitating and spending time for being cautious. This encouraging beliefs system 
was used interactively. Furthermore, beliefs system concerning PE culture of exploring 
opportunities for inorganic growth. It was not communicated through formal symbols, but 
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shared in the fund setting culturally and clarified interactively. This distinction between 
cultural values and symbols has been clearly conceptualized in the MCS package framework 
of Malmi & Brown (2008). In sum, these findings demonstrate the materialized potential of 
triangulation to support discovery and improve matching, an exceptional benefit identified in 
the systematic combining literature (e.g. Dubois & Gadde 2002). 
5.3.2 Dynamic capabilities approach to strategy implementation 
Dynamic capability approach provides concepts to match dynamic aspects of strategy 
implementation. Capabilities of dynamic nature are those that enable integrating, building and 
reconfiguring resources. Identifying opportunities and fostering renewal are closely related to 
these capabilities. (Teece 2007; 2012) Such elements were identified in the case, having been 
supported and controlled by the use of MCS. Initial buyouts can be seen as a major act of 
integrating capabilities. Entrepreneurs of the target companies were involved in resource 
orchestration, which was supported with interactive and encouraging beliefs systems. By 
inviting external industry professionals into interactive board work of the advisory team, the 
fund management also integrated additional human capital in a dynamic way. The fund 
management built acquired target company capabilities further by improving their business 
understanding and expanding their technical orientation to more managerial directions. This 
process was longer and involved more MCS. Interactive systems were used to "challenge" and 
share insights. The fund management assigned open-ended questions to the entrepreneurs as 
CEOs. Managers were granted discretion over the use of MCS in their own organizations. They 
were challenged to continuously improve their mindset and organizations by sparking 
discussions on ad hoc uncertainties. In addition to interaction, business orientation was also 
supported by operational implications to performance (beliefs) and diagnostic systems that 
integrated customer perspective into management routines. 
Increased business understanding of the target company layer together with interactive MCS 
extended the scope of opportunity identification. Identification of opportunities for integrating 
and building resources was supported with such beliefs systems that encouraged to proceed 
under uncertainty and to explore potential acquisition targets as a PE investor. Already acquired 
capabilities of the target companies were involved in this exploration by using other MCS. For 
example, strategic boundaries defined division of labor, and interaction was used to share 
emerging insights. More operational asset reconfiguration was supported with diagnostic 
systems. If target companies identified any potentially strategic insights, they were encouraged 
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to share them interactively with the fund management. In summary, interactive control systems 
in the original sense of LOC served as the significant backbone for dynamic capabilities. 
However, other MCS, such as encouraging beliefs and diagnostic systems were occasionally 
involved as well. Discussion above shows yet another notion: there are many other potential 
aspects of dynamic capabilities to be applied in MCS research, on top of considerations of 
environmental velocity (McCarthy & Gordon 2010) introduced in the framework. 
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6 Conclusions and implications 
Earlier research on MCS in PE investing has been scarce in general. Within the frame, there is 
even more notable lack of comprehensive longitudinal single case studies with sensitivity to 
contingent factors. This research space motivated to examine how PE investors used MCS in 
strategy implementation during their ownership period of buyout targets. Empirical setting of 
a PE fund hierarchy provided a means to expand conventional scope of MCS research that has 
typically focused on single organizations with their senior managers as the highest authority of 
implementing MCS. This research aimed to capture wider setting of PE context and relevant 
factors that influenced MCS beyond the boundaries of a buyout company. The examined PE 
fund was not isolated from the parent Asset management company and its customers as 
investors and limited partners. Potential to contribute to MCS research on PE was not the only 
opportunity that this diverse case provided. PE context demonstrates how the use of MCS can 
cross firm boundaries through board work. Furthermore, the research enabled to improve 
general understanding of relations between MCS, ownership and capabilities. 
Existing body of research did not provide sufficient examples of similar cases with 
aforementioned approach to MCS. Sufficient research of this empirical scope required to 
develop theoretical framework of MCS and PE to fit with the context. Therefore, systematic 
combining was chosen as the research method. In order to match theory and practice of how 
PE investors used MCS during their ownership period, realizing capabilities, ownership and 
delegation of entrepreneurial judgment implied integration of additional elements into the 
theoretical framework. Consequently, examined empirical setting and the constructed 
theoretical framework formed an exceptional research on MCS and PE. The following parts 
will discuss limitations of the research as well as implications for theory, practice and further 
research. 
6.1 Theoretical conclusions and implications 
This research contributes to existing literature on MCS and PE by illustrating a longitudinal 
case of PE investor identifying opportunity, raising capital, acquiring target companies, 
planning a strategy and implementing it before selling assets further. Theoretically, in order to 
explain how PE investors use MCS during their ownership, it is worth to realize the wider 
setting. PE investing is often conducted by a branch of an organization that has customers as 
potential investors. PE investor organization has specific history, gained capabilities and 
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possibly a specialized approach to PE investing. All these factors have potential impact on 
MCS on top of actual intended strategy implementation by a specific PE fund management. 
This research illustrates that the concepts of MCS, capabilities approach and entrepreneurial 
judgment complement each other in matching theory and practice of an empirical case. 
Approach above appears to be aligned with Chenhall (2003) who notes that there is no unified 
contingency theory in MCS research, but amount of varying theories. Thus, the author suggests 
that in order to realize MCS in a specific context, composition of additional complementary 
theories may be required. Furthermore, aforementioned author referred to "contextual 
variables" of organization science. In this case, additional theoretical elements of the 
framework were integrated by the process of matching, inherent to systematic combining. 
However, additional approaches are not trivial and of high context-specificity. For example, 
issues of ownership and delegation of judgment are not just values of certain variables, but they 
can be seen as variables with high universal relevance. 
6.1.1 Implications for private equity literature 
Counter to popular views and expectations, exceptional examples of PE investors building 
synergies between buyout targets were found in the case. Barber & Goold (2007) classified PE 
ownership as making temporary investments and influencing them. Notably, the authors 
illustrated a matrix where temporary and flexible ownership types were explicitly regarded as 
incompatible with building synergies. Only in case of regarding the whole Cleantech fund as a 
single unit of analysis, then synergies were not built between any other comparable investment 
entities. However, regarding the Asset company and the Technology company as separate units 
of analysis, synergies between them were built during PE ownership. Thus, the case 
demonstrates how PE can take other forms than stereotypical LBO associations known for the 
use of constraining boundary and diagnostic controls. 
Wright (2001b) already suggests realizing variety of PE buyouts according to mindset and 
purpose. However, the conceptualization was not viable to result in a sufficient match between 
theory and practice. Aforementioned framework limits its scope to cover control and 
reconfigurations that the PE investor performs in a single target company. It does not specify 
sources of imagined opportunities and entrepreneurial plans. In the case, it was exceptionally 
the PE investment organization that originally imagined the business opportunity and started 
exploration of particular buyout companies with suitable entrepreneurs as complementary 
resources. Thus, none of the buyout types conceptualized by Wright (2001b) capture the nature 
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of examined buyouts. This finding has two implications. First, even when adopting the view 
of PE as an industry of versatile buyout types, existing conceptualizations can still constrain 
realization of existing variety. Second, recognized lack of suitable concepts among existing 
literature points the need for conceptual development. Leaning on judgment approach, 
investment is a capital allocation decision based on an imagined opportunity. PE investors and 
buyout targets can have different roles in delegation of this entrepreneurial judgment and 
resource orchestration. As the case demonstrates, some PE investors may originally imagine 
an opportunity and buy companies as complementary resources in order to implement an 
entrepreneurial plan. Especially dynamic capabilities such as integration, development and 
reconfiguration of resources capture essential aspects that can reveal substantial differences 
between buyouts. 
6.1.2 Implications for management control systems literature 
In point of view of general MCS literature, the revised framework of LOC (Tessier & Otley 
2012) appears to be useful in matching MCS, PE, ownership and capabilities approaches. 
Especially in PE context, target companies are typically governed by an investor with a higher 
order strategy. Distinction between strategic and operational layers clarifies division of labor 
in such cases. Furthermore, by defining diagnostic and interactive uses of actual beliefs and 
boundaries, the revised framework appeared useful in identifying causal relations between 
original levers of LOC. Furthermore, whereas the original LOC defines controls with formal 
aspects, the revised framework identifies more implicit uses. There were examples in the case 
where beliefs and boundary systems were used interactively by generating shared 
understanding. The original LOC does not pay sufficient attention to realizing these aspects of 
MCS, which appeared to be yet common in the case. Simons (1995, 127-128) suggests that 
extensive use of MCS and especially interactive controls takes place when organization reaches 
maturity. Notably, this research demonstrates that examined PE investors used multiple LOC 
and especially interactive control for growth companies. Concepts of MCS packages such as 
LOC and the revised framework guided research to identify static and easily identifiable 
control elements. However, sufficient attention to different strategic processes and dynamic 
capabilities increased accuracy to identify dimensions of MCS and match theory with empirical 
case. 
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6.1.3 Implications for ownership and capabilities approaches 
Common for judgment and capabilities approaches was the idea of capital heterogeneity. By 
matching aforementioned theoretical concepts with an empirical case, this research contributes 
to practical understanding of heterogeneous capital. The case illustrates that the use of MCS 
during ownership period was a manifestation of more abstract ownership competence. MCS 
was used by the fund management already when capital was raised. By communicating 
identified opportunity, the fund management explored investors with aligned judgment. Beliefs 
and boundary systems were mainly used to demonstrate the imagined opportunity to the 
investors with higher order judgment. The fund philosophy can be seen as a proxy for 
capabilities and the way strategy was intended to be implemented with diagnostic and 
interactive controls. Thus, MCS was used to align original judgment according to the imagined 
opportunity and implied derived judgment. However, it is worth to bear in mind that MCS are 
closely defined by intended strategy and the expected need to account for uncertainties. More 
theoretically, subjective nature of judgment approach implies that there cannot be one objective 
optimal strategy for a company. Furthermore, even against a shared strategy, there are only 
subjective perceptions of implementation. Thus, there can be multiple reasons to own a 
company for a certain time. This notion supports the view that PE industry can be seen as a 
variety of specialized potential value creators alongside with established industrial 
organizations. 
6.2 Managerial implications 
MCS of a single organization are not in isolation from ownership and resources. However, 
strength and the way these factors may influence MCS is strongly case-specific. Thus, 
especially when there are changes in ownership and resource base, implications on MCS should 
be updated. MCS in light of judgment approach would imply that consistent delegation of 
original judgment begins from board work, involving design of strategic MCS. Furthermore, 
organization needs a function that evaluates and if necessary, corrects alignment of strategic 
and operational layers of MCS. Inherent to PE industry, MCS may have a role already in the 
phase of raising capital for a specific fund. The case demonstrates how beliefs and boundary 
systems were used explicitly to define the imagined opportunity. Diagnostic and interactive 
systems were merely present indirectly, implying capabilities and a distinctive approach to PE. 
When stating beliefs and boundaries in similar case, it is worth to take into account that too 
strict design may impose constraints on unexpected strategic opportunities. On the other hand, 
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too unspecified and flexible boundaries may appear vague and unattractive for potential 
investors.  
The case shows an encouraging example of the use of interactive controls in a growth business. 
However, interactive controls typically requiring attention from higher management have risks 
in a PE setting. In the case, one accountable investment director served as a remedy between 
strategic an operational layers. Success of the fund orchestration was highly dependent on the 
readiness, motivation and energy of one person. Learning effect and tacit knowledge of an 
interactive investment director may also bring upside potential related to synergies. PE 
investors that manage different companies can observe and potentially identify complementary 
resources over their boundaries. While being often categorized as a branch of financial sector, 
this thesis implies such classifications too narrow to capture the potential of PE industry. It is 
true that PE industry cannot be defined solely as “entrepreneurial” (Klein et al. 2013), and 
typical LBOs with extensive financial engineering may continue to define the industry. 
However, this research points an exceptional opportunity of established PE as a channel for 
orchestrating resources and implementing more comprehensive entrepreneurial plans. 
6.3 Limitations of the research 
As a single case research conducted by systematic combining, empirical findings are 
contingent to many specific factors that radically limit generalizability. The use of MCS by a 
PE fund described in the case and analysis part cannot be generalized to define the whole PE 
or even cleantech investments. The research question emphasized the use of MCS in PE 
investments. Examination of factors with potential influence on MCS was limited to 
immediacy of the PE fund management. Worth noting is that the use of MCS in the Asset 
management company (including PE funds branch) was not prioritized and, thus, not examined 
comprehensively. Judgment approach and dynamic capabilities were complementary and 
secondary parts of the framework. Aligned with this proportion, they have relatively minor role 
in the case and analysis part. Empirical research and data gathering emphasized MCS. For 
example, subjective perceptions of the limited partners as investors have not been examined. 
Consequently, empirical evidence does not enable comprehensive analysis of subjective 
judgment and motivations of limited partners. 
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6.4 Ideas for further research 
Limitations of the research point potential ideas for further research. The use of MCS by a 
parent company to control PE funds activities would be a potential research space. Applying 
judgment approach, survey research could be conducted to identify subjective preferences of 
limited partner investors. Furthermore, these preferences can be linked to perceptions of 
different MCS. Such research would shed light on the question, if investors appreciate specified 
beliefs and boundaries of an investment target, or opportunistic flexibility, for example. 
Furthermore, some ideas for further research emerged from theory and empirical findings. As 
concluded earlier, further integration of capabilities approach into buyout literature could 
contribute to realizing and analyzing variety of PE industry. Furthermore, ownership and 
judgment approach could be integrated into MCS research more generally. Different settings 
of delegating judgment and their relation to MCS point a potential field of research. 
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